基于信号传递的技术标准联盟候选伙伴风险控制研究

一、引言 关于技术标准联盟的明确定义,代升华,张平(2005)总结技术标准联盟的内涵时认为技术标准联盟是企业围绕技术标准形成的一种战略联盟,李大平,曾德明(2006)认为技术标准联盟实质上是一系列许可协议的集合体,联盟各企业通过谈判达成协议从而形成一种契约关系,是一种典型的契约型联盟.本文认为技术标准联盟是企业围绕技术标准形成的一种基于技术与市场力的特殊联盟,企业组建技术标准联盟的根本目的是通过组建联盟,促使标准得到确立和扩散,然后通过联盟来获取标准价值.     

技术标准联盟——信息产业发展的新趋势

信息产业技术标准联盟可促进标准的研发,扩大标准安装基础,加快技术标准的确立与扩散,同时技术标准联盟多为集体发起成立,结构和层次比较复杂,其发展与标准的发展同步.因此,我国技术标准联盟应吸引优秀企业加入,不断完善联盟管理,以面对国外联盟的威胁和竞争.     

证券投资基金治理结构:一个理论视角

证券投资基金的治理结构直接关系到能否保护基金持有人的利益和证券投资基金业的发展前景,本文从理论的角度对契约型和公司型基金的治理结构进行了研究,并提出了一些新的观点.     

契约型投资基金治理的国际比较与启示

目前我国证券投资基金主要采取契约型基金管理模式,本文选取英国、德国和日本三个典型的契约型基金管理国家,从基金治理的组织结构、治理机制和监管体系三个方面进行比较分析,归纳总结其契约型基金治理经验及对我国证券投资基金治理的启示。     

证券投资基金治理结构分析

证券投资基金的治理结构直接关系到能否保护基金持有人的利益和证券投资基金业的发展前景,本文从理论的角度对契约型和公司型基金的治理结构进行了研究,并且认为条件具备的情况下,应着手发展公司型基金公司.     

证券投资基金治理结构:一个理论视角

证券投资基金的治理结构直接关系到能否保护基金持有人的利益和证券投资基金业的发展前景,本文从理论的角度对契约型和公司型基金的治理结构进行了研究,并提出了一些新的观点。     

高科技企业技术标准竞争优势形成机理研究

高科技企业技术实力、结盟实力与用户吸引实力是技术标准竞争优势的主要源泉。针对技术标准化过程中标准的构建、产业化与市场化三个不同阶段,企业需要实施不同的竞争战略以促使技术标准竞争优势的形成。协作 R&D 与知识产权战略为构建技术标准提供了技术保障,有助于技术实力竞争优势的形成。产业联盟与开源战略为技术标准产业化提供了企业内外部资源整合环境,有助于结盟竞争优势的形成。先发制人与平台战略为技术标准市场化提供了用户基础条件,有助于用户吸引实力竞争优势的形成。     

基于交易成本的技术标准联盟形成机理研究

技术标准专利化趋势加速了以技术标准联盟设立技术标准的趋势.从交易成本视角看,市场、科层组织和技术标准联盟在技术标准设立过程中都会产生生产成本、机会主义成本、信息成本以及协调成本,相比之下,技术标准联盟在降低交易费用、提高交易质量方面有明显优势,技术标准联盟形成有其合理性.     

基于战略联盟重构视角探析企业并购管理

基于价值链管理角度进行分析可以发现,企业并购活动本质上属于战略联盟的重构,由此可见战略联盟与企业并购存在的紧密联系.基于此,本文将简单分析企业并购与战略联盟,并深入探讨企业并购与战略联盟选择、战略联盟重构路径,希望研究内容能够为相关业内人士带来一定启发.     

从保护投资者利益角度看当前我国开放式基金治理

一、我国开放式基金治理结构的现状 我国开放式基金首先由基金管理人发起,管理人与托管人签订基金契约,向公众招募后正式成立.属于契约型基金,没有董事会等有形机构来行使基金份额持有人的权利.     

企业经理人报酬契约的嵌入性结构分析

"经济人"假设前提下的企业经理人激励理论对现代企业存在的某些现象无法给出合理解释,我们在放宽了"经济人"假设前提的关系合同理论基础上,通过对合同治理结构(权威治理和双边治理)和嵌入人际关系(对称结构和非对称结构)的匹配对经理人的报酬契约进行分析,认为国有企业属于权威型的不对称结构,而民营企业属于双边治理的对称结构。因此,国有企业经理人的报酬契约模式相对单一且倾向于政府干预,而民营企业经理人的报酬契约模式更加多样化并倾向于市场治理。     

财务治理效率之理论基础探究

财务治理效率是财务治理的根本目标和财务核心竞争力。对财务治理效率及其理论基础进行研究已成为非常重要和亟待解决的课题。推进财务治理效率问题的研究，必然离不开对其理论基础进行系统研究，但既有文献非常匮乏。有鉴于此，本文较为系统地梳理和创造性地研究了财务治理效率的企业契约理论、企业能力理论、财权理论、公司治理理论以及博弈论等理论基础，部分弥补了财务治理效率理论基础研究非常薄弱的缺憾，也必将对该领域的后续研究起到抛砖引玉的作用。     

Exploring the transitional behavior among value and growth stocks

Unlike the corporate funds in the US, mutual funds in many countries such as China and Germany operate under a different governance arrangement and are thus called “contractual funds.” The governance structure of contractual funds allows shareholders of fund management companies, rather than the fund investors, to be responsible for asset management decisions. Therefore, a fund’s governance attributes may be especially important in driving its performance. Using a comprehensive governance data covering Chinese mutual funds, this paper finds that the governance and organizational structures of Chinese fund management companies significantly influence the performance of their affiliated funds. In particular, while a larger stake from the top1 shareholder significantly improves the performance of affiliated funds, the presence of multiple largest shareholders reduces their performance. Moreover, fund management companies that offer fewer fund products and charge higher management fees tend to perform better. Finally, more institutional holding in a fund appears to function as an external supervisory surrogate for internal board governance to help improve fund performance.     

Corporate Governance and Development

The literature shows that good corporate governance generallypays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It isassociated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity,greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders,although the direction of causality is not always clear. Thelaw and finance literature has documented the important roleof institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement,including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-leveldata, researchers have documented relationships between countries’corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance,valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financingon the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance,firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistanceby entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and politicaleconomy factors at the level of markets and countries partlyexplain why they do not.      

公司法如何面对家庭秩序———以一个家族公司的裁判为例

主流公司法理论强调公司的经济属性,突出章程、正式治理以及程序规则在公司治理中的 作用。但是,具有亲属关系的股东控制的家族公司具有明显的关系与伦理维度,存在不同于普通公司 的治理机制与目标。家族公司的本质属性是关系嵌入性,亲属关系在家族公司中具有工具与目的双 重价值。家族公司的关系治理延续了家庭成员间的互动模式,受到家庭成员间社会规范的约束。在 典型的家族公司中,家族股东之间在权力与利益的分配上遵循利他主义、信任与互惠规范,这些规范 抑制了契约式谈判,维系了家族股东的强人合性,降低了交易成本,但会产生事后背信的风险。在解 释家族公司个案的事实与行为时,法官面临家族逻辑与公司逻辑之间的紧张对立,需特别分析案件发 生的背景与当事人的身份关系。在处理家族股东之间的内部利益纠纷时,应该充分考量信任与互惠 规范的法律价值,保护当事人的合理期待,以抑制事后的机会主义。基于索源公司案中家庭成员间的 特殊期待与信任,直接适用公司法上的默认规则会破坏家庭成员的共识,应该适用诚实信用原则填补 漏洞,以实现家族公司个案的正义,也体现公司法对信任等社会规范的尊重。     

Social Networks and Corporate Governance

We analyse frameworks that link corporate governance and firm values to governing boards' social networks and innovations in technology. Because agents create social networks with individuals with whom they share commonalities along the dimensions of social status and income, among other attributes, CEOs may participate in board members' social networks, which interferes with the quality of governance. At the same time, social connections with members of a board can allow for better evaluation of the members' abilities. Thus, in choosing whether to have board members with social ties to management, one must trade off the benefit of members successfully identifying high ability CEOs against the cost of inadequate monitoring due to social connections. Further, technologies like the Internet and electronic mail that reduce the extent of face‐to‐face networking cause agents to seek satisfaction of their social needs at the workplace, which exacerbates the impact of social networks on governance. The predictions of our model are consistent with recent episodes that appear to signify inadequate monitoring of corporate disclosures as well as with high levels of executive compensation. Additionally, empirical tests support the model's key implication that there is better governance and lower executive compensation in firms where networks are less likely to form.     

Does Corporate Governance Matter in the Contractual Form of Fund Management Companies in China?

ABSTRACT

Operating under a regulatory environment with weak enforcement of investor protection, the contractual form of fund management companies (FMCs) in China’s emerging fund industry presents some complex governance issues in addition to the conventional agency problems of modern public corporations. Using 288 firm-year observations covering more than 98 percent of FMCs in China, this article presents the first systematic study on whether the quality of corporate governance mechanisms affects the performance of the contractual form of FMCs. Our results suggest that FMCs with good corporate governance do matter in generating favorable performance for fund investors in China.     

Exploring the Agency Cost of Debt: Evidence from the ISS Governance Standards

Corporate governance is usually viewed in the context of strengthening shareholder rights and enhancing shareholders’ welfare. However, the impact of corporate governance on bondholders is much less understood. We explore how corporate governance influences the cost of debt financing. Using broad governance metrics encompassing fifty governance attributes reported by The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we document that stronger corporate governance is associated with a higher cost of debt. As governance strengthens by one standard deviation, the cost of debt rises by as much as 11 %. The results are robust even after controlling for both firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. Our results are important because they suggest that corporate governance has a palpable effect on critical corporate outcomes such as credit ratings and bond yields. More importantly, we show that, while corporate governance may mitigate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, it appears to exacerbate the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders (the agency cost of debt).     

非正规金融低违约率的动因:基于契约治理的解释

本文基于契约治理视角,阐释了非正规金融保持低违约率的动因,并结合茅于轼在山西省龙头村的信贷扶贫案例,对非正规金融保持低违约率进行经验验证。研究表明,非正规金融内生于特定的社会网络,社会资本机制、信誉机制、群体贷款或连带责任以及灵活担保机制,有助于克服信贷过程中的道德风险与机会主义行为,降低借款人的违约率。     

家族企业公司治理成本研究

公司治理成本分为公司治理机构的组织成本、总代理成本和协调决策成本三大部分.与非家族企业相比,家族企业治理成本的特征主要体现在代理成本相对较低,决策成本和协调成本随着企业的发展而不断增大三个方面.在治理成本的应用中,政府应充分考虑家族企业治理成本的表现特征对企业评价体系的影响,而家族企业则要重点寻找本企业的适度治理成本以加强公司治理建设.