高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系实证研究

以2014~2015制造业A股上市公司为研究对象,从显性薪酬和隐性薪酬两个视角深入探究高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系。研究发现,显性薪酬的重要组成成分货币薪酬和股权激励与盈余管理均显著正相关,即货币薪酬和股权激励会诱发高管进行盈余管理活动;在职消费能够减少高管盈余管理行为;在职消费与盈余管理存在U型相关。     

独立董事薪酬与公司治理效率

利用2003～2013年上市公司数据,本文基于独立董事薪酬视角对其治理效用的发挥进行了考察。研究发现,当独立董事的薪酬过低时,存在激励不足问题,不利于调动独立董事履职的积极性,由此造成公司高管变更与经营业绩间敏感性的降低及公司盈余管理程度的提高。与此相仿,当独立董事的薪酬过高时,存在激励过度问题,削弱了独立董事的独立性,也将导致较低的高管变更与经营业绩的敏感性及更高程度的公司盈余管理。最后,我们对独立董事薪酬影响其治理效用发挥的路径进行了考察,结果显示,过低的薪酬降低了独立董事参加董事会会议的意愿,而过高的薪酬造成独立董事更不会对董事会议案提出异议。     

浅谈高管激励与盈余管理的关系与对策

本文研究了高管薪酬激励与股权激励对盈余管理的关系,并对高管激励制度引起盈余管理行为的治理对策进行了初步探讨。治理基于高管激励引起的盈余管理应当优化高管绩效评价体系,引入多指标市场化评价体系,同时独立激励设计与考核机构,提高高管违规成本,以保障股东利益。     

浅谈高管激励与盈余管理的关系与对策

本文研究了高管薪酬激励与股权激励对盈余管理的关系,并对高管激励制度引起盈余管理行为的治理对策进行了初步探讨。治理基于高管激励引起的盈余管理应当优化高管绩效评价体系,引入多指标市场化评价体系,同时独立激励设计与考核机构,提高高管违规成本,以保障股东利益。     

有关股权激励与盈余管理关系的分析

本文以盈余管理为出发点,通过总结检验,针对关于股票薪酬和股票所有权的管理层股权激励政策与盈余管理国内外研究文献进行了综舍的回顾与评述。我们发现．管理层薪酬与股权激励计划相关度高的管理层更倾向于在未来出售股票．因此更乐于操纵盈余,以便提高股价。本研究的贡献在于系统地总结我国上市公司实施股权激励方案后对于公司盈余的影响,为监管层的进一步监管和上市公司推出更加完善的股权激励方案提供参考。     

建立薪酬激励机制会导致高管操纵利润吗？

我国上市公司从2002年开始普遍建立经理人员的绩效评价标准和薪酬激励约束机制，并以公司会计盈余作为业绩指标之一，这一重要机制的实施对我国上市公司管理层的影响受到国内外资本市场的广泛关注。本文手工收集上市公司年报中披露的高级管理人员的绩效评价标准和薪酬激励机制信息，研究建立与会计盈余挂钩的高管薪酬激励制度是否会导致高管操纵会计利润。研究发现，建立以会计盈余为绩效评价指标的薪酬激励没有使公司高管更为显著地操纵盈余，而且这类公司对管理层有更为完善的监管和制约机制。研究结果说明完善的监管和制约机制能约束管理层的盈余管理行为，但也挑战了国内现行的薪酬机制对管理层的实际激励作用。本文不仅为国内薪酬激励研究首次提供了高管绩效评价标准和薪酬激励机制建立的准确信息，而且为国际上薪酬激励负面效应的研究提供我国的经验证据。     

公司内部薪酬差距、股权集中度与盈余管理行为——基于高管团队内和高管与员工之间薪酬的比较分析

本文基于我国2002-2011年间上市公司的数据,研究了股权集中公司比较普遍的制度背景下,内部薪酬差距对盈余管理行为的影响。结果表明,内部薪酬差距越大,盈余管理程度越高,而且相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司,股权集中的公司这种效应更加明显。进一步研究表明,内部薪酬差距与盈余管理之间的正相关关系是股东动机和高管动机共同作用下的结果,并且管理层权力的存在加剧了盈余管理行为,即使在与同行业其他公司的高管的比较中高管所获得的薪酬更高,也不改变内部薪酬差距诱使其进行更多的盈余管理行为。本文研究意味着,就算内部薪酬差距真的能够提高公司业绩指标,也不表示它在其它治理问题中也符合最优契约理论预期,必须关注它的反向激励效应,使得理论研究与政策制定、社会共识更为一致。     

公司并购、盈余管理与高管薪酬变动

基于前人关于上市公司盈余管理影响因素的研究,本文分析了主并方公司并购收益与并购完成后公司盈余管理之间的关系,以及两者对高管货币性薪酬变动的相互作用机制。本文以2007至2012年我国沪深两市发生重大并购的A股上市公司为研究对象,结果发现:在并购完成后,并购收益与公司盈余管理存在负相关关系,即并购收益越低,公司在并购完成后第一、二年进行正向盈余管理的程度越高;盈余管理与并购收益对高管薪酬的变动存在着相互替代的关系,即并购收益越低,盈余管理对促进高管薪酬增长的影响越大。本文的研究丰富了盈余管理和公司并购的理论内涵,并为监管部门以及投资者的决策提供了重要的经验证据。     

独立董事薪酬对盈余管理影响的实证研究

本文以沪深两市2007-2011年的A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了独立董事薪酬对盈余管理的影响。结果表明:独立董事薪酬与盈余管理程度显著正相关;进一步地,相比负向盈余管理,独立董事薪酬对正向盈余管理的影响更加显著;最后,发现业绩好的公司中,独董薪酬与盈余管理程度的正相关关系更为显著。本研究表明,尽管独立董事在一定程度上有能力发现公司盈余管理行为,但因无法有效抑制该行为的发生,所以会要求不同程度的薪酬水平为其违规隐瞒行为寻求风险补偿,而高公司业绩给独立董事的高薪要求创造了条件,从而进一步加剧公司盈余管理水平。     

国有企业高管团队薪酬差距与盈余管理行为研究

报酬契约是盈余管理行为的重要动机。本文以2007-2010年间我国A股国有上市公司为样本,考察了国有企业高管团队薪酬差距对盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,从整体上看,高管团队薪酬差距与盈余管理行为显著负相关。进一步区分国有企业控制级层后发现,相对于地方国有企业,中央国有企业高管团队薪酬差距与盈余管理行为负相关关系更加显著。     

Auditors’ Economic Incentives and the Sensitivity of Managerial Pay to Accounting Performance

The use of managerial incentives to manage earnings in order to enhance accounting performance‐based compensation is greater when auditors have economic incentives to compromise their independence. Hence, compensation committees face more difficulties in determining cash compensation when earnings quality declines. This study investigates whether boards of directors can mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders by being aware of the opportunistic earnings management encouraged by auditors’ economic incentives and actively adjusting performance‐based compensation for the reduced earnings quality. To this end, it examines how auditors’ economic incentives affect the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance. The findings show a negative association between the client's economic importance to the auditor and the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance, with this association more pronounced for firms that opportunistically inflate earnings, suggesting that boards mitigate agency problems by actively intervening to modify performance‐based compensation schemes for the reduced earnings quality. Additional analyses show that board effectiveness in determining compensation depends on its characteristics. These results suggest the urgent need to oblige companies to establish compensation committees, particularly in countries that lack such a mandatory requirement or where few companies have such committees.     

Accruals quality and the incentive contracting role of earnings

This paper investigates the association between accruals quality and the usefulness of accounting earnings in incentive contracting. Accruals quality, which measures the precision with which accruals predict future cash flows, has two potential opposing effects on the noise in earnings as a measure of managerial performance. Specifically, higher quality accruals should decrease the deviations of earnings from future cash flows and increase the sensitivity of earnings to cash flows that are not attributable to managerial actions. My evidence indicates that better accruals quality is associated with a higher weight on earnings in compensation contracts, which suggests that accruals quality overall reduces the noise in earnings. I also find that the positive association between accruals quality and the weight on earnings is mainly driven by innate accruals quality rather than discretionary accruals quality. Therefore, accrual errors resulting from the volatility of the operating environment are a primary source of noise in earnings considered by compensation committees.     

董事会监管下的高管变更对盈余管理的影响研究

以我国上市公司为样本,对董事会监管下高管变更带来的盈余管理行为进行研究。实证结果表明:高管变更当年存在调减盈余行为;董事会监管程度与高管变更的概率有相关关系;董事会监管能抑制高管变更时的盈余管理行为。因此,我国上市公司应注重董事会制度建设,强化董事会监管作用,以规范盈余管理行为,促进我国上市公司健康、有效的发展。     

Stock liquidity and managerial short-termism

We examine whether stock liquidity exacerbates or mitigates managerial short-termism. Utilizing earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism, we establish three major findings. First, firms with liquid stocks engage in less accrual-based and real earnings management. Second, the effect of stock liquidity on earnings management is amplified for firms with high levels of managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. Third, the positive association between the intensity of earnings management and firm cost of capital is evident only for firms with low stock liquidity. Our findings are consistent with the threat of blockholder exit as the main governance channel through which stock liquidity discourages opportunistic earnings management and mitigates managerial short-termism.     

Equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting

To investigate how the possibility of earnings manipulation affects managerial compensation contracts, we study a two-period agency setting in which a firm’s manager can engage in window-dressing activities to manipulate reported accounting earnings. Earnings manipulation boosts the reported earnings in one period at the expense of the reported earnings in the other period. We find that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity may increase and expected managerial compensation may decrease as the manager’s cost of earnings management decreases. When the manager is privately informed about the payoff of an investment project to the firm, we identify plausible conditions under which prohibiting earnings management can result in a less efficient investment decision for the firm and more rents for the manager.     

Incentives, Discretion, and Asset Valuation in Closed–End Mutual Funds

This paper studies earnings management using 363 closed–end mutual fund firm–years of data. Closed–end fund assets consist of unrestricted and restricted securities, and realized and unrealized income. While unrestricted securities are not subject to earnings management, restricted security values are largely discretionary. Managerial valuation of restricted securities is modeled as contingent on unrestricted returns relative to a performance benchmark. Four unrestricted performance regions are identified. Known multi–period compensation incentives become the basis for hypothesizing earnings management behaviors in the regions in the form of restricted security valuation. Across several benchmarks, the results are consistent with multi–period maximization rather than simpler single–period compensation maximization or income smoothing. Funds with extreme unrestricted performance show relatively larger income–decreasing earnings management, and funds with slightly–below benchmark returns show relatively larger income–increasing earnings management than those slightly above. These results clarify the relationship between complex earnings management behavior and managerial incentives.     

高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究

本文在对国内外文献进行综评的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,分别选择会计绩效指标(ROA、ROE)、市场指标(Tobinq)以及股东财富指标(OF)构建模型,对我国上市公司高层管理当局的薪酬激励、特别是现金薪酬与上市公司业绩之间的相关性进行了经验研究,并减弱了相关的多重共线性现象。我们发现,高层管理当局薪酬与公司以及股东财富前后两期的变化,均成正相关关系;而与本期Tobinq的变化成负相关关系,与上期Tobinq的变化成正相关关系。公司的董事会或薪酬委员会在决定高层管理当局薪酬时青睐于会计盈余指标的变化更甚于信任股东财富指标。     

产品市场竞争、管理层权力与薪酬辩护

以2011~2014年我国 A 股上市公司为研究样本,基于薪酬辩护的视角,考察管理层权力对薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响以及产品市场竞争的监督约束作用。实证结果表明,企业高管利用手中权力获取超额薪酬、谋取私利的同时,会通过提升薪酬—业绩敏感性为自身薪酬进行辩护,形成薪酬契约合理有效的表象;产品市场竞争能够显著抑制企业高管的薪酬辩护行为,降低管理层权力对薪酬契约的影响和扭曲。     

管理者过度自信与企业盈余管理行为研究

本文以我国上市公司作为研究样本,依据行为金融理论,从管理者过度自信角度研究了企业盈余管理行为。研究发现,管理者过度自信既会导致公司正向盈余管理行为的发生,也会导致负向盈余管理行为的发生。进一步研究发现,女性比例越高的管理团队越有可能进行盈余管理,管理团队的年龄越小越有可能进行正向盈余管理,管理团队学历越低越有可能进行负向盈余管理行为。本文对研究公司选择会计政策行为,治理公司盈余管理行为乃至完善公司治理结构均具有一定的启示。     

Managerial myopia and the unintended real consequences of conditional conservatism

We examine whether the demand for conditional conservatism produces unintended real consequences that are exacerbated by managerial incentives to report higher earnings. We document a robust positive association between conditional conservatism and real earnings management (REM), particularly for firms whose CEOs face greater compensation incentives and capital market incentives to report higher earnings. Using mediation analyses, we find that conservatism has a negative indirect relation with future returns via REM over the next 1–3 years. In additional tests, we find that the relation between conservatism and REM is attenuated for firms with higher debt-to-equity, which suggests that debtholders moderate the negative relation between conditional conservative reporting and REM. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to its monitoring benefit, conditional conservatism can exacerbate managerial myopia, resulting in negative consequences for future firm value.