全球经济失衡、主权财富基金与金融稳定

全球经济失衡导致新兴国家的外汇储备巨额盈余,以外汇储备为资金来源的主权财富基金在此背景下迅速崛起。主权财富基金在全球范围内的大规模跨境投资,给国际金融市场稳定带来了正负两方面的效应。为了维护全球金融市场的健康持续发展,必须从金融稳定的视角,构建主权财富基金的国际监管框架。     

经济安全与主权财富基金投资动向研究

主权财富基金具有支持国家发展战略、更好地在全球范围内优化配置资源的作用,其中并不排除要对全球战略性资产获得一定的控制权,以保障本国经济的安全和持续发展。然而,主权财富基金的一些冒进投资或战略性行为可能会影响东道国的经济安全。主权财富基金投资动向应基于对其设立国和东道国双方经济安全的认识,在两者间寻求合适的平衡点,以期实现投资双赢。     

2007年主权财富基金境外投资概况及2008年展望

本文概述2007年全球主权财富基金境外投资主体、投资形式、投资资金流向等出现的新特点;研判了2008年主权财富基金投资形势,认为2008年将是"主权财富基金年",提出我国应高度关注主权财富基金投资新动向及潜在投资风险。     

新常态下亚洲主权财富基金的投资布局与趋势研究

全球经济已步入增长速度放缓的“新常态”,对主权财富基金的运作构成严峻的挑战。为规避系统性风险和市场风险,亚洲主权财富基金的投资布局日益多元化并呈现新的趋势。本文以此为研究重点,追踪探讨亚洲主权财富基金投资布局的新动态。     

主权财富基金的投资行为与中国主权财富基金的投资策略

20世纪90年代以来全球宏观经济形势的好转使主权财富基金逐步兴起。近年来,以美欧为主的投资目的国对主权财富基金在本国的投资倍加限制,尽管这种限制因次贷危机有所缓和,但金融保护主义可能再次抬头。本文指出主权财富基金威胁论是无依据的,不同于欧美等投资目的国单纯的"限制"叫嚣,IMF主权财富基金投资准则从增强透明度方面为主权财富基金的投资行为提供的指引是有积极意义的,文章最后对我国主权财富基金的投资运作提出了对策建议。     

主权财富基金兴起的现状、影响及我国的发展对策

各种形式主权财富基金的悄然兴起,已经成为全球金融市场上一种新型的投资巨无霸。主权财富基金由主权国家力量控制,其投资动因与投资策略不同于一般的投资基金,对全球金融市场稳定的影响也更为复杂,因而引起了发达国家的密切关注。对于我国而言,设立主权财富基金是提高外汇储备使用效率的一种积极尝试,但要密切关注主权财富基金海外投资可能遭遇的政策风险,同时加强对流入我国的主权财富基金的监管。     

主权财富基金研究综述

主权财富基金已经成为金融危机之后影响世界经济、金融、政治的一个重要角色。本文对已有的主权财富基金研究成果进行了综述,主要关注四个方面:主权财富基金概况、主权财富基金投资策略、主权财富基金对世界经济的影响、我国主权财富基金存在的问题及解决之道。     

主权财富基金:一个文献综述

主权财富基金是国际金融中一个十分重要的新的研究领域。近年来,主权财富基金的研究取得了一些新的进展:在透明度方面,最新研究从透明度的评估标准、透明度对主权财富基金投资行为及偏好的影响等角度展开;在主权财富基金投资策略方面,研究更加细化,主要从地域、行业、文化等角度展开;在主权财富基金的影响方面,不仅研究了主权财富基金对全球金融稳定的影响,更加关注主权财富基金的微观影响,以及能否给目标企业创造价值、改善治理结构等。本文基于国内外对主权财富基金的最新研究成果,对主权财富基金的相关理论、观点和争议进行了梳理,并结合我国主权财富基金现状给出了建议。     

主权财富基金研究综述

主权财富基金已经成为金融危机之后影响世界经济、金融、政治的一个重要角色。本文对已有的主权财富基金研究成果进行了综述,主要关注四个方面：主权财富基金概况、主权财富基金投资策略、主权财富基金对世界经济的影响、我国主权财富基金存在的问题及解决之道。     

主权财富基金的发展与中国的应对策略

作为一种政府投资工具，主权财富基金以其强大的资金实力和神秘的政治背景，引起了世界的广泛关注，并对全球资源流动与投资结构带来了重大影响。本文分析了主权财富基金的发展概况，重点介绍了中国的主权财富基金——中投公司的设立背景、组织结构及在投资活动中暴露出的问题，全面综述了国外机构对主权财富基金的研究重点和争论的焦点，归纳了美国质疑中国主权财富基金发展的五个方面，并据此提出中国应积极参与全球主权财富基金行为规则的制定、努力完善中投公司治理结构、统筹海外投资战略等应对策略。     

Are related-party transactions beneficial or detrimental in emerging markets? New evidence of financial services agreements from China

This paper examines a new and underexplored form of related-party transactions in which Chinese listed companies sign financial services agreements with affiliated finance companies within the same business group. With FSAs, listed companies can readily finance through internal capital markets. However, some concerns controlling shareholders can use FSAs to embezzle funds of listed companies legitimately, thereby expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders. Using a staggered difference-in-differences model with fixed effects, we empirically examine the economic consequences of FSAs. We document that FSAs are detrimental to listed companies' market valuation and operating performance. This phenomenon mainly concentrates on companies without financial constraints and those with lower bankruptcy risks. Further analysis shows that sound corporate governance could inhibit the signing of FSAs ex-ante. This paper contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of related-party transactions in emerging markets. It also provides empirical support that the internal capital market of business groups in China is inefficient and offers controlling shareholders opportunities for tunneling.     

Asset sales in the mutual fund industry: Who gains?

We analyze gains from intercorporate sales of mutual fund subsidiaries, using mandated SEC disclosures to assess the performance of mutual funds transferred by these transactions. Sellers are financial conglomerates (banks) using equity-based deals to transfer poorly performing funds to highly focused asset management companies. The transferred funds experience significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns, efficiency, and asset growth. These improvements are closely correlated with the gains in wealth to buyers and sellers at deal announcements, indicating the market efficiently capitalizes expected performance improvements. Our results provide evidence that these transactions transfer assets to acquirers better able to manage them, generating gains for fund holders and buyer and seller shareholders.     

Do Excess Funds Make Financially Constrained Firms Better Off? Evidence from IPOs in China

Firms in transition economies often suffer financial constraints. In initial public offerings (IPOs), however, many newly listed Chinese firms raise funds in excess of what is originally planned. This paper examines whether these excess IPO funds are wasted on value-destroying spending or enable firms to take growth opportunities. After controlling for the endogeneity issue, we find that Chinese firms with excess IPO funds have better post-IPO operating performance, especially those with limited financing channels. In revealing the mechanism, we find that excess IPO fundraising alleviates financial constraints and reduces the cost of debt.     

Collateralizing liquidity

I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why financial assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects with nonobservable returns. Since holding these assets allows firms to raise these funds, investing firms value the asset more than noninvesting ones. When assets are less than perfectly liquid and investment opportunities are persistent, collateralized debt minimizes asset transfers from investing to noninvesting firms and thus is optimal. Frictions in asset markets lead to an illiquidity discount and a collateral premium, which increase with the asset’s illiquidity.     

Institutional spending policies: implications for future asset values and spending

University endowments, sovereign wealth funds, and foundations support spending. In this paper, we analyze how different spending policies affect future asset values and spending opportunities. We show that the covariance between the asset returns and the spending rate implied by the spending policy is important in this regard. Many of the spending policies used in practice aim at smoothing the spending level by letting current spending be a function of both current asset values and earlier spending levels. One feature of these types of spending policies is that the funds can be depleted. Depleted funds cannot support spending.     

全球流动性过剩中的对冲基金:国际新动向及其对中国的启示

全球流动性过剩导致全球金融资产激增,推动对冲基金业规模迅速膨胀。与此同时,对冲基金业也出现了新的变化:投资者结构出现了机构化趋势,并受到监管当局日趋严厉的监管。这也使得对冲基金的收益和风险水平有了新的变化,呈现稳中趋降的态势。全球经济失衡和流动性过剩也推动对冲基金在全球寻找套利和投机机会,对全球的金融稳定产生一定的影响。中国需要审慎地推进资本项目开放和加强对冲基金的监管。     

Leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility

We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called ‘value investing’, i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are approximately normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. This changes when the funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, which allows them to purchase more assets than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times, funds that use more leverage have higher profits, increasing their wealth and making them dominant in the market. However, if a downward price fluctuation occurs while one or more funds is fully leveraged, the resulting margin call causes them to sell into an already falling market, amplifying the downward price movement. If the funds hold large positions in the asset, this can cause substantial losses. This in turn leads to clustered volatility: before a crash, when the value funds are dominant, they damp volatility, and after the crash, when they suffer severe losses, volatility is high. This leads to power-law tails, which are both due to the leverage-induced crashes and due to the clustered volatility induced by the wealth dynamics. This is in contrast to previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility, which depended on ‘irrational behavior’, such as trend following. A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility becomes high, making these extreme fluctuations even worse.     

互联网货币基金的多重分形分析——以余额宝、理财通为例

本文以余额宝、理财通为互联网货币基金代表,选取两种货币基金2013-2020年的七日年化收益率数据为研究区间,运用多重分形分析方法研究了两种货币基金的对数日收益率序列的多标度行为及其之间的非线性动态关系。研究结果表明,余额宝与理财通两收益率序列均存在时变的多重分形特征。比较而言,理财通收益率序列的多重分形强度更大,而余额宝收益率序列的正持续性更强;在小波动下,两收益率序列均表现出强持续性;两种互联网货币基金之间的交互相关关系是正相关的,具有多重分形性。同时,讨论了新冠肺炎疫情对互联网货币基金收益率的影响,并针对当前新冠肺炎疫情形势,给出投资理财建议。     

行业变革下理财子公司的机遇和挑战

随着资管新规、理财新规和理财子公司管理办法的相继颁布,我国资产管理行业迎来了重大的变革。2019年,理财子公司陆续成立,作为一种全新的资产管理机构,因为体量大、背景深,对整个资管行业将产生重大影响。理财子公司成立于行业发生重大变革的背景下,面临着经营模式转型、关系重新定位、人才系统欠缺、能力亟待提升等方面的挑战,但同时也有市场机遇、政策机遇和转型机遇等方面的有利条件。面对行业变革带来的机遇和挑战,理财子公司要通过做好自身定位、打造合作共赢生态圈、建设三大体系、构筑四大基础,为客户和企业提供一站式金融服务。