我国上市公司自愿性信息披露影响因素研究

影响上市公司实施自愿性信息披露的因素有很多。本文通过实证分析,验证上市公司规模、财务杠杆、盈利能力、股权结构、所处地区、实际控制人性质、所聘审计单位是否对上市公司自愿性信息披露程度具有影响作用。针对这些影响因素,提出提高我国上市公司自愿性信息披露水平的建议。     

我国上市公司内部控制信息自愿性披露动机的研究综述

随着《企业内部控制基本规范》的出台,企业内部控制信息的披露开始成为上市公司年度报告披露中的一部分。越来越多的公司自愿选择披露其内部控制信息,其背后的动机是什么呢?本文对国内近几年研究上市公司内部控制信息自愿性披露的文章进行了梳理,以期能够找出上市公司选择进行自愿性内部控制信息披露的真正原因。     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及对策

为了增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和有效性,本文通过研究自愿性信息披露的外部条件,阐述了上市公司自愿性信息披露的含义、背景、意义以及现状分析,得出了提升上市公司自愿性信息披露的外部性策略和方法,得出了关于上市公司自愿性信息披露相关制度的建议。     

上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度绩效的实证检验

我国上市公司终极控股股东利用对上市公司的控制权,普遍通过非公平关联交易、违规信息披露、市场操纵等方式获取控制权私人收益,非法侵害中小投资者的合法权益。从上市公司股权结构等角度,通过逻辑回归分析,分别对股权分置改革时期、后股权分置时期中国上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度的绩效进行实证检验,这为制定保护中小投资者权益的政策提供了实证依据。     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及对策

为了增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和有效性,本文通过研究自愿性信息披露的外部条件,阐述了上市公司自愿性信息披露的含义、背景、意义以及现状分析,得出了提升上市公司自愿性信息披露的外部性策略和方法,得出了关于上市公司自愿性信息披露相关制度的建议。     

市场化进程、终极控制人现金流权与控制权分离和盈余管理

本文以2001—2005年由地方政府和民营资本最终控制的A股上市公司为研究样本,研究了终极控制人现金流权与控制权的分离程度与上市公司盈余管理的关系,并进一步检验了这种关系是否会受到各地区市场化进程的影响。研究发现：终极控制人现金流权与控制权的分离显著影响上市公司盈余管理的程度,但这种关系会受到市场化进程的制约。研究还发现,当终极控制人对上市公司存在现金流权与控制权分离的情况下,上市公司往往可能不是利用操控性应计来进行盈余管理,而是利用非经常性损益的手段进行盈余管理。     

上市公司自愿性披露会计信息的问题分析

自愿性信息披露是对基本信息披露制度强制性信息披露的补充和深化,对提高公司信息披露质量,展示公司未来和真正价值具有重要作用。本文试图为上市公司自愿性披露信息行为动因给出理论解释,并分析了其现状和产生原因的基础上,提出强化自愿性披露的建议,为上市公司自愿性披露的研究提供一些参考。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露对股票流动性影响的实证研究

以2007～2008年沪深两市A股上市公司年报作为研究基础,运用描述性统计和两阶最小二乘法分析了自愿性信息披露对上市公司股票流动性的影响。验证了自愿性信息披露会促进上市公司股票的流动性,同时发现自愿性披露信息中财务方面信息对上市公司股票流动性的提高作用最大。     

上市公司会计信息质量与自愿性披露关系的实证研究

本文对我国上市公司会计信息质量与自愿性披露程度进行了实证分析,研究发现,我国上市公司自愿性披露整体水平不高,存在较为严重的盈余管理现象,会计信息质量与自愿性披露程度没有相关性,但公司规模却与自愿性披露程度呈现显著正相关。     

市场化进程、两权分离与资本结构选择——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国民营上市公司作为研究对象,探讨了终极控制人控制权和现金流权的分离度对资本结构选择的影响以及如何受市场化程度的影响。研究结果表明:终极控制权与现金流权分离程度越大,终极控制人的掠夺和掏空动机越强烈,他们会选择较低的资本结构,但市场化进程的提高将抑制终极控制人对负债水平的过低选择,从而使负债的利益转移限制效应和破产威胁效应得以有效发挥。     

Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity

This paper examines the effect of controlling shareholders on stock price synchronicity by focusing on two salient corporate governance features in a concentrated ownership setting, namely, ultimate cash flow rights and the separation of voting and cash flow rights (i.e., excess control). Using a unique dataset of 654 French listed firms spanning 1998–2007, this study provides evidence that stock price synchronicity increases with excess control, supporting the argument that controlling shareholders tend to disclose less firm-specific information to conceal opportunistic practices. Additionally, this study shows that firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes, consistent with the conjecture that controlling shareholders are more likely to hoard bad information when their control rights exceed their cash flow rights. Another important finding is that firms’ stock prices are less synchronous and less likely to crash when controlling shareholders own a large fraction of cash flow rights. This is consistent with the argument that controlling shareholders have less incentive to adopt poor disclosure policies and to accumulate bad news, since high cash flow ownership aligns their interests with those of minority investors.     

Corporate value,ultimate control and law protection for investors in Western Europe

This paper analyses both ultimate ownership and investors’ protection in determining corporate value for a sample of firms from 12 Western European countries. The analysis is based on two data sets which consider the presence of an ultimate controller, as well as, the level of separation of cash flow rights and voting rights in the controlling stake. It examines the effect of the rights given to both creditors and shareholders, and the degree to which these rights are enforced with a measure of the efficiency of the judicial system. The main findings suggest that it is likely that firms tend to adjust their ultimate controlling structure to overcome the value-decreasing risks associated with country laws that offer low investors’ protection. This information is a valuable tool for managers in order to strategically adapt institutional corporate governance practices.     

Why are shareholders not paid to give up their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy

Dual-class share unifications have typically been argued to be beneficial for voting shareholders, who are usually compensated for the loss of their superior voting privileges. However, no covenants exist that make this compensation mandatory for voting shareholders. In this paper, we examine a subset of dual class share unifications from Italy where, in the main, voting shareholders are not offered any compensation in lieu of the loss of their superior voting rights. We present a simple model describing the conditions under which the controlling voting shareholder will choose not to offer compensation to minority voting shareholders as part of a share unification. Our empirical results support the model predictions.     

中小股东一致行动改善了公司治理水平吗?

在资本市场推行注册制改革的背景下,维护中小股东利益成为保障注册制改革效果,助力资本市场平稳运行的关键。本文实证考察了作为非实际控制人的中小股东如何利用一致行动参与公司治理。研究表明,中小股东通过一致行动形成投票表决权的集中配置,进而制衡大股东,从而改善公司绩效。在治理机制方面,中小股东一致行动对绩效的改善,一方面源于其帮助中小股东在股东大会上提出更多代表自身利益的议案,在董事会中委派更多董事,在决策过程中形成更大影响力;另一方面则源于其帮助中小股东实现对大股东的制衡和对经理人的监督,从而抑制实际控制人的“隧道挖掘”行为,缓解内部人控制问题。进一步研究发现,中小股东一致行动的作用效果受到一致行动人的持股比例、形成动机、上市公司的投票表决制度以及一致行动人类型的影响。     

Does cross-listing facilitate changes in corporate ownership and control?

This paper examines whether controlling shareholders of foreign firms use a US cross-listing to facilitate changes in ownership and control. Prior to listing, about three quarters of the firms in our sample have a controlling shareholder. After listing, about half of the controlling shareholders’ voting rights decrease, with an average decrease of 24% points that differs significantly from that of the controlling shareholders of benchmark firms that do not cross-list. Large decreases in voting rights are associated with controlling shareholder characteristics, domestic market constraints, and better stock market performance and liquidity. In addition, there is control change in 22% of the firms. Controlling shareholders are more likely to sell control, and are more likely to do so to a foreign buyer, than controlling shareholders of benchmark firms. The results suggest that controlling shareholders who want to sell shares or their control stake can use a US cross-listing to decrease the cost of transferring ownership.     

Controlling shareholders’ opportunistic use of share repurchases

This study examines how share repurchase and dividend policies are influenced by controlling shareholders in an emerging market. We maintain that the controlling shareholders can utilize share repurchase opportunistically, particularly when they exercise voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights. The evidence of Korean firms suggests that the wedge between the voting rights and cash-flow rights positively affects share repurchases but negatively affects cash dividends. We also find that share repurchases are not always supported by operating performances. The results indicate that firms may utilize share repurchases as a means to pursue private benefits of the controlling shareholders. We also document that share repurchases do not substitute for cash dividends, suggesting that share repurchases are not genuine distributions. Furthermore, we find that the wedge of share repurchases reduces firm value. Overall, our results indicate that the controlling shareholders of Korean firms use share repurchases opportunistically rather than strategically.     

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

Abstract:  Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders.     

科创板差异化表决权安排制度略论

我国科创板引入了差异化表决权安排制度,其内涵丰富,包括但不限于双重股权结构。公司自治理念、股东平等内涵的演变及效率价值为差异化表决权安排的设定和存续提供了充足的理论基础。通过分析评价我国相关文件和法律法规对差异化表决权的时间要求、企业准入模式与市值要求、持股主体资格、特别表决权倍数、自动转换机制、信息披露要求、控股股东的信义义务、监督模式、中小股东利益保障和司法保障的规定,提出相关建议,以期进一步完善差异化表决权安排制度。     

控制权、现金流权与资本结构——一项基于我国民营上市公司面板数据的实证分析

本文利用我国91家民营上市公司2003-2005年面板数据检验终极股东控制与资本结构的关系。研究发现,终极股东控制权一致性与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著正相关,终极股东控制权/现金流权偏离度与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著负相关。这表明资本结构决策本身存在代理问题,终极股东一方面积极利用股权融资的非稀释效应,另一方面对负债的破产威胁效应和利益转移限制效应作出了壕沟防守反应。     

终极控制股东、金字塔结构与会计稳健性

我国股权大都集中在大股东的手中,终极控制股东普遍采用金字塔股权结构的方式对底层公司实施控制并影响会计稳健性。基于Basu模型,采用2012-2017年深沪两市A股上市公司数据,对终极控制股东产权性质、金字塔股权结构对上市公司会计稳健性进行研究。结果表明：与终极控制股东为非国有的上市公司相比,终极控制股东为国有的上市公司会计稳健性更高;金字塔层级增加导致会计稳健性降低;金字塔层级的增加对于国有控股企业和非国有控股企业会计稳健性的影响存在差异,国有终极控制上市公司的会计稳健性更高。