投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与现金股利政策

本文基于行为公司金融的视角,在相关研究的基础上进一步放宽了"理性人"假设,分析了投资者非理性与管理者非理性共存时对公司现金股利的影响,并以2010—2013年期间A股上市公司为研究样本进行了实证分析。结果发现,虽然投资者情绪与管理者过度自信各自对公司现金股利有不同的影响,但是投资者情绪和管理者过度自信两者的共同作用会对公司现金股利产生负向的影响。本文有助于人们从新的角度来认识股利政策。     

投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与现金股利政策北大核心

本文基于行为公司金融的视角,在相关研究的基础上进一步放宽了"理性人"假设,分析了投资者非理性与管理者非理性共存时对公司现金股利的影响,并以2010—2013年期间A股上市公司为研究样本进行了实证分析。结果发现,虽然投资者情绪与管理者过度自信各自对公司现金股利有不同的影响,但是投资者情绪和管理者过度自信两者的共同作用会对公司现金股利产生负向的影响。本文有助于人们从新的角度来认识股利政策。     

行为公司治理理论的研究综述

管理者过度自信行为与公司治理机制的相互作用构成了目前行为公司治理理论研究的主题.本文笔者首先分析了管理者过度自信产生的原因,其次阐述了管理者过度自信对公司治理的影响,最后提出了监督或制约过度自信管理者的三种治理机制.     

行为公司治理理论的研究综述

管理者过度自信行为与公司治理机制的相互作用构成了目前行为公司治理理论研究的主题。本文笔者首先分析了管理者过度自信产生的原因，其次阐述了管理者过度自信对公司治理的影响，最后提出了监督或制约过度自信管理者的三种治理机制。     

管理者过度自信与公司财务决策研究综述

<正>随着行为财务学的兴起,公司财务理论研究已经认识到投资者和管理者的非理性行为可能对公司财务决策产生影响。而在管理者非理性行为中,以过度自信最为引人注目。管理者过度自信是指管理者在进行决策时会因为高估自身能力和知识而产生偏差,从而导致管理者高估决策成功的可能性并低估与决策相关的风险。本文试图梳理和总结国内外有关管理者过度自信对投资、融资和股利决策影响的研究成果。     

高管过度自信与现金股利相关性研究——基于融资约束的视角

〗以股改后2007~2011年A股上市公司为样本,考察融资约束对高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系的影响。结果发现：高管过度自信与上市公司现金股利支付之间具有负相关关系,但这种负向关系只有在非国有上市公司较为显著。进一步研究表明,高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系在不同股权性质下存在差异的主要原因来自于外源融资约束的影响,较强的外源融资约束加剧了高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应,而外源融资环境的改善可以在一定程度上抑制高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应。     

公司管理者过度自信、过度投资行为与治理机制——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文从行为金融学视角出发,以2002~2009年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,研究管理者过度自信这一心理因素对公司过度投资行为的影响,并检验了公司内外部治理机制对它的抑制作用。研究表明,中国上市公司的管理者过度自信与公司过度投资行为之间存在显著正相关关系,而现有的公司治理机制并不能对这种非效率行为进行有效约束。本文的研究发现有助于我们更好理解中国上市公司的过度投资行为,也对如何完善中国上市公司治理机制有一定启示意义。     

高管过度自信对现金股利波动性的影响研究

本文以2008-2012年A股上市公司为研究样本,从高管过度自信视角研究我国上市公司股利政策的波动性问题。研究结果表明,相对于不存在过度自信高管的上市公司,存在过度自信高管的上市公司在决定是否支付股利上随意性更大,在上市公司现金股利发放的连续性上也更差;而在上市公司股利支付水平的稳定性上,高管的过度自信心理行为的影响并不显著。这一结论为解释我国上市公司股利政策波动性问题提供了一个新的思路。     

公司治理视角下我国上市公司股利政策研究

股利政策是我国上市公司主要的分配政策,也是投资者获得回报的重要途径。股利政策对于公司的长远发展,乃至对资本市场的健康成长,都有着非常重要的意义。从界定公司治理结构和股利政策入手,论述公司治理结构与股利政策的关系,在分析公司治理视角下股利政策分析的基础上,提出了公司治理视角下上市公司股利政策的建议。     

公司治理视角下我国上市公司股利政策研究

股利政策是我国上市公司主要的分配政策,也是投资者获得回报的重要途径。股利政策对于公司的长远发展,乃至对资本市场的健康成长,都有着非常重要的意义。从界定公司治理结构和股利政策入手,论述公司治理结构与股利政策的关系,在分析公司治理视角下股利政策分析的基础上,提出了公司治理视角下上市公司股利政策的建议。     

Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.     

现金股利政策影响因素实证分析——以中国酒业上市公司为例

股利政策作为现代公司理财的核心内容之一,不仅关系着公司股东的利益还关系着公司的稳定发展,因此合理的股利分配政策无论是对于股东的利益还是对于公司的稳定发展都有着重要的意义。而影响股利政策的因素也有很多,不同的因素对其影响也不同。文章选取了中国酒业上市公司为研究对象,根据2009、2010两年派发现金股利的情况和上市公司年报的财务数据资料,通过实证研究找出影响中国酒业上市公司现金股利政策的主要因素,并通过具体地分析,进一步为该行业股利政策的制定和规范提出具有合理性和可取性的建议,以提高企业的价值,实现股东财富最大化的目标。     

Reappearing Dividends

During the last two decades of the 20th century, the propensity of U.S. companies to pay cash dividends declined significantly. The trend away from dividends accelerated during the late 1990s, leading some economists to conclude that dividend policy was shifting in a very fundamental way. But there was a sharp reversal in this trend starting in 2000.
This article investigates five possible explanations why dividends are reappearing. Given the explosion of new companies during the 1990s, the authors find that part of this rebound can be explained by the "maturity hypothesis"– by the need for such companies to pay out their excess "free cash fiow" to reassure investors that it will not be wasted on value-destroying investments. The authors also report evidence that some companies have chosen to use dividends in part to restore investor confidence about the "quality" of corporate earnings in the wake of concerns over corporate governance. Third, the authors' findings suggest that U.S. companies have responded to the recent dividend tax cut, as one might expect, although the rebound in dividends started well before tax reform became a widely discussed possibility. Finally, the study finds little support for behavioralist explanations in which managers "cater" to irrational investor preferences for dividends. Although the authors hesitate to read too much into the recent rebound, their evidence is consistent with the idea that corporate payout policy has shifted back in favor of conventional cash dividends.     

现金股利政策影响因素的实证研究——以上市银行为例

股利政策作为现代公司理财的核心内容之一,不仅关系着股东、债权人的利益,而且关系着公司的未来发展,因此股利分配政策一直是公司内外部利益相关者关注的焦点.本文以上市银行为研究对象,首先分析了2008-2012年上市银行的股利支付情况,然后运用多元回归模型从盈利能力、现金流状况、偿债能力、公司规模、股权结构等方面分析影响上市银行股利分配的因素,以期研究结果能为上市银行制定合理的股利分配政策提供实践指导.     

Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy: A Test Using Antitakeover Legislation

Managers strongly prefer not to pay dividends as dividend payouts reduce the amount of cash subject to managerial discretion ( Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986 ). Previous empirical tests of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout policy employ endogenous measures of this agency problem. Using a relatively exogenous measure that incorporates state antitakeover laws and the differences‐in‐differences approach, our analysis indicates that dividend payout ratios and propensities fall when managers are insulated from takeovers. The impact of antitakeover laws on dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and small firms.     

Retail minority shareholders and corporate reputation as determinant of dividend policy in Australia

This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies. While retail investors are typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived in academic literature to have limited influence on corporate dividend decisions, casual empiricism suggests the contrary. We hypothesise that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers' incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the propensity to manage for corporate reputation is positively related to the degree of retail shareholder base. We find empirical evidence of managers of Australian companies catering to the retail investors' preference for dividends when setting dividend policy, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of these retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and franking credits.     

Corporate governance and operating performance of Chinese listed firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation in China. Our study introduces a composite measure of corporate governance to measure the association between corporate governance and Chinese firms’ performance and valuation. Because agency theory suggests that companies with better corporate governance standards perform better, we propose that better governed Chinese firms would have greater performance and higher valuation. We find that our composite measure of corporate governance is positively and significantly associated with firm performance and valuation. These findings have implications for policy makers, researchers, managers, and investors in general and those in emerging markets in particular.     

Government Ownership and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Newly Privatised Firms

In this paper we examine the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Using a multinational sample of newly privatised firms from 43 countries, we find strong and robust evidence indicating that dividend payout is negatively related to government ownership, consistent with the predictions of agency theory. We also find that country‐level corporate governance affects the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Specifically, the adverse effects of government ownership on dividend policy are more pronounced in countries with weak law and order and a lower level of checks and balances. Our results are important, as they show that government ownership, as well as the institutional environment, does in fact affect the critical corporate policies, such as dividend policy, of newly privatised firms.     

上市公司大股东的“掏空”路径及制衡机制研究

在中国股权相对集中或高度集中的上市公司中,由于控股股东或大股东掌握着公司的实际控制权,大股东的自利天性与机会主义行为可能导致其利用资金占用、关联交易、股利政策和内幕交易等种种手段实现大股东掏空。为遏制大股东掏空现象的泛滥,需从内部治理和外部制衡两个角度,构建大股东掏空的内外部制衡机制,以保护中小股东权益的不受侵害。     

公司治理对保险公司绩效影响的实证检验——以24家中资财产保险公司为例

近年来,金融机构的治理问题日益引起学者们的重视,成为公司治理领域研究的热点。综观已有的国内外文献,国外研究侧重于不同所有制保险公司的治理差异,且样本多来自英美发达国家;而国内保险公司治理研究刚刚起步,在研究变量、研究样本的选择上还存在一些不足。鉴于此,本文以24家中资财产保险公司为样本,实证检验了股权结构、董事会特征、高管激励机制、信息披露透明度等治理机制对保险公司绩效的影响。