资本约束对我国商业银行资产负债表影响的实证研究

随着资产规模的持续扩张以及资本监管的强化,如何应对资本约束已经成为我国商业银行面临的最紧迫问题。本文利用16家上市银行2000-2014年的面板数据,分析了资本约束对商业银行资产负债表行为的影响,包括资产负债表调整的内容、方向与相对力度。实证结果显示,商业银行在面临资本约束时会同时对资产和资本项进行调整,但是资本项的调整力度要远大于资产规模,而资产结构调整的贡献非常有限;在资产项调整中以贷款资产为主,资本约束将限制贷款总体规模的增长,但是风险权重较低的个人贷款增速反而更快。本文的研究发现,对于理解商业银行行为以及制定监管政策均有重要意义。     

资本监管对商业银行信贷资产的影响

伴随一系列监管政策的出台,关于最低资本监管要求对我国商业银行的风险资产配置行为以及银行的贷款量的影响情况,一直是理论界与实务界的探讨重点。本文运用面板数据的多元线性回归模型实证分析了银行资本监管对我国商业银行信贷行为的影响。研究结果表明,商业银行的贷款与中长期贷款分别与监管压力显著正相关。     

商业银行监管资本套利的均衡分析

监管资本套利,产生于巴塞尔协议资本监管框架的缺陷,是一种利用资本监管制度之间的差异性以及制度内部的不协调性,运用某种手段在不改变实际风险水平的情况下提高资本充足率水平的行为。通过对以下问题的探讨:商业银行监管资本套利所获得的收益在银行与资金需求方之间的配置比例;针对某种资产的监管资本套利,对其他资产供求双方所产生的隐性套利收益的表现形式及其归属程度;由商业银行异质性所导致的监管套利顾客现象;信息不对称情况下,市场对于套利者与非套利者的逆向选择等等,认为银行监管部门应适当引导符合政策意图的套利行为,提高政策引导调控能力。     

资本监管、流动性约束对商业银行贷款行为的影响北大核心CSSCI

本文研究资本监管与流动性约束的交互效应对商业银行贷款行为的影响。结果表明:(1)资本监管会促使商业银行调整表内外资产结构,减少表内贷款发放,扩张表外未使用贷款承诺业务,严格执行监管惩罚措施有利于抑制商业银行表内外信贷增长;(2)资本监管与流动性约束具有互补性,资本监管对商业银行贷款行为的非线性影响依赖于流动性比率的大小,流动性比率越高,其促进资本监管压力下的信贷紧缩效应越明显;(3)逆周期监管政策的实施,有助于减弱资本监管与流动性水平交互作用对商业银行贷款行为的负向影响。     

资本充足率影响我国商业银行资产风险的实证研究

<正>一、引言作为巴塞尔系列协议以及各国监管当局的监管指标,对商业银行的资本充足率进行监管被认为能够约束商业银行的风险行为,增强其稳定水平。资本充足率越高,银行承担的风险越低。本文使用银行风险加权资产作为商业银行资产风险的度量     

监管政策对商业银行行为选择的冲击效应研究——基于H省若干家商业银行的TRAMO/SEATS检验

根据《巴塞尔协议》等国际公约的要求,中国的银行监管部门于2004年1月开始,在全国的银行系统推行严格的资本充足性管理。作为国际银行界主流的监管政策,资本充足性管理对商业银行的行为选择产生了深远的影响。本文选取了中国中部某省份2002年至2006年的商业银行数据,针对包括贷款对象结构、贷款期限结构和风险偏好结构三个表征商业银行行为特征的24个数据序列,运用TRAMO/SEATS的技术方法,实证检验了所有序列的结构性变动点以及监管政策的冲击效果。研究显示,当监管当局开始实施严格的资本充足性监管时,大多数商业银行都降低了风险偏好,说明监管政策的冲击效应十分明显;但是经过大约一年后,几乎所有的商业银行又选择恢复到初始状态,开始增加风险偏好,说明存在商业银行的资本约束软化效应。因此,若要保持资本监管政策的长期效果,还需不断完善相关制度体系建设。本文从商业银行行为变化的特征出发,提出了我国应对《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》挑战的若干建议。     

资本缓冲对中国商业银行行为的影响——基于审慎监管视角

国际金融危机的爆发引起了人们对资本缓冲如何影响银行行为更为广泛的关注。笔者构建动态面板数据模型估计目标资本充足率,在此基础上检验资本缓冲对银行资产和资本结构调整行为的影响。研究结果表明,2003—2012年,资本缓冲对中国商业银行资产配置和融资行为具有重要影响,资产缓冲较高的银行会发放更多贷款,持有更多高风险资产,但补充资本的激励不足;资本缓冲对银行行为的影响取决于监管惩罚措施的执行,资本监管的"硬约束"增强了银行调整风险偏好、采用股权融资补充核心资本以满足外部监管要求的动力。笔者的研究发现为后危机时代监管当局的逆周期资本监管政策提供了经验证据。     

商业银行资本与风险承担行为研究——基于资本监管的视角

通过对比16家上市商业银行2004—2014年资本监管新标准颁布前后的数据,研究资本监管对商业银行资本与风险承担行为产生的动态影响。分析的结果表明:在实施资本监管新标准之前,资本监管对资本不足和资本缓存不足的银行提高资本充足水平产生了积极的影响,且这种积极影响在实施资本监管新标准之后持续发挥作用。而资本缓存充足的银行在实施新政策之前倾向于投资高风险资产,但在实施新政策之后为了向监管机构展示其良好的经营状况,会继续提高资本水平。资本约束对于降低银行资产风险水平的作用并不显著。     

商业银行资本与风险承担行为研究--基于资本监管的视角

通过对比16家上市商业银行2004—2014年资本监管新标准颁布前后的数据,研究资本监管对商业银行资本与风险承担行为产生的动态影响。分析的结果表明：在实施资本监管新标准之前,资本监管对资本不足和资本缓存不足的银行提高资本充足水平产生了积极的影响,且这种积极影响在实施资本监管新标准之后持续发挥作用。而资本缓存充足的银行在实施新政策之前倾向于投资高风险资产,但在实施新政策之后为了向监管机构展示其良好的经营状况,会继续提高资本水平。资本约束对于降低银行资产风险水平的作用并不显著。     

资本监管对我国商业银行资本充足率和资产风险水平影响的实证研究

本文运用14家商业银行的实际数据,对《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》实施后,资本监管对我国商业银行资本充足率和资产风险水平的影响进行实证研究。结果表明,目前商业银行资本充足率水平的提升主要得益于政府注资等外部行为,资本监管的实施促使资本不足的银行大幅度提高资本充足率水平的作用尚不明显,同时,资本监管的压力也不能解释近年来商业银行资产风险水平的变化。     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Modeling Foreign Bank Performance and Lending Behavior

This paper examines the profitability and commercial loan growth of foreign banks using a simultaneous‐equation framework. Maximizing behavior provides a two‐equation system in which bank profitability depends on variables related to expected returns, costs, and risks and in which loan growth is determined by risk and return variables. The model is tested to evaluate the determinants of foreign bank performace and lending behavior in the United States between 1987 and 1991. Overall the results indicate that factors such as capital strength, commercial and industrial loan growth, and assets composition were important in determining foreign banks' return‐on‐assets in the period under study. The role of capital appears to be particularly important in explaining foreign bank performance. The single significant determinant of loan growth was found to be previous period's loan growth.     

Capital Adequacy, Bank Mergers, and the Medium of Payment

We examine how banks' capital requirements affect the way bank mergers are financed, as well as the stock-market reaction to the merger announcement. We find that the capital position of the acquirer is one of the two factors most strongly influencing the choice of financing method; the other is the relative size of the merging banks. The smaller the acquirer in relation to the target bank and the higher the acquirer's capital adequacy ratio, the more likely it is that the acquisition will be financed by a stock swap. The capital requirements also affect the market reaction, through their effect on the financing method choice. The value of the acquirer's equity decreases more at the time of the merger announcement if the method of payment is stock. Like prior studies, we find that the abnormal return on the target banks' stock is positive.     

Bank Managers' Heterogeneous Decisions on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions

This study examines bank managers' three major motivations for discretionary behavior with respect to loan loss provisions: signaling, income smoothing, and capital management. To do so, it utilizes a bank-specific time-series regression approach that captures heterogeneity in the banks' priorities and strategies for alternative motives and compares the results to those from alternative model specifications. The statistical tests and results presented in this study lead to three conclusions. First, significant results for the income smoothing hypothesis are robust to the various model specifications. Second, average signaling coefficients estimated from bank-specific regressions are systematically larger than corresponding coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions and are statistically significant. Finally, bank managers appear to use loan loss provisions to manage their regulatory capital levels by comparing them with the minimum ratios specified by regulators rather than with a time-series bank-specific ratio or pooled time-series cross-sectional mean ratio.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

Real effects of bank capital regulations: Global evidence

We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.     

宏观经济不确定性与银行资产组合行为:1995～2009

本文研究了宏观经济不确定性在银行资产配置中所起的作用。论文首先构建了一个投资组合模型,论证了宏观经济不确定性与银行资产组合行为的理论关系。然后对我国银行业从1995年至2009年的两者关系作了实证分析,研究结果表明,宏观经济不确定性在银行的投资决策中有着显著影响,当宏观经济不确定性显著增加时,银行资产配置中的贷款份额下降,贷款/资产比率截面分布方差减小,出现羊群效应。     

资本计量方法改革、商业银行风险偏好与信贷配置

为提高银行业风险管理水平与信贷配置效率,监管部门于2014年开展了资本管理高级方法的试点工作。本文基于上市银行2010至2016年的微观数据,与银监会公布的行业信贷风险进行匹配,采用双重差分和三重差分法,实证分析前述改革如何影响试点银行的风险偏好和信贷调配。研究发现,在资本管理高级方法实施后:(1)试点银行显著降低了风险加权资产的规模;(2)试点银行风险偏好的变化存在非线性的特征,在调减高风险行业贷款的同时,并未显著增加最安全行业的贷款,而是增加了风险略高行业的贷款,体现出试点银行对风险与收益的权衡;(3)进一步将行业划分为“虚”与“实”,研究发现试点银行减少了房地产业(“虚”)、制造业(“实”)和建筑业(“实”)贷款,显著增加了金融业(“虚”)贷款。本文研究不仅丰富了资本监管方面的文献,也对金融支持供给侧结构性改革具有启示意义。     

结售汇如何影响银行风险承担水平?——基于银行资产负债表的视角

本文构建了一个基于银行资产负债表的理论模型,研究了结售汇对银行风险承担水平的影响机制,并采用结售汇报表数据进行实证检验。结果表明,为实现利润最大化,银行会将外汇流入创造的流动性用于投放较高风险的贷款,导致净结汇对银行风险承担水平有正向影响,异质性分析结果显示大型银行受影响程度高于中小银行。本文结论意味着,当考虑结售汇波动可能进一步加剧时,有必要出台更多结构性政策,补足外汇流入减少带来的货币缺口,优化存款市场结构,稳定金融机构流动性预期,以缓冲外需冲击可能带来的影响,并激励银行服务重心进一步下沉,为小微企业提供更多信贷支持,完成好金融服务实体经济的重要使命。     

Loan growth and riskiness of banks

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.