银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

Bank stock performance and bank regulation around the globe

We analyze the effect of bank capital, regulation, and supervision on the annual stock performance of global banks during the period of 1999–2012. We study a large comprehensive panel of international banks and find that higher Tier 1 capital decreases a bank's stock performance over the whole sample period. However, during turbulent times stocks of more highly capitalized banks perform significantly better. Additionally, we find strong evidence that banks that are more likely to receive government bailout during financial distress realize smaller stock performance. In contrast, we find no convincing evidence that banks that generate higher non-interest income have a higher performance.     

The economic effects of foreign bank presence: Evidence from the Philippines

This study examines the economic effects of the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines from 1990 to 2006. The findings provide strong evidence on the dominance of competition effects from foreign bank presence which lead to the reduction in the profitability and overhead costs of domestic commercial banks. These findings, which reveal that both the actual market penetration and mere presence of foreign banks seem to exert competitive pressure to domestic banks, imply that foreign banks may serve as an effective competitive force, reducing the excess profits earned by domestic banks and compelling domestic banks to update their production technologies and techniques to improve their cost efficiency.From a policy perspective, the findings on competition effects of foreign banks in the domestic banking system justify the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines. The main findings demonstrate that the goal of banking liberalization in transforming domestic banks to be more competitive and efficient works considerably well in the case of the Philippines. Aside from the policy of easing the entry of foreign banks, bank-specific conditions can have significant impact on the performance of domestic banks. Therefore, a sustained improvement in the efficiency of domestic commercial banks requires not only liberalizing the entry of foreign banks, but also on continued strengthening of domestic prudential regulation and supervision on the commercial banking system.     

投资银行业经理人估值与分配机制研究——基于多层次的利益相关者分析框架

现阶段我国投资银行经理人的估值与薪酬考核面临如下困境:一方面由于某种错觉,社会普遍认为投行经理人的收入远远高于合理水平;但另一方面,经理人的实际薪酬水平与其他行业以及国外同行相比明显偏低,投行经理人的激励严重不足。立足于我国现有制度现实,应该寻找一种渐进的、与现有制度安排协调的投行经理人估值与分配模式。本文基于利益相关者分析框架考察了投行经理人的估值与分配机制,运用模型从环境分析、组织模式和方法体系三个递进的层次对经理人的业绩评价进行了系统分析,从理论上对我国投资银行经理人的估值模型进行了开拓性研究。     

Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all?

Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002–2008, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk using quantile regressions. In contrast to most previous research, we find that banking regulation and supervision has an effect on the risks of high-risk banks. However, most measures for bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks. As banking risk and bank regulation and supervision are multi-faceted concepts, our measures for both concepts are constructed using factor analysis.     

Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

This paper considers whether banks have an incentive to disclose accurate information concerning their risk and capital adequacy. State-of-the-art capital regulation relies on quantitative capital requirements, bank supervision, and public disclosure of information to the markets. Is voluntary regulatory disclosure of risk information sufficient to achieve policy objectives? The game-theoretic model of this paper suggests that voluntary disclosure can be usefully supplemented with other regulatory tools, in particular with direct supervision and financial market discipline.     

商业银行跨业经营与风险传导研究

本文基于面板数据分析,对国内政策层面启动综合经营试点以来有关银行的绩效波动建立回归模型,综合考察了不同性质跨业综合经营对银行总体风险的传导作用。实证结果显示：不同的跨业形式对于风险的影响在方向上可能完全相反,因此对于综合经营是增大还是减小银行风险的研究,应当是一种基于跨业差异性的分类讨论;尽管跨业综合经营可以提高国内商...     

我国商业银行经营投资银行业务对风险影响的实证研究

本文以2009-2018年19家商业银行为研究对象,运用波动性分析、相关性分析及面板数据回归分析方法,考察了经营投资银行业务对银行风险的影响。研究结果表明,投资银行收入无明显周期性趋势,波动性明显高于利息净收入,经营投资银行业务会加剧银行业收入的不确定性,但由于收入占比较小,投资银行业务并非造成我国银行业收入波动的主要因素。多数银行的投资银行收入与利息净收入表现为正相关性,银行难以通过经营投资银行业务实现风险分散目的。投资银行业务对银行风险影响的回归结果较为显著,随着投资银行收入在银行收入结构中的权重越来越大,银行多元化收入程度随之加深,银行风险也随之下降。     

Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract:   This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value.     

中国上市银行薪酬激励与银行绩效

本文以14家股份制商业银行为样本,从公司治理视角分析上市银行CEO报酬及银行内的报酬差异与银行经营绩效间的关系。研究结果表明,中国上市银行员工薪酬激励与银行绩效有显著的正相关关系;缩小银行高管薪酬和员工薪酬差异对银行绩效有显著的正相关影响;股权激励对上市银行绩效的影响并不显著;银行高管内部薪酬差异却存在锦标赛竞争机制,即银行高管间适当的薪酬差异可以提升银行绩效。因此,改变目前中国上市银行报酬—绩效契约是今后的金融业改革中需要解决的重要问题。     

Bank Growth Choices and Changes in Market Performance

Changes in bank market performance are compared for banks that choose not to grow, to branch, bank acquire, product expand, or some combination. Using the change in market value‐to‐book value ratios, banks that include acquiring other banks as part of their growth strategy have significant positive changes in performance. Positive performance by bank acquirers is in contrast to many studies, but prior research has not reviewed other growth activities in a single model, nor used market‐based measures to review performance over longer time periods following bank expansion.     

The Competitive Impact of Commercial Bank Underwriting on the Market for Municipal Revenue Bonds

This paper examines the impact of commercial bank entry in the market for municipal revenue bonds. We show that issues underwritten by commercial banks have lower underwriter spreads but not lower yields relative to issues underwritten by nonbank investment firms. In particular, this is more significant for non-investment-grade bonds underwritten by commercial banks. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that bank entry has resulted in increased competition in the municipal revenue bond market and that the lower yields observed for bank-underwritten commercial bonds may be due to banks having private information. Overall, our results suggest that policy changes leading to the relaxation of restrictive provisions concerning bank underwriting of municipal revenue bonds have had beneficial effects.     

Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

U.S. bank supervisors conduct frequent and comprehensive loan-level exams of the syndicated loan market. These exams are costly as adverse exam loan ratings may increase supervisory scrutiny and reduce bank capital. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage in 1998, we estimate that the cost of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decreases by approximately 18%. We show that large lenders use the coverage change to exclude deals from supervision, especially riskier deals. Strikingly, small lenders shift their lending to increase supervisory coverage, suggesting the potential importance of supervision in reducing information asymmetries within lending syndicates.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

金融控股公司的反垄断法规制——以银行集中控制为视角

金融控股公司已成为当前各国发展金融行业，提升金融竞争力的主要方式。金融控股公司的集中是竞争效率的反应，但过度集中则会导致竞争者减少，竞争机制的失灵。过去，人们强调金融业的监管问题，但金融危机不仅使人们意识到审慎监管的重要性，也引起了人们对金融反垄断的思考。对金融控股公司集中的反垄断规制应以有效竞争原则为基本理念；在规制的具体规则中，则应考虑相关市场的界定和有效抗辩机制这两个因素。     

机构投资者股权对银行公司治理与绩效的影响

在机构投资者对银行进行投资时,不同类型的机构投资者具有不同的表现.其中,QFII、证券公司、社保和保险基金都能影响银行的公司治理,促进其综合业绩的提高;证券投资基金和企业不能对这两个方面产生显著影响.在选择银行股时,证券投资基金注重银行过去综合业绩的表现,企业、社保基金和保险基金注重银行过去市场价值的增长,QFII和证券公司同时考虑了这两个方面.实行银行股权全流通,放松时机构投资者的管制,改革证券交易方面的税收制度,培养机构投资者的投资理念,有利于发挥机构投资者对银行公司治理的积极作用.     

银行信贷与股票价格动态关系研究

本文采用五变量VAR模型对我国银行信贷与股票价格之间的动态关系进行实证分析,发现股票价格的上涨会导致银行信贷的扩张,但银行信贷扩张不是股票价格上涨的原因。基于此,本文提出对银行信贷的调控要考虑股票市场的影响。在股票市场繁荣的时候应该通过增加股票供给、丰富投资产品等措施防止股市泡沫的扩大,降低市场对股价升幅的预期,同时密切关注银行信贷资金的流向,防止资金由实体经济大量流向股票市场;而在股票市场萧条的时候,放松银行信贷并不能阻止股票价格下跌,稳定股票市场的关键是增强投资者信心,改善投资者对未来股票价格的预期。     

Banking on the Boom,Tripped by the Bust: Banks and the World War I Agricultural Price Shock

How do banks respond to asset booms? This paper examines (i) how U.S. banks responded to the World War I farmland boom; (ii) the impact of regulation; and (iii) how bank closures exacerbated the postwar bust. The boom encouraged new bank formation and balance sheet expansion (especially by new banks). Deposit insurance amplified the impact of rising crop prices on bank portfolios, while higher minimum capital requirements dampened the effects. Banks that responded most aggressively to the asset boom had a higher probability of closing in the bust, and counties with more bank closures experienced larger declines in land prices.     

银行资本、经济周期和货币政策文献综述

银行资本自身具有顺周期变化的特点,监管当局的资本监管一般会导致信贷供给更为严重的顺周期性,并放大经济冲击,因此在经济高涨期,必须高度关注信贷快速扩张的潜在后果。银行资本的顺周期变化也会使货币政策效果表现出非对称性,造成经济周期的不同阶段货币政策的效果不同,中央银行和监管当局政策目标的差异往往也会导致短期银行资本监管与货币政策内的潜在冲突,但长期目标是一致的。我国正逐步实施巴塞尔新资本协议,相关国际研究成果值得梳理和借鉴。