税权划分对地方税制度效率的影响

税权包括税收立法权、执法权和征管权。税权划分问题实际上是一个国家税权在中央和地方政府间的安排问题。税权划分应该尊重一国的社会经济现实基础。分税制改革以后,我国对税收征管权在中央和地方政府间进行了重新的分配,地方政府获得了一定的税收征管权,但税收的立法权依旧归于中央。适应分税制改革的需要,地方政府应该获得适当的税收立法权。     

借鉴国外税务审计经验完善我国税务审计制度

税务审计作为强化税收征管的措施,日益受到各国重视。OECD成员国的税务当局均把提高税法遵从度作为其使命或长远目标,并制定相应的税务管理战略。本文在借鉴外国税务审计经验和成功做法的基础上,结合我国实际,提出构建制度化、规范化和信息化的税务审计体系应成为我国实施科学化、精细化税务管理,进一步提高税收征管质量和效率的重要内容。     

政府审计的内部控制改善功能能够增强制度反腐效果吗——基于中央企业控股上市公司的实证分析

进一步推进制度反腐,需要深入探索政府审计理论上的制度改善功能能否在实践中转化成制度反腐的治理效果.本文利用审计署实施的中央企业审计事件,采用双重差分模型探究政府审计的内部控制改善功能对国有企业高管显性腐败的治理作用,研究发现:与未经政府审计的企业相比,政府审计后的央企高管显性腐败发生的概率明显较低;进一步区分政府审计的内部控制改善程度后发现,政府审计对内部控制制度的改善效果越好,高管显性腐败发生概率越低,这表明政府审计的制度改善功能提高了反腐的效果,有助于我国现阶段制度反腐实践的落实和进一步发展.     

我国税收征管效率实证分析——基于修正的三阶段DEA方法

基于修正的三阶段DEA法,控制松弛量、外部环境和随机误差对效率测度的影响,评估1997～2007年我国30个省（含直辖市、自治区）的税收征管效率。实证结果显示：若忽略松弛量的影响,对外生环境变量和随机冲击因素不做控制,不仅会低估各地的税收征管效率,而且还会使估计出的不同地区的效率相对值发生偏误;我国税务部门的税收征管效率近年略微下降,但整体效率比较高,仍有10％的提升空间;经济开放程度越高、税务部门女职工比例越高,越有助于税务部门效率的提高。准确地评估分析税收征管效率,对于优化税收征管、增进税务部门的效率,以及解释“税收超GDP增长之谜”等都颇具价值。     

试论税收审计与税务稽查的关系

“税收审计”和“税务稽查”是两个截然不同的概念，它们有各自的含义和应用范围。在我国现有的税收征管体制和审计体制下，“税收审计”和“税条稽查”既有区别又有联系。     

注册会计师内部控制审计问题与对策

目前我国注册会计师内部控制审计能力还有所欠缺,审计业务实践和发展模式也存在不足,其原因在于企业管理者对内部控制重视程度不够、内部控制审计人员能力不足以及内部控制市场发展不完善,需要政府管理机构、企业管理者、行业协会、会计师事务所等主体共同努力,完善企业内部控制体系,提升注册会计师内部控制审计能力,规范和完善内部控制审计市场,以此提升我国注册会计师审计效能。     

信息化环境下税收征管模式的构建

近年来,我国税收信息化建设取得了重大进展。在经济发达地区,信息化建设已基本覆盖了税收征收管理和行政管理的各个领域。税收信息化所带来的业务重组、机构重组、不同层级机构事权的调整及其职能实现方式的转变,有效促进了税收征管水平和行政管理效率的提高。税收信息化建设对     

巧用数据比对开展税收征管审计

地方税收收入是地方财政收入的主要来源。审计机关对地税部门税收征管情况进行审计，对促进地税部门依法治税，不断提高税收征管质量，保障地方财政收入持续、稳定增长具有重要的意义。但由于税收工作政策性强、涉及面广、数据量大、资料零散，如何利用计算机技术从海量数据中审查数据疑点关系着审计工作的成败。     

审计监督、最终控制人性质与税收激进度

新兴市场中的企业税收激进活动受到所有权性质与政府干预等转轨因素的影响。审计以特有的监督与治理功能可以有效地制约企业税收激进活动。本文主要探讨审计作为公司外部治理机制对税收激进活动具有的监督作用,以及这种监督制约作用在不同企业所有权环境下的表现差异。通过对中国A股上市公司2002—2009年相关数据进行经验研究发现,高质量外部审计可以有效制约企业税收激进活动,且这种制约作用在不同最终控制人性质企业存在显著差异,基于政治关联程度与融资约束差异,审计监督对非国有企业税收激进活动的治理效率更突出。因此,提高审计对整体税收激进的监督效率,需要强化审计对国有企业税收活动的监管。     

制度环境、政府间竞争与地方审计机关效率——基于省际面板数据的空间计量分析

本文以1998-2009年我国内地30个省份的地方审计机关为样本,运用空间计量模型实证检验制度环境和政府间竞争等因素对地方审计机关效率的影响。研究发现,我国地方审计机关效率存在空间依赖;制度环境越完善的地区,地方审计机关纯技术效率越低,制度环境对国家审计治理功效发挥具有显著的替代效应;地方政府间竞争损害了地方审计机关效率,竞争越激烈,地方审计机关效率越低。研究还发现了审计人员相对工资、信息化水平等因素也对地方审计机关效率有显著影响。     

Corporate Tax Enforcement Externalities and the Banking Sector

We explore whether corporate tax enforcement can affect bank lending. Specifically, we hypothesize that tax enforcement efforts aimed at small and midsized enterprises (SME) can improve their information environments, which in turn could lead to increased bank commercial lending. Exploiting the regional structure employed by the IRS until 1999, we find that the corporate tax return audit probability for SMEs is associated with greater commercial lending growth for regionally focused banks. We find similar evidence when exploiting the IRS reorganization from a regional to federal system in 2000. Further results show that tax enforcement's impact on SME informational environments is at least partially responsible for this association: The impact of tax auditing on bank lending is stronger for banks facing greater informational disadvantages and in areas where SMEs face greater hold-up problems. Finally, we find that the tax audit rate is positively associated with loan portfolio quality, suggesting that tax enforcement can lead to better loan decisions. Our findings are consistent with the tax authority's mandate having important externalities on bank lending and SME access to capital, suggesting that the benefits to tax enforcement go beyond improving tax collection.     

关于农村审计性质的探讨

农村审计对于发展农村经济、巩固税费改革成果、减轻农民负担、加强社会主义新农村建设是十分必要的。但对于农村审计性质至今尚未形成统一的认识。农村审计不同于内部审计、政府审计和社会审计,农村审计应属于外部审计。     

税费替代:增值税减税、非税收入征管与企业投资

通过减税促进企业投资和提振宏观经济是近年来中国税收制度改革的重要目标,但减税政策的实际效果却存在争议。本文利用2009年增值税转型改革,研究了减税对地方政府税费收入和企业非税负担的影响,从税费替代的角度揭示非税负担变动如何影响企业固定资产投资。研究发现:(1)增值税转型在减税的同时提高了地方政府非税收入并加重了企业非税负担,地方财政收入受增值税转型冲击越大,企业非税负担上升越明显。(2)上述应主要体现在小型、微型和民营企业上,大中型、非民营企业的非税负担未发生明显变化。(3)非税负担上升会显著抑制小型、微型和民营企业的固定资产投资,促使小型微型和民营企业通过持有更多现金和减少流动性负债来应对税费负担不确定性。本文有助于理解减税政策对小型微型和民营企业非税负担的溢出效应及其影响,为通过减税降费促进投资和提振经济提供经验支撑。     

Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance

The existence of a private cost borne by audited taxpayers affects the tax enforcement policy. This is so because tax auditors will face now two sources of uncertainty, namely, the typical one associated with taxpayers’ income and that associated with the taxpayers’ idiosyncratic attitude towards tax compliance. Moreover, the inspection policy can be exposed to some randomness from the taxpayers’ viewpoint due to the uncertainty about the audit cost borne by the tax authority. In this paper we provide an unified framework to analyze the effects of all these sources of uncertainty in a model of tax compliance with strategic interaction between auditors and taxpayers. We show that more variance in the distribution of the taxpayers’ private cost of evading raises both tax compliance and the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers. The effects of the uncertainty about the audit cost faced by the tax authority are generally ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for the regressive (or progressive) bias of the effective tax system.     

美加两国税务稽查管理特色及对我国的启示

美国、加拿大两国同属发达国家,也都实行联邦制。先进的税务稽查制度对两国经济高速发展起到了明显的促进作用。本文以美国、加拿大两国为例,归纳和分析两国在税务稽查管理方面的先进经验和做法,以期对我国税务稽查的改革和完善有所裨益。     

出口退税管理的不对称信息分析

在出口退税管理过程中存在着两类委托代理关系:税务机关与外贸企业之间的委托代理关系及中央政府与税务机关之间的委托代理关系。由于不对称信息现象的存在使得出口退税管理难以达到优化状态。运用信息经济学的方法,通过对出口退税管理的行为主体间的委托代理关系分析,可以找到均衡条件下影响代理人最优努力水平的各项因素,从激励约束机制设计角度探讨如何改进现行出口退税管理,使其更好地发挥应有的作用。     

The effectiveness and valuation of political tax minimization

We find evidence suggesting that corporate lobbying for tax purposes over the period 1999–2009 is one method by which firms managed corporate taxes. Furthermore, tax management strategies employed by these politically active firms were valued by shareholders. Firms lobbying on tax issues have lower book effective taxes and greater discretionary permanent differences in GAAP and IRS taxable income. Investors place a premium on lobbying activities for tax purposes unless the firm already has a low effective tax rate or very high book-tax differences. We conclude that lobbying political officials is one method by which firms manage risks attendant an aggressive tax strategy.     

Politics and economics in weak and strong states

While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.     

税收征管目标及征纳双方的博弈分析

目前,国内关于税收征管目标有两种代表性观点:一是促使纳税人依法纳税;二是提高税收征管的质量和效率。应该同时吸收两种观点的合理要素,将税收征管目标重新界定为税收成本与税收流失总和最小化。在税收征纳关系中,税务机关追求的是税收成本与税收流失总和最小化,而纳税人追求的是自身利益最大化,两者根据对方的策略,做出符合各自目标的策略选择,从而形成税收征纳博弈关系。     

论税款缴纳义务履行顺位的确定——基于《税收征管法》第四十五条中的税收优先原则

我国《税收征管法》第四十五条设定了税收优先权:税务机关征收税款优先于无担保的普通债权及纳税人欠缴税款发生后以其财产设定抵押、质押或者财产被留置的担保债权,即纳税人的税款缴纳义务优先于普通债务给付义务和成立在后的附担保债务给付义务。一般情况下,和处于破产情形中税款缴纳义务的履行顺序问题侧重不同,故需从法际整合的角度出发,构建普适性的诸项给付义务的履行顺位规则。在法理上,通过确定不同税种欠缴税款发生时间,以厘清税款缴纳义务与附担保债务给付义务、职工薪酬给付义务之间的履行顺序。此外,税收与行政罚款、事业性收费、社保费用、滞纳金和附加税费等其他公法义务的履行顺位规则亦可结合税收公平原则和税收征管的立法意图进行构建。