The Effects of Advertising on Mutual Fund Flows: Results from a New Database

We examine 471,000 mutual fund company advertisements from 1997 to 2003 to study advertising's effect on fund inflows. We find advertising is generally ineffective in attracting inflows but was more effective during the bear market despite smaller advertising expenditures during this time. The top 10 advertisers in our sample were most successful in capturing inflows. These companies generated inflows with mutual fund ads; other companies succeeded when advertising their other products and their brand image. Within a fund family, advertising affects the flagship fund differently than the other funds. Sample firms appeared unable to choose correctly between print and TV ads.     

Mutual Fund Flows and Cross‐Fund Learning within Families

We develop a model of performance evaluation and fund flows for mutual funds in a family. Family performance has two effects on a member fund's estimated skill and inflows: a positive common‐skill effect, and a negative correlated‐noise effect. The overall spillover can be either positive or negative, depending on the weight of common skill and correlation of noise in returns. Its absolute value increases with family size, and declines over time. The sensitivity of flows to a fund's own performance is affected accordingly. Empirical estimates of fund flow sensitivities show patterns consistent with rational cross‐fund learning within families.     

Fund Manager Allocation

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way.     

Why are some mutual funds closed to new investors?

Fund families typically claim that closing a fund protects the fund's superior performance by preventing it from growing too large to be managed efficiently. Even though funds with better performance and larger size are more likely to be closed, there is no evidence that closing a fund can indeed protect its performance. Instead, fund closing decisions are more likely to be motivated by spillover effects – by closing a star fund, the fund family signals its superior performance and also brings investors' attention and investments to other funds in the family. Some evidence exists to suggest that the closing strategy is effective in generating higher inflows into the rest of the family, at least in the short run.     

Mutual Fund Family Size and Mutual Fund Performance: The Role of Regulatory Changes

We examine whether the previously documented positive association between fund family size and fund performance is affected by significant regulatory changes (i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the Global Settlement (GS), and increased scrutiny as a result of trading scandals) that have occurred in the last decade. Using Reg FD as a beginning point for these structural changes, we find that, while fund family size was positively associated with fund performance in the period prior to the regulatory changes, this advantage is significantly weaker in the period subsequent to the regulatory changes. Consistent with the weakened advantage of fund family size in fund performance, we find that the greater stock‐picking skill of larger fund families, measured using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks they trade, also weakened subsequent to the regulatory changes. Using narrower event windows around the regulatory changes, we find that the previously documented superior return of large fund families was partly attributable to selective disclosure. We also find that fund families implicated in the trading scandals experienced a decline in their performance during the scandal period. Finally, we examine the role of large investment banks in providing an advantage to large fund families. Family size was positively associated with the extent to which funds traded in the same direction as forecast revisions by analysts from large investment banks in the period prior to Reg FD and the GS and this association declined significantly after the two regulatory events.     

Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families

I examine whether independent directors with multiple board affiliations (IDMAs) trade off the interests of one fund relative to another (fund favoritism) or whether they benefit fund shareholders by increasing the level of the board's expertise. Using a sample of mutual funds affiliated with the top 55 fund sponsors from 2002 to 2008, I find that the presence of IDMAs is negatively related to performance/resource shifting across funds within fund families. IDMAs appear to decrease fund fees, increase the return gap associated with the unobserved actions of fund managers, and facilitate the transfer of information across funds in a fund family.     

Tournaments in Mutual-Fund Families

We examine intrafirm competition in the mutual-fund industry.We test the hypothesis that fund managers within mutual-fundfamilies compete with each other in a tournament. Our empiricalstudy of the US equity mutual-fund market shows that they adjustthe risk they take depending on the relative position withintheir fund family. The direction of the adjustment depends onthe competitive situation in that family. Risk adjustments areparticularly pronounced among managers of funds with high expenseratios, which are managed by a single manager and which belongto large families.     

投资者的选择与基金溢出效应研究

本文着重研究基金家族中明星基金对家族内部基金的溢出效应,即明星基金对基金资金流入增长率的影响。对中国证券市场54家基金家族管理的281只开放式偏股型基金的面板分析发现,拥有明星基金能够显著提高基金家族的新基金流入的增长比例,但拥有垃圾基金并不能显著地减少;明星基金比非明星基金能给自身吸引来更多的新资金,明星基金家族的非明星基金与非明星家族的基金相比没能被笼罩在这样的优质光环下。     

Capacity effects and winner fund performance: the relevance and interactions of fund size and family characteristics

This study analyzes the existence of capacity effects and performance persistence for US equity mutual funds for the period from 1992 to 2007. We focus on winner funds and distinguish between capacity effects from both size and inflows and explore their interactions with two measures of family size, i.e. family total net assets under management (family TNA) and the number of funds at the family level (family breadth). The differentiation of family size allows us to analyze competing effects at the family level such as economies of scale as well as organizational complexity costs and conflicts of interest. Our empirical results confirm diseconomies of scale at the winner fund level and indicate that only small winner funds with low inflows significantly outperform the four-factor benchmark on a net return basis. There are no universal benefits from economies of scale at the family level, but our findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest in families offering a relatively large number of funds. Small winner funds in families offering a small number of funds significantly outperform while economies of scale only materialize among extremely small winner funds. We provide detailed robustness checks for our empirical results. Overall, simply conditioning on fund size is not sufficient for selecting future outperforming funds. The results indicate that fund investors may earn positive abnormal returns when combining information on fund size with information on fund flows or fund family affiliations in their asset allocation decisions.     

Performance Chasing,Fund Flows and Fund Size in Real Estate Mutual Funds

Real estate mutual funds have grown dramatically in number, size, scope and assets under management over the last 15 years, but little assessment is evident. The present study addresses this limitation. Better prior period performance is associated with greater shares of fund inflows for a period. Returns, however, are negatively associated with increased fund flows and fund size. Investors chase past performance limiting fund managers’ ability to optimize investments. Under normal market conditions, but departing from typical mutual fund performance, real estate mutual fund returns generally exceed relevant benchmarks on a before expenses basis and match benchmark returns after expenses. The ability to meet and exceed benchmark returns, however, does not hold during the financial crisis period. Overall, more established funds are shown to have higher returns while fund turnover is not a determinant of returns.     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.     

Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes (e.g., three percent per year) of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund's style characteristics differ from those of the value-weighted market portfolio. Power can be substantially improved, however, using event-study procedures that analyze a fund's stock trades. These procedures are feasible using time-series data sets on mutual fund portfolio holdings.     

Conflicting Family Values in Mutual Fund Families

We analyze the investment behavior of affiliated funds of mutual funds (AFoMFs), which are mutual funds that can only invest in other funds in the family, and are offered by most large families. Though never mentioned in any prospectus, we discover that AFoMFs provide an insurance pool against temporary liquidity shocks to other funds in the family. We show that, though the family benefits because funds can avoid fire sales, the cost of this insurance is borne by the investors in the AFoMFs. The paper thus uncovers some of the hidden complexities of fiduciary responsibility in mutual fund families.     

Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.     

Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows

We examine whether mutual funds change their names to take advantage of current hot investment styles, and what effects these name changes have on inflows to the funds, and to the funds' subsequent returns. We find that the year after a fund changes its name to reflect a current hot style, the fund experiences an average cumulative abnormal flow of 28%, with no improvement in performance. The increase in flows is similar across funds whose holdings match the style implied by their new name and those whose holdings do not, suggesting that investors are irrationally influenced by cosmetic effects.     

Capital inflows,equity issuance activity,and corporate investment

This paper uses issuance-level data to study how equity capital inflows that enter emerging market economies affect equity issuance and corporate investment. It shows that foreign inflows are strongly correlated with country-level issuance. The relation especially reflects the behavior of large firms. To identify supply-side shocks, capital inflows into each country are instrumented with exogenous changes in other countries’ attractiveness to foreign investors. Shifts in the supply of foreign capital are important drivers of increased equity inflows. Instrumented contemporaneous and lagged capital inflows lead large firms to raise new equity, which they use to fund investment.     

Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows

Examining a shock to the salience of the sustainability of the U.S. mutual fund market, we present causal evidence that investors marketwide value sustainability: being categorized as low sustainability resulted in net outflows of more than $12 billion while being categorized as high sustainability led to net inflows of more than $24 billion. Experimental evidence suggests that sustainability is viewed as positively predicting future performance, but we do not find evidence that high‐sustainability funds outperform low‐sustainability funds. The evidence is consistent with positive affect influencing expectations of sustainable fund performance and nonpecuniary motives influencing investment decisions.     

Fund manager conviction and investment performance

This paper examines the role conviction plays in asset management and its relationship with investment returns. We measure the strength of fund manager conviction through a fund's Active Share, i.e., the extent to which an investment portfolio differs from its benchmark index. First, we show fund manager conviction increases following both superior and, surprisingly, inferior past performance, and more so among solo-managed than team-managed funds. Second, and more importantly, we find an inverse-U relationship between conviction and subsequent performance. High levels of conviction proxied by high Active Share are associated with lower future returns and greater fund risk. Our study also illustrates an asymmetric investor reaction to fund manager conviction in the form of higher (lower) fund inflows rewarding good performance by high (low) conviction managers, but no pronounced penalties for poor performance, ceteris paribus.     

Attracting Flows by Attracting Big Clients

We explore a new channel for attracting inflows using a unique data set of corporate 401(k) retirement plans and their mutual fund family trustees. Families secure substantial inflows by being named trustee. We find that family trustees significantly overweight, and are reluctant to sell, their 401(k) client firm's stock. Trustee overweighting is more pronounced when the relationship is more valuable to the trustee family, and is concentrated in those funds receiving the greatest benefit from the inflows. We quantify this flow benefit and find that inclusion in the 401(k) plan has an economically and statistically large, positive effect on inflows.