The Benefits of Relationship Banking: Evidence from Small Business Financing in Finland

Using unique small business credit-file data from a major Finnish bank, I analyze how relationship characteristics are associated with loan interest rates. Data includes the effective loan rate and variables that describe the duration and scope of relationship, collateralization, firm characteristics, bank’s internal risk rating, and loan characteristics. The results show that longer duration tends to lower the cost of credit and that a long-term bank/firm relationship is beneficial especially to high-risk firms. As the relationship matures, the loan premiums for high-risk firms decrease at higher rate than for low-risk firms.     

Evidence of a bank lending channel in the UK

Using balance sheet data for a panel of UK listed firms, we find evidence of a bank lending channel of monetary transmission. A higher interest rate induces more bank lending to listed companies, but this effect diminishes if monetary policy becomes tight enough to impose severe constraints on bank loan lending. The dynamic behaviour of bank debt versus non-bank debt shows that the lending channel works through cutting back loan supplies to small, bank-dependent firms while restricting the bank’s ability to provide financial assistance to other firms. We see cross-sectional differences between bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent listed companies, and between listed and non-listed companies: Both can contribute to the size effect of investment. Small firms bear most of the reductions in bank loan supplies, and since they do not have many alternatives to bank finance, they suffer more from monetary tightening than big firms. This is consistent with inventory behavior. Furthermore, we have found that big, non-bank-dependent firms can benefit more from the bank–firm relationship than small, bank-dependent firms.     

浮动利率房贷提前还款的损失度量

住房抵押贷款是银行一项重要业务和资产.随着利率的波动和其他因素的影响,借款人有可能提前还款从而影响银行的收益.准确地度量提前还款给银行带来的损失有助于商业银行更好地管理这类经营风险.在具有均值回复特性的随机市场利率和服从纯跳跃过程的浮动住房贷款利率条件下,以最常见的每月等本金还款方式为基础,根据对利率的预测,使用求期望的办法估算出银行房贷总收益的预期值,然后将该预期值折现到提前还款发生时刻,从而构造出借款人在合同期间提前偿还房贷给银行造成的利息损失度量模型.     

Loan growth and riskiness of banks

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.     

利率市场化与银行资产配置选择 —基于45家商业银行的面板数据分析

本文在对商业银行资产配置进行理论分析的基础上,构建利率市场化对商业银行 资产配置影响的实证模型,利用45家商业银行2003-2014年的面板数据进行实证检验,实证结 果表明：利率市场化对信贷资产的增长没有产生激励效应,商业银行并未在利率市场化进程中 加速信贷扩张;利率市场化对商业银行资产配置结构产生了显著影响,随着利率市场化程度的 加深,信贷资产和证券资产在总资产中的占比都增大;利率市场化对信贷资产内部配置结构也 产生了显著影响,促进零售信贷资产占比提升,而对公司信贷资产占比和前十大客户信贷资产 占比的影响为负,这验证了在利率市场化的推进过程中,商业银行将信贷资源向个人客户和中 小企业客户倾斜,利率市场化发挥了一定的积极效应。     

Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank Portfolios: An Application to a Set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa

The banking crises of the ‘90s emphasize the need to model the connections between financial environment volatility and the potential losses faced by financial institutions resulting from correlated market and credit risks. Due to the number of variables that must be modeled and the complexity of the relationships an analytical solution is not feasible. We present here a numerical solution based on a simulation model that explicitly links changes in the relevant variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank capital ratios. This forward looking quantitative risk assessment methodology allows banks and regulators to identify potential risks before they materialize and make appropriate adjustments to bank portfolio credit qualities, sector and region concentrations, and capital ratios on a bank by bank basis. It also has the potential to be extended so as to assess the risks of correlated failures among a group of financial institutions (i.e., systemic risk analyses). This model was applied by the authors to the study of the risk profile of the largest South African Banks in the context of the Financial System Stability Assessment program undertaken by the IMF in 1999. In the current study, we apply the model to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. As expected, the credit quality and diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and financial environment volatility, are shown to interact to determine bank risk levels. We find that the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio is the most important risk factor. We also show the risk reduction benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail even during very volatile periods. Asset and liability maturity mismatches generally increase bank risk levels. However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than their assets. Risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels.     

Characteristics of failed U.S. commercial banks: an exploratory study

This study uses survival analysis to determine how early the indications of bank failure can be observed. We find that banks with high loan to asset and high personal loan to assets ratios are more likely to survive. Older banks and banks with high real estate and agricultural loans, loan loss allowance, loan charges off and non‐performing loans to assets ratio are more likely to fail. It is possible to predict survival functions of <50% for failed banks, 3 years or less before failure. Moreover, we find that most of the variables present a behaviour that departs from Benford’s Law.     

Deposit Insurance and Forbearance Under Moral Hazard

We study the efficacy of forbearance using a real options approach. Our model endogenizes moral hazard embedded in credit risk undertaken by the bank. The bank's interest rate risk is modeled as duration mismatch. Other modeling improvements over previous studies include such features as stochastic interest rates and deposits, continuous interest payments on an ongoing deposit portfolio, and a stochastic forbearance period. We find that the bank does have an incentive to engage in undue risk taking. Even in the presence of moral hazard, however, forbearance can still be a desirable course of action in reducing the FDIC's expected liability. In addition, the capital ratio plays an extremely important role in determining the fair insurance premium. Finally, using the mismatch of asset and deposit durations as the correct measurement of interest rate risk, our model reveals that an optimal asset variance may exist for a particular bank, contrary to what the contingent claims framework would predict. Therefore, we resolve the puzzle that banks in practice do not increase asset risk to take full advantage of the limited liability.     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers

This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.     

资本约束对商业银行资产配置行为的影响——基于175家商业银行数据的经验研究

本文使用1998～2009年我国175家商业银行的资产配置数据,研究了资本监管制度对银行资产配置行为的影响。本文发现,现行的资本监管制度对银行资产配置行为具有重要影响,资本监管制度实施之后,银行依据自身资本水平调整资产结构,资本充足银行持有更多的风险资产,贷款比例较高;而资本不足银行则减持风险资产,贷款比例下降。此外,由于不同规模商业银行面临的融资约束不同,资本水平对资产配置行为的影响存在一定的差异,资本对城市及农村商业银行的约束效应更明显。本文的这些发现为监管当局的资本监管政策提供了经验证据,并提出进行差异化监管的政策建议。     

所有权、产业政策指导与银行贷款利率

以上市公司披露的银行信贷数据为样本,实证分析产业政策指导对企业贷款利率的影响。结果表明:产业政策指导中的重点支持类企业和一般支持类企业往往获得了银行贷款的利率优惠,商业银行较好地落实了国家的产业政策;相比于民营企业,与政府有密切关系的国有企业获得了较低的贷款利率,商业银行的信贷决策表现出一定程度的所有权金融歧视。     

媒体报道的信息中介作用:来自我国银行授信的证据

本文基于中国上市公司的媒体报道数据,实证检验了媒体报道对企业获取银行授信的影响。研究发现,在整体上,新闻媒体发挥了重要的信息中介作用;媒体关注度越高、正面报道倾向越强,企业越容易获取银行授信。进一步研究表明,媒体报道对银行授信的作用主要存在于非国有企业、市场化程度高的地区和资产负债率高的企业中;媒体报道对银行授信的影响存在一定的中长期效应;与负面报道相比,媒体正面报道在银行授信中的作用更为显著。本文不仅丰富了媒体报道与银行授信领域的研究,而且为新闻媒体信息中介作用的有效发挥提供了政策启示。     

商业银行效率及其影响因素实证研究

以我国14家商业银行2000～2009年的面板数据为分析依据,采用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法对商业银行效率进行计量,并从公司治理、市场结构、宏观经济政策、金融业结构和经营能力等方面分析商业银行效率的影响因素。结果表明:市场集中度和银行个体市场份额与银行效率反向变动;投资和货币供给对银行效率影响较大;经济周期、通货膨胀和存贷利差对银行效率影响较小;存款准备金率对银行效率影响最小。可以认为,在当前形势下,存款准备金率的调控作用只是暂时的,无法从根本上抑制货币的流动性;存贷利差对银行效率影响不大。因此,为控制通货膨胀实施不对称加息政策,不会对商业银行系统产生较大影响;从银行经营能力考察,传统的存贷业务已不能独立支持商业银行的进一步发展,应大力提倡金融创新,寻求新的业务增长点。     

Toward a theory of bank loan commitments

The characteristics of fixed and variable rate bank loan commitments are analyzed in a contingent-claims framework, and valuation expressions are derived for these commitments. The valuation expressions are used to present estimates of the impact of interest rate uncertainty on the liability assumed by a bank issuing loan commitments. Finally, a simple, two-period, asymmetric information model is employed to explain the recent trend among bankers to substitute variable rate commitments for their fixed rate counterparts.     

Credit rationing and non-price loan terms: A re-examination

This paper develops the implications of heterogeneous bank loans for borrower and lender behaviour in a competitive bank loan market by considering the own funds-loan ratio as the ‘non-price’ loan term. It is shown that in equilibrium each bank will ration its loan to borrowers by providing them with the smaller loan and requiring the higher own funds-loan ration than they would desire at the equilibrium loan rate. Moreover, restrictive monetary policy that raises the opportunity cost of granting loans decreases the loan size and increases the own funds-loan ratio, but its effect on the loan rate and credit rationing remains ambiguous. Thus credit rationing may decrease as a result of restrictive monetary policy.     

Main Bank Power,Switching Costs,and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence from Ukraine

We examine firms' motivation to change their main bank and how this switch affects loans, interest payments, and firm performance. Applying treatment effect analysis to unique firm-bank matched Ukrainian data, we find that larger and more highly leveraged companies are more likely to switch their main bank. Importantly, firms tend to switch to a new main bank that holds a higher share of equity in the firm and thus has stronger power. The results also suggest that after switching, firms obtain additional access to bank loans but, on average, have lower profits due to bigger interest payments.     

The ties that bind: Bank relationships and small business lending

The importance of bank relationships for small firms’ ability to raise external finance is well-documented, yet the mechanism through which relationships improve access to capital markets has received little empirical attention. This paper uses hand-collected, proprietary data from a mid-sized bank in the United States to identify the channels that strengthen the relationship between a small business and its bank. In contrast to earlier work that focuses on the role of relationships in alleviating information and incentive problems in lending, I find that the source of value in relationship banking is not limited to enhanced monitoring. Exploiting a unique feature of this dataset, I examine two channels of relationship strength that directly measure the stream of non-lending profits generated from (1) the non-credit services cross-sold to the borrower, and (2) the additional bank clients referred by the borrower. I document that non-lending profitability empirically determines the risk-adjusted terms of lending. In models of loan price that already include both the bank’s proprietary risk rating and traditional risk proxies, non-lending profits significantly improve explanatory power and account for up to half of the total explained variation. Conditional on risk profile, a one-standard deviation increase in aggregate non-lending profits lowers the loan interest rate by 32 basis points and increases access to credit by 26%.     

Risk and Discounted Loss Reserves

Abstract

The author places the discounting of loss reserves for investment income within a financial economics context. This enables the evaluation of a loss reserve containing a security margin, such as to produce p% confidence in adequacy, taking account of both asset and liability risks. This loss reserve is expressed as a multiple of the economic value of the liabilities. If the security margin is defined as the difference between these two quantities, it is found to increase (decrease) withincreasing asset risk for high (low) values of p. Finally, the author provides a numerical example.     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。