Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge

This paper determines optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy in which firms pay limited attention to aggregate variables. Firms’ inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. This is shown to have strong implications for optimal nominal demand policy. In particular, if firms’ prices are strategic complements and economic shocks display little persistence, monetary policy has strong real effects, making it optimal to stabilize the output gap. Weak complementarities or sufficient shock persistence, however, cause price level stabilization to become increasingly optimal. With persistent shocks, optimal monetary policy shifts from output gap stabilization in initial periods following the shock to price level stabilization in later periods, potentially rationalizing the medium-term approach to price stability adopted by some central banks.     

Exact Utilities under Alternative Monetary Rules in a Simple Macro Model with Optimizing Agents

We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the representative agent. Fully optimal policy can attain the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Fully optimal policy is contrasted with both naive and sophisticated simple rules that involve, respectively, complete stabilization and optimal stabilization of one variable or a combination two variables. With wage contracts, outcomes depend crucially on whether there are also price contracts. For example, if labor supply is relatively inelastic, for productivity shocks, nominal income stabilization yields higher welfare when there are no price contracts. However, with price contracts, outcomes are independent of whether there are wage contracts, except, of course, for the nominal wage.     

WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

交易型操纵行为影响证券价格的微观机制研究--以连续交易、虚假申报、对倒操纵典型案例为切入点

中国证监会行政处罚的典型案例显示,交易型操纵行为包括建仓持仓、通过不正当交易行为影响证券价格、反向交易获利或谋取其他利益等三个步骤。在连续交易操纵中,行为人大量以高于市场卖一价的价格申报并高比例成交,影响证券交易价格。虚假申报操纵是通过不以成交为目的频繁或大额申报、撤单,制造买盘汹涌的假象,误导市场投资者跟风交易,从而影响证券交易价格。对倒操纵是利用资金优势或持股优势,通过自买自卖放大证券交易量并拉抬证券价格。因此,交易型操纵实质上是通过不正当交易行为,在特定期间内制造虚假证券供求关系,从而扭曲证券市场价格。     

Tax distortions and the case for price stability

We investigate the case for price stability in the general version of the New Keynesian (NNS) model with capital and several shocks. The model includes, in addition to the standard imperfect competition and monetary frictions, a non-trivial, endogenous tax distortion. We find that the case for perfect price stability is not significantly weakened. Optimal policy tolerates a small amount of output gap and price variability by reacting less strongly to supply and fiscal shocks in comparison to a policy that aims at perfect price stabilization.     

投资者注意力、应计误定价与盈余操纵

基于应计误定价视角,以投资者认知特征分析为切入点,本文检验了投资者注意力、应计误定价及盈余操纵间的关系。研究发现:(1)投资者注意力具有认知效应,投资者注意力的提高能够显著提高其对盈余构成信息的认知效率,并降低市场中投资者对应计信息的定价高估;(2)投资者注意力具有治理效应,即投资者对股票的充分注意能够显著降低管理层主观的盈余操纵行为。综合而言,投资者注意力具有"认知效应"和"治理效应",投资者注意力调节了投资者的认知效率并提升了对会计盈余构成信息的定价效率,进一步影响了管理层主观的盈余操纵行为。深化投资者注意力的研究具有很高的理论价值和现实意义。     

Monetary policy and aggregate volatility

Discretionary conduct of monetary stabilization policy can increase real and nominal aggregate volatility by arbitrary amounts when firms pay limited attention to aggregate shocks. A conservative central banker with stronger preference for price stability eliminates the commitment problem, thereby reduces output and price volatility and gives rise to a policy-induced ‘Great Moderation’. Increased focus on price stability facilitates firms’ information processing and aligns their expectations better with policy decisions. This ‘coordination effect’ reduces aggregate real and nominal volatility. Consistent with empirical evidence, the moderation manifests itself through reduced residual variance in vector autoregressions (VARs) involving macroeconomic variables.     

Laddering IPO shares

Regulators, investors, and the financial media argue that underwriters tie Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocations to investor post-listing purchases in the issuer shares. Using unique data from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) I investigate if these tie-in agreements are driven by price stabilization (reducing price falls below the offer price) or laddering (inflating prices above the offer price). I find that both stabilizing and laddering investors are rewarded with increased allocations for their service. However, only laddering investors increase allocations in very oversubscribed future issues. Secondary investors also lose from falling returns following laddering. I conclude that underwriters use both price stabilization and laddering across different IPOs. However, the rewards for cooperating investors and the economic consequences for secondary investors are much greater following laddering.     

Evidence on Price Stabilization and Underpricing in Early IPO Returns

Using data on 560 firm-commitment initial public offerings of common stock for the 1982–1983 period, we find that the cross-sectional distribution of one-day returns is modeled better as a mixture of two distributions, with the parameter estimates of one distribution being consistent with underpricing and the other with price stabilization. Further, the evidence that early IPO returns are drawn from a mixture distribution persists for at least four weeks. The implications of these results for the analysis of IPO returns are illustrated by examining the influence of a measure of ex ante price uncertainty on IPO pricing.     

Price discovery in auction markets: a look inside the black box

Opening mechanisms play a crucial role in information aggregationfollowing the overnight nontrading period. This article examinesthe process of price discovery at the New York Stock Exchangesingle-price opening auction. We develop a theoretical modelto explain the determinants of the opening price and test themodel using order-level data. We show that the presence of designateddealers facilitates price discovery relative to a fully automatedcall auction market. This is consistent with specialists extractinginformation from observing the evolution of the limit orderbook. In addition, the specialist's opening trade reflects noninformationalfactors such as price stabilization requirements.     

中国房地产价格波动与货币政策：一个实证研究

本文采用家庭还款额的支付性指数HAI来测算中国房地产价格的合理性，发现中国房地产市场自1998年以来就存在严重的泡沫；通过对央行货币政策操作目标与房地产价格波动做回归分析，得出央行货币政策对房地产价格波动作出显著响应；建立结构向量自回归模型研究房地产价格波动在给定货币政策准则下对产出缺口和价格稳定的）中击，得出近年来房地产价格波动对价格稳定冲击比较大，对产出冲击比较小的结论；最后提出货币当局应针对房地产价格波动制定最优货币政策准则。     

Patterns of Transition from Plan to Market

The transition from a planned economy to a market economy involvesa complex process of institutional, structural, and behavioralchange. This article develops an index of economic liberalizationand analyzes its interaction with growth and inflation, usingdata from twenty-six transition countries for 1989–94.The article reveals two paradoxes of transition. First, theattempt to maintain output by subsidizing enterprises resultsin larger declines in output than occur under a policy of reducingsubsidies. Second, price liberalization results in lower inflationthan occurs under a policy of continued price controls. Strong common patterns exist among countries at similar stagesof reform. The common legacy and the associated changes thatresult from initial disruptions in the socialist economic coordinatingmechanisms and subsequent liberalization measures go a longway toward explaining the transition experience. Because stronginteractions between liberalization and stabilization are likely,stabilization becomes a priority for the resumption of growth.     

Are IPOs Really Underpriced?

While IPOs have been underpriced by more than 10% during thepast two decades, we find that in a sample of more than 2,000IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO was significantly overvaluedat the offer price relative to valuations based on industrypeer price multiples. This overvaluation ranges from 14% to50% depending on the peer matching criteria. Cross-sectionalregressions show that "overvalued" IPOs provide high first-dayreturns, but low long-run risk-adjusted returns. These overvaluedIPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and higher analystgrowth forecasts than "undervalued" IPOs. Ex post, the projectedhigh growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize, while theirprofitability declines from pre-IPO levels. These results suggestIPO investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts andpay insufficient attention to profitability in valuing IPOs.     

The impact of designated market makers on security prices

This paper is divided into two distinct parts. Part I, Empirical Evidence, tests a previously formulated variance, thinness relationship for security returns. First quarter 1972 daily returns variance is regressed on market value of shares, share price, trading activity, sales variance, and institutional holdings for 178 firms selected by stratified random sampling from AMEX and NYSE (specialist exchanges), and from Tokyo and Rio de Janeiro (non-specialist exchanges). The principal finding is that returns variance and market value are inversely related on non-specialist exchanges, but not on specialist exchanges; this difference is attributed to specialists' impact. Part II, Policy Proposals, discusses the manner in which designated market makers may be effectively incorporated into a continuous auction exchange. Issues discussed include: desirability of price stabilization, transfers implicit in the existing U.S. specialist system, consolidation and public availability of the limit order book, number of designated market makers for a security, competitive bidding, and compensation for performing the price stabilization function. Stabilization is modeled as an external economy, and specific policy proposals for internalizing it are advanced.     

投资者关注与股价崩盘风险:抑制还是加剧?

本文以2010—2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了投资者关注影响股价崩盘风险的客观表现和传导路径。研究发现,投资者关注度的提高会显著加剧下一期的股价崩盘风险,存在“关注度的崩盘效应”;分组检验发现,关注度的崩盘效应仅在机构持股比例低的公司和市场处于牛市状态下存在;路径检验发现,投资者关注不存在信息路径,没有改善公司信息透明度,但存在部分的情绪路径,提高了股价同步性和投资者情绪,从而加剧了股价崩盘风险。建议监管部门重视投资者关注对股价带来的冲击,通过进一步提高机构者持股比例,缓解情绪过热导致的定价错误程度,降低股价崩盘风险。     

Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings

The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.     

WHY MOST FIRMS CHOOSE LINEAR HEDGING STRATEGIES

I investigate the efficiency of alternative hedging strategies of nonfinancial firms facing hedgeable price risk, unhedgeable quantity risk, and financial contracting costs in low-profit events. The analysis suggests that variance-minimizing hedging strategies are very close in economic terms to optimal, value-maximizing hedging strategies for most firms. Furthermore, the marginal gains from shifting to nonlinear hedging strategies are often small enough to be neglected. These results illuminate some puzzling findings in survey studies of firms' hedging practices and suggest an alternative view on firms' selective hedging practices termed "cautious selective hedging."     

GAMBLING, SPECULATION, AND INSURANCE: WHY THEY CONTINUE TO BE CONFUSED AND CONDEMNED

Governments and the media have often attacked financiers for “speculating” in their countries' currencies, thereby forcing them to make drastic and sometimes painful changes in monetary and fiscal policies. This article argues that such accusations have no basis in economic theory, and that “such rhetoric should be seen for what it is: an attempt by politicians and policy-makers to divert attention and blame from their own mismanagement.” More generally, the author argues that the failure of the general public to understand the social benefits of financial activies such as trading in government bonds, commodity futures, and, more recently, financial derivatives has led throughout history to “prejudice, bad laws, and bad regulations.” Much as the charging of interest and certain forms of insurance were proscribed by the medieval Church, agricultural commodity futures were attacked in the 19th century (and in much of the 20th as well) in the U.S. and elsewhere as thinly disguised forms of gambling. Moreover, the same restrictions that were imposed on gambling and futures markets during the 19th and early 20th centuries are now imposed in many Third-World countries. Instead of encouraging the use of forward markets by small producers and traders, and promoting the development of organized commodity markets and banks in local centers, most less-developed countries today support national and international “stabilization” measures such as buffer stocks and regulations like price floors, price ceilings, and crop quotas. Meanwhile, in Western nations, governments continue to accuse financial markets of “destabilizing speculation” and of a myopic obsession with short-term profitability—even as the U.S. IPO market continues to assign record values to companies that have yet to show profits. Viewed in this light, the media and regulatory assaults on the junk bond markets in the late 1980s and on derivatives in the early 1990s are only the latest in a long line of misguided attacks on financial innovation.     

金融期货价格波动限制机制探讨

金融期货价格稳定机制延缓了价格发现过程，并造成了流动性干扰，但从降低期货、现货交易总成本来讲，它还是利大于弊，因此设置价格波动限制是一种可行的政策，而且在期货、现货市场同时设定的效果最好。此外，从不同价格波动限制方式的影响来看，选择弹性涨跌幅限制可较好地发挥价格限制的好处，减小价格限制的不利影响。     

The case for inflation stability

We evaluate the case for inflation stabilization in a New Keynesian (NNS) model that includes various frictions, capital accumulation and a variety of shocks. In such a model, price rigidity may provide the monetary authorities with an opportunity to improve upon the inefficient flexible price equilibrium via the suitable cyclical manipulation of real marginal costs. We find that such an opportunity is of limited value and that a strong case for perfect inflation stabilization remains. Policies that tolerate a small amount of inflation variability may outperform perfect inflation targeting when capital adjustment costs are low and the monetary distortion is substantial but only if prices are very flexible.