财产保险公司资产负债管理多维量化评估体系研究

良好的资产负债管理是保险业可持续发展的基石,也是支持保险业在日益复杂的风险环境中保持稳健发展、防范系统性风险的重要保障。近年来,随着我国金融市场发展,业务产品创新加快,保险业在资产端与负债端的业务结构和风险特征出现了新情况、新变化。特别是部分保险公司缺乏有效的治理结构,采取激进经营、激进投资的策略,导致业务快进快出、风险敞口过大以及流动性问题,对保险公司资产负债匹配管理、风险控制提出了挑战。本文介绍了财产保险公司资产负债多维度量化评估规则设计原理、主要评估模型和评估方法,针对财产保险公司的负债特性提出的沉淀资金匹配,在成本收益匹配中有机地将资产投资收益与承保业务综合成本进行匹配,在现金流匹配模式中打破了僵化的匹配模式,解决了长期困扰财产保险公司的资产负债期限不匹配的问题,对财产保险公司资产负债管理具有重要意义。     

Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the Capital Markets and a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance Industry

The number and severity of natural catastrophes has increased dramatically over the last decade. As a result, there is now a shortage of capacity in the property catastrophe insurance industry in the U.S. This article discusses how insurance derivatives, particularly the Chicago Board of Trade's catastrophe options contracts, represent a possible solution to this problem. These new financial instruments enable the capital markets to provide the insurance industry with the reinsurance capacity it needs. The capital markets are willing to perform this role because of the new asset class characteristics of securitized insurance risk: positive excess returns and diversification benefits.
The article also demonstrates how insurance companies can use insurance derivatives such as catastrophe options and catastrophe-linked bonds as effective, low-cost risk management tools. In reviewing the performance of the catastrophe contracts to date, the authors report promising signs of growth and liquidity in these markets.     

Beyond takeovers: politics comes to corporate control

In the 1990s, politics will replace takeovers as the defining tool for corporate governance challenges, and a marketplace of ideas will replace the frenzied activity that once dominated the financial marketplace in the 1980s. In the transaction-driven market of the past, corporate raiders used junk bonds and other financial tools to take control of their targets. In the new marketplace of ideas, debate will replace debt as active shareholders press specific operating policies for their target corporations in a new politicized market for corporate control. John Pound, associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, reports that investors are already using shadow management committees, independent director slates, and outside experts to influence management policy. Pound cites Carl Icahn's battle for control of USX as an example of the emerging trend. What began as a hostile takeover ended with a negotiated solution in which many constituencies ultimately played a role in the restructuring of the company. This political approach to governance gives management a chance to embrace a bargain that is in its long-term interest. By promoting politically based tactics, managers can generate political capital with their major investors. Managers in companies as diverse as Avon and Lockheed now meet regularly with investors, seeking their input on both financial and strategic decisions. In the new politicized market for corporate control, striking a bargain with long-term investors is ultimately in the best interest of the corporation.     

Financial distress and bankruptcy prediction among listed companies using accounting,market and macroeconomic variables

Using a sample of 23,218 company-year observations of listed companies during the period 1980–2011, the paper investigates empirically the utility of combining accounting, market-based and macro-economic data to explain corporate credit risk. The paper develops risk models for listed companies that predict financial distress and bankruptcy. The estimated models use a combination of accounting data, stock market information and proxies for changes in the macro-economic environment. The purpose is to produce models with predictive accuracy, practical value and macro dependent dynamics that have relevance for stress testing. The results show the utility of combining accounting, market and macro-economic data in financial distress prediction models for listed companies. The performance of the estimated models is benchmarked against models built using a neural network (MLP) and against Altman's (1968) original Z-score specification.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

Social Capital,Trust, and Corporate Performance: How CSR Helped Companies During the Financial Crisis (and Why It Can Keep Helping Them)

The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.     

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Australian Companies

The authors examine a sample of large Australian companies over a 10‐year period with the aim of analyzing the role that firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms such as insider ownership and independent boards play in explaining a company's cost of capital. The Australian corporate system offers a unique environment for assessing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms. Australian companies have board structures and mechanisms that are similar in design to Anglo‐Saxon boards while offering a striking contrast to those of German and Japanese boards. At the same time, however, the Australian market for corporate control is much less active as a corrective mechanism against management entrenchment than its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, making the role of internal governance mechanisms potentially more important in Australia than elsewhere. The authors report that greater insider ownership, the presence of institutional blockholders, and independent boards are all associated with reductions in the perceived risk of a firm, thereby leading investors to demand lower rates of return on capital. In so doing, the study provides evidence of the important role of corporate governance in increasing corporate values.     

资本市场开放能否提高企业信息披露质量？——基于“沪港通”和年报文本挖掘的分析

提高信息披露质量对于改善上市公司治理结构和保护股东权益具有重要意义。本文利用2014年开通的“沪港通”机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放是否提高了企业的信息披露质量。从2010-2019年A股上市公司年报文本中提炼可读性指标衡量信息披露质量,使用匹配和双重差分方法进行实证研究,发现“沪港通”机制实施以后,标的公司(纳入“沪港通”的A股上市公司)的信息披露质量显著提高。这一结论对不同的估计方法、样本区间及控制变量组均保持稳健。异质性分析表明,对于盈余操纵水平较高、股价信息含量较低的企业,资本市场开放能够更好地改善其信息披露质量。本文丰富了资本市场开放对企业行为和绩效影响的实证研究,为继续推进资本市场开放政策提供了理论依据。     

International Insurance Society Roundtable on Risk Management After the Crisis

In this roundtable, an adviser to several central banks and founding member of the Group of 30 discusses regulatory reform and corporate risk management strategies with senior executives from three of the world's largest insurance companies. Much of the discussion attempts to explain why insurance and reinsurance companies have proven less vulnerable to the crisis than commercial and investment banks. Part of the explanation has to do with their financial conservatism, which is attributed to a habitual tendency to decision‐making that gives heavy weight to long‐term probabilities and risks. But along with this “actuarial” cast of mind is a growing willingness to accept and make use of risk‐based capital requirements—a decision‐making framework that is, in some respects, in conflict with the accounting and regulatory capital conventions that still prevail in the industry. In particular, “Solvency II”—the risk‐based capital guidelines that are set for adoption in 2012 by insurers in the European Union—is held up as a possible model for global use.     

Value Creation in the Insurance Industry

Using the insights of current research in corporate finance and financial institutions, the authors briefly present a consistent economic framework for looking at insurance. Shareholders of insurance companies provide risk capital that is invested in financial assets and therefore earns the market return of the assets it is invested in. However, due to the legal and fiscal environment insurance companies are in, they have a competitive disadvantage at investing, and this gives rise to frictional capital costs. The core competence of insurers is in managing the size of these frictional capital costs. Insurers must ensure that they can sell insurance for a price in excess of what they need to produce the cover they sell and compensate the incurred frictional costs on risk capital. It is through the ability to do so that insurers create shareholder value.     

Corporate Insurance Strategy: The Case of British Petroleum

The authors provide a fundamental rethinking of how corporations should evaluate various kinds of risks and risk management solutions—a rethinking that leads to a major shift in British Petroleum's approach to insuring property and casualty losses, product liability suits, and other insurable events. Conventional corporate practice—and until the early 1990s (when this article was written) the longstanding policy of BP and most large oil companies—was to insure against large losses while self‐insuring against smaller ones. In this article, the authors explain why BP has chosen to go against the conventional wisdom and instead buy insurance for mainly smaller losses while self‐insuring larger ones. The BP decision came down to factors affecting the market supply of insurance as well as the corporate demand for it. On the demand side, the authors demonstrate that the primary source of demand for insurance by large public companies is not, as standard insurance textbooks assume, to transfer risk away from the corporation's owners. Because corporate stockholders and bondholders effectively manage the effects of such risks by diversifying their own portfolios, the corporate demand for insurance in BP's case stems from the insurers' comparative advantage in evaluating and monitoring BP's smaller risks and in processing claims. On the supply side, the authors explain why the capacity of insurance companies and markets to underwrite very large or highly specialized exposures—when compared to the industry expertise and financial resources of companies like BP—is quite limited, and likely to remain so. Since premiums would be experience‐rated and prior years' losses simply rolled into the following years' premiums, there would be no effective transfer of risk, and so no gain to BP from buying insurance.     

消费金融资产证券化与系统性风险管理研究

在强大的市场需求和金融科技支持下,消费金融公司自正式试点以来呈现良好的发展态势,其中资产证券化成为消费金融公司的重要融资方式。资产证券化在助力消费金融公司增资扩容、改善流动性和提高运营稳健性的同时,也促使消费金融行业风险高并导致诉讼案件的增加。本文基于捷赢个人消费贷款资产支持证券的经验证据,明确了消费金融创新、消费金融风险与金融市场系统性风险管理之间的内在联系,揭示可以通过大数据精准获客、规范催收行为和智能风险防控等措施为消费金融市场发展保驾护航。因此,针对消费金融资产证券化,政府应制定专门的政策法规以强化风险管理,不断完善消费金融资产的监管机制,借助系统性风险管理来规避套利和资金风险,进而促进消费金融资产证券化的稳健有序发展。     

我国保险业在后危机时代的风险管理

美国次贷危机引发的华尔街金融风暴席卷全球,危机延伸到保险业导致美国保险巨头美国国际集团AIG由政府接管,金融危机使得人们更深层次地意识到风险管理对于金融业的重大意义。保险作为一种风险管理方式,其行业自身的风险管理尤为重要。本文借鉴国外保险公司的风险管理策略,并结合我国构建风险管理体系的经验与实际情况,提出关于构建我国保...     

跨期环境下的巨灾风险分担：一个比较分析

资本市场通过衍生品交易增强的管理风险能力,大大改善了其跨期风险分担功能。作为风险中介的再保险公司通过储备流动性的方式,在跨期风险分担方面具有比较优势,而传统的资本市场缺乏衍生品交易,更多地体现为跨地风险分担的功能。在资本市场的竞争压力下,直保公司和再保险公司都面临融资和风险转移问题,如果通过新的资本市场工具,将资产负债表上的成熟产品通过证券化的形式转移到资本市场上,那么资本市场将是有效率的。     

保险治理与公司违规——董事高管责任保险的治理效应研究

公司治理机制被认为是影响公司违规的重要因素,然而董事高管责任保险作为一种重要的外部治理机制,是否会影响公司违规尚未得到充分研究。本文研究发现董事高管责任保险显著降低公司违规概率,符合监督效应假说。经工具变量法、Heckman两阶段模型和倾向得分匹配法稳健性检验,上述结论依然成立。影响机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险显著降低了公司违规倾向,显著增加了违规后被稽查的概率,并降低了上市公司的第一类代理成本。对董事高管责任保险的监督职能做进一步分析发现:(1)董事高管责任保险对上市公司经营违规和领导人违规的监督效应更为显著,但对信息披露违规的治理作用并不显著;(2)董事高管责任保险发挥的监督职能与股权属性和保险机构股东治理存在替代效应,与外部审计师治理和董事长CEO二职分离存在互补效应;(3)分组检验结果表明,董事高管责任保险对公司违规的监督效应在外部监管环境较差或者公司内部信息透明度较高的情况下更加显著。本文既提供了保险合约通过公司治理渠道影响公司违规的证据,同时也表明保险机构通过董事高管责任保险为中国资本市场提供了一种较为有效的公司外部治理机制。     

基于政府参与情形的混合巨灾债券设计与实证分析

我国是属于自然灾害多发的国家,但由于保险市场与资本市场相对落后,目前对于巨灾的管理仍然主要依靠政府事后的财政拨款与民间捐赠。本文借鉴并改进了国内外相关研究结论,构建了由保险市场、资本市场以及政府所组成的巨灾风险分担模型。在该模型的基础上,以熵测度为准则,设计了一种有政府参与的混合巨灾债券,这种债券是传统的简单巨灾债券与...     

Quality of Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity in Brazil

Common sense suggests that the adoption of better corporate governance practices, which enable greater transparency, more protection against capital expropriation, and greater rights for investors, should have the effect of reducing the risk perceived by shareholders and so lead to lower required returns. This article investigates the existence of an inverse relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the cost of equity capital for Brazilian companies. The authors begin by constructing a broad index of corporate governance quality that combines four key aspects of corporate governance: (1) transparency and disclosure; (2) structure of the board of directors; (3) ownership and control structure; and (4) shareholder rights. To estimate the cost of equity, the CAPM was applied by using ex ante market premiums calculated with a simple discounted‐dividend method. On the basis of a sample of 67 Brazilian companies traded at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) during the period 1998–2008, the study concludes that there is a significant inverse relationship between the cost of equity and a number of proxies for effective governance, particularly those representing transparency and disclosure. Closer inspection of the reductions in cost of capital associated with improvements in the specific governance quality index components suggests that companies would benefit the most from prompt submission of information to regulators and full disclosure of executive pay.     

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.     

Private Equity,Corporate Governance,and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control

In the early 1980s, during the first U.S. wave of debt‐financed hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, finance professors Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback introduced the concept of the “market for corporate control” and defined it as “the market in which alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources.” Since then, the dramatic expansion of the private equity market, and the resulting competition between corporate (or “strategic”) and “financial” buyers for deals, have both reinforced and revealed the limitations of this old definition. This article explains how, over the past 25 years, the private equity market has helped reinvent the market for corporate control, particularly in the U.S. What's more, the author argues that the effects of private equity on the behavior of companies both public and private have been important enough to warrant a new definition of the market for corporate control—one that, as presented in this article, emphasizes corporate governance and the benefits of the competition for deals between private equity firms and public acquirers. Along with their more effective governance systems, top private equity firms have developed a distinctive approach to reorganizing companies for efficiency and value. The author's research on private equity, comprising over 20 years of interviews and case studies as well as large‐sample analysis, has led her to identify four principles of reorganization that help explain the success of these buyout firms. Besides providing a source of competitive advantage to private equity firms, the management practices that derive from these four principles are now being adopted by many public companies. And, in the author's words, “private equity's most important and lasting contribution to the global economy may well be its effect on the world's public corporations—those companies that will continue to carry out the lion's share of the world's growth opportunities.”