控股股东股权质押与高杠杆公司杠杆操纵——基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据

关于股东股权质押对会计信息质量的影响,已有研究主要聚焦于利润表信息质量(尤其是盈余信息质量),鲜有研究涉及资产负债表信息质量.本文以我国A股非金融类高杠杆上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了控股股东股权质押对公司杠杆操纵的影响.研究发现,与未有控股股东股权质押的高杠杆公司相比,具有控股股东股权质押的高杠杆公司进行杠杆操纵的可能性更大,且控股股东股权质押比例越高,高杠杆公司杠杆操纵程度越大;以上效应在成长性更差、短期偿债压力更大、媒体关注程度更高和股价崩盘风险更大的高杠杆公司中更为显著.     

我国上市公司盈余管理动机研究述评

盈余管理一直是会计研究的一个重要领域,许多研究都将盈余管理与利润操纵不加区分,一些学者认为,盈余管理就是利润操纵的另一个手段,另外一些学者则认为盈余管理与利润操纵是两个截然不同的概念.那么,盈余管理的动机究竟有哪些?本文对盈余管理的这一基本问题进行国内外研究现状的归纳和总结,以期为后续的研究提供一些理论支持.     

相得益彰抑或掩人耳目:盈余操纵与MD&A中非财务信息披露

本文以2007-2012年之间的盈余重述公司为样本,研究了高管是否利用管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)中非财务信息来为其盈余操纵行为做掩盖。研究发现,非财务信息披露的一个动机是为了隐藏盈余操纵,在隐藏期间(被重述年度与重述年度之间),进行盈余重述的公司会披露更多的MD&A中非财务信息。进一步,我们发现盈余操纵与MD&A中非财务信息披露的关系在隐藏动机较大(例如有股权激励)的公司当中更强,由此验证了我们的隐藏动机假说。本文提供了一个策略性的进行非财务信息披露的情景,补充了有关信息披露动机的文献。本文提请投资者更加清晰的辨别非财务信息和盈余信息;也提请监管层能够更加严格的监管信息披露,尤其是非财务信息披露。     

定向增发公司盈余管理研究

文章按照定向增发公司发行对象分组，分析了各组公司在发行前后共计11个季度的盈余管理情况。发现公司只对大股东发行股份时，发行前没有操纵利润，但发行后存在较强盈余管理；当机构投资者参与定向增发时，企业在发行前后都进行了盈余管理，发行后盈余管理的程度有所降低。机构投资者参与定向增发的程度越大，企业在增发过程中盈余管理的持续性和程度都越大。盈余管理的动机可能是为了保证企业承诺业绩的实现。     

论上市公司盈余管理

适度的盈余管理是传递内部信息的一种重要手段,但过度就会引起会计信息的失真,阻碍资本市场的发展。本文从盈余管理的综述谈起,分析了盈余管理与利润操纵的区别、盈余管理的动机、盈余管理的手段,并结合以上的观点,提出了识别盈余管理的一些建议。     

股权分置改革的盈余质量效应

股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。     

新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理行为分析

对于企业会计信息的外部使用者来说,盈余信息是最为重要、最为直观的一种会计信息,在企业对外披露的财务报告中占有核心的地位.尤其对于上市公司来说,可通过盈余管理来控制财务报表中的盈余信息,从而影响会计信息质量.本文具体分析盈余管理产生的原因、上市公司进行盈余管理的动机、盈余管理的策略及实施手段,并分析会计准则对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响.     

" 信息机制"还是"成本机制"?——大数据税收征管何以提高了企业盈余质量

本文借助"金税三期"工程实施的"准自然实验"考察了大数据税收征管对企业盈余质量的影响.研究发现,"金税三期"工程的实施显著降低了企业的盈余管理程度,且对向上和向下的盈余管理均有抑制作用.机制检验发现,大数据税收征管通过提高企业信息透明度而抑制了向上与向下的盈余管理,且没有证据表明在大数据征管下所得税成本和向上的盈余管理程度相关,这一结果支持了"信息机制"假说.进一步地,大数据税收征管对盈余管理的抑制作用在避税动机更强的企业中更显著.此外,大数据税收征管还导致企业采用了更多的真实活动盈余管理.本文丰富了有关税收征管和盈余管理的文献,为大数据技术相关研究和实践提供了参考.     

企业盈余管理相关问题探讨

企业进行盈余管理的动机多种多样,主要是上市、筹资、避税、比较和契约论等.盈余管理弊大于利,只有规范盈余管理,才能从根本上解决问题.本文首先从盈余管理的主要动机进行分析,研究其主要形成原因以及主要手段,其次探讨盈余管理的弊端,最后提出了规范企业盈余管理的几点建议.     

对企业社会责任与盈余管理关系探讨

关于企业社会责任与盈余管理的关系,学术界存在不同的观点。Kim et al.从社会责任动机之一——道德层面入手研究企业履行社会责任是否会限制企业进行盈余操纵,结果发现履行社会责任越好的企业通过操纵利润、造假经营活动方式进行盈余管理越少,并能较好地披露透明的财务报告。     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

Non-GAAP Earnings and the Earnings Quality Trade-off

Using a large sample of earnings press releases by Australian firms, we compare multiple attributes of non-GAAP earnings measures with their closest GAAP equivalent. We find that, on average, non-GAAP earnings are more persistent, smoother, more value relevant, and have higher predictive power than their closest GAAP equivalent. However, the same set of non-GAAP earnings disclosures are also less conservative and less timely than their closest GAAP equivalent. The results are consistent with non-GAAP earnings measures reflecting a reversal of the trade-off between the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting inherent in accounting standards and the way they are applied. We also find that differences in several of these attributes between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are more evident in larger firms, firms with lower market-to-book ratios, firms with a higher proportion of independent directors, and firms that report profits rather than losses. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that accounting standards impose significant amounts of conditional conservatism at some cost to the valuation role of accounting information. Non-GAAP earnings measures can therefore be seen as a response to the challenges faced by a single GAAP performance measure in satisfying the competing demands of value relevance and stewardship.     

Earnings Co-movements and the Informativeness of Earnings

We examine the informativeness of earnings in the presence of earnings co-movements. Many theoretical studies infer that the more a firm's earnings move with the market the less weight investors need to place on those earnings, thus rendering them less informative. On the other hand, managers have less opportunity to bias the earnings signal the more earnings co-move, making them more reliable. We measure earnings co-movement using an industry–firm pairing correlational technique. Overall our results show both the degree of co-movement and the ordering of earnings announcements impacts on the informativeness of earnings as indicated by earnings response coefficients. Earnings responses are larger for firms that report earnings before their most highly correlated industry peer, but the responses are reduced as earnings co-movement increases. We interpret our results to indicate that the more earnings co-move with an industry peer the less informative earnings become, but only when the peer firm is able to obtain information at a later date.     

Sustained Earnings and Revenue Growth,Earnings Quality,and Earnings Response Coefficients

We show that firms reporting sustained increases in both earnings and revenues have (1) higher quality earnings and (2) larger earnings response coefficients (ERCs) in comparison to firms reporting sustained increases in earnings alone. With respect to earnings quality, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have more persistent earnings, exhibit less susceptibility to earnings management, and have higher future operating performance. With respect to response coefficients, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have both higher ERCs and lower book value response coefficients, consistent with the implications of the Ohlson (1995, Contemporary Accounting Research 12, 661–687) model.JEL Classification: G12, M41     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.     

Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals: Earnings Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance

We examine market reactions to contemporaneous announcements of current earnings and future earnings guidance for evidence on how investors trade off relevance and reliability. Current earnings are more reliable than future earnings guidance, but future earnings guidance may be more relevant for predicting future performance. We find that current earnings are more strongly associated with announcement-period returns than concurrently disclosed future earnings guidance, consistent with investors’ relative preference for reliability. We find similar return reactions to stand-alone earnings and to earnings released with guidance. In contrast, return reactions are lower for guidance announced simultaneously with current earnings than for stand-alone guidance.     

Earnings beta

Review of Accounting Studies - The literature on cash flow or earnings beta is theoretically well-motivated in its use of fundamentals, instead of returns, to measure systematic risk. However,...     

Earnings Virality

We examine the determinants and market consequences associated with earnings announcements going viral on social media, a phenomenon we label “earnings virality.” Using a comprehensive panel of historical Twitter data, we find that the typical earnings announcement receives relatively little social media coverage, but others go viral on social media, quickly reaching the feeds of millions of people. We find that viral earnings announcements generally have Twitter content that is more extreme in tone and contains less unique content. Further, earnings virality is positively associated with revenue surprises, investor recognition, retail investor ownership, and retail investor trading around the announcement. Earnings virality appears to be detrimental to markets, as it coincides with lower market liquidity and slower price formation. Overall, our evidence suggests that user-driven dissemination through social media platforms, when amplified and taken to extreme levels, may be harmful to markets.     

Earnings Volatility and Earnings Prediction: Analysis and UK Evidence

This paper confirms that US evidence of a negative relationship between earnings persistence and earnings volatility applies to UK firms over the period 1991–2010. Our analytical framework highlights the possibility that this result may reflect downward estimation bias in earnings persistence (and persistence of cash flow and accruals components of earnings) related to transitory earnings elements. Out‐of‐sample forecasts, based on models estimated for earnings volatility quartiles, suggest significant improvement in earnings forecasts for lower volatility firms. The results also suggest that the negative association between earnings persistence and volatility may be due to both estimation bias and variation in core earnings persistence.     

Earnings Management? Erroneous Inferences Based on Earnings Frequency Distributions

A vast literature following Hayn [1995] and Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] attributed the so-called "discontinuities" in earnings distributions around zero to earnings management. Despite recent evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by other factors, researchers and teachers continue to point to the shapes of these distributions as evidence of earnings management. We provide three sets of further evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by factors other than earnings management: (1) we provide, as an example, a detailed analysis of the severe effects of sample selection in a recent study; this study erroneously concludes that the shape of an earnings distribution is evidence of earnings management, (2) we provide a simple explanation for the shape of the earnings distribution that is most often cited as evidence of earnings management; the relation between earnings and prices differs with the magnitude and the sign of earnings, and (3) we provide further examples that support the main point of our paper; evidence beyond the mere shape of a distribution must be brought to bear before researchers can draw conclusions regarding the presence/absence of earnings management.