税收遵从影响因素的实验分析

税收不遵从问题是各国政府面临的一大难题,各国政府都力图从那些影响纳税人遵从决策的因素中找到有效的方法来提高税收遵从水平.运用实验的方法对纳税人税收遵从的主要影响因素进行分析表明:较高的税收检查概率、罚款率,纳税人从政府获得较多的公共物品以及较低的"不存在第三方报告的收入"的比重,会导致纳税人税收遵从率较高;纳税人感到自已是不公平的受害者,税收遵从率较低;税率、纳税人收入水平及性别对税收遵从的影响是不确定的.应从树立现代税收意识、加强税收检查、提高税收执法质量等方面提高我国纳税人税收遵从水平.     

基于税收遵从的道德思考

本文对传统税收遵从模型进行了分析,结果表明,纳税人遵从与否不仅是税率、稽查概率和处罚率等外部要素的函数,还取决于内在的遵从意愿。因此,税收道德的培养和完善将有利于税收遵从水平的提高。对于我国而言,税收道德的培养有赖于:一是要在税制改革中遵循公平原则,二是要加强对税款使用的监督,以保证政府在提供公共产品和公共服务过程中资金使用的合意性和高效率。     

纳税人风险偏好对遵从决策的影响——基于前景理论的实证研究北大核心CSSCI

行为经济理论认为,人的风险偏好会影响其行为选择。纳税人的遵从行为也可能受其风险偏好的影响。前景理论为纳税人风险偏好与遵从决策的关系提供一种更有说服力的解释。本文采用问卷调查方法,设计"纳税情况选择",运用Ordered-Logistic与Ordered-Probit回归模型,模拟纳税人在不确定条件下的遵从决策。实证研究结果表明,持"纳税是企业或个人的一种损失"观点者与持"逃税是企业或个人的一种收益"观点者相比,前者更倾向于风险爱好,更具有偷逃税行为选择。本文建议,应重新审视税收本质理论,注重税收激励的作用,通过提高公共物品供给效率、在管理中更多应用预缴制度等方式来提高纳税人的纳税遵从度。     

纳税人税收遵从行为博弈分析

创建基于行为博弈的税收遵从均衡模型,将处于相同税收境况的纳税人视为一个群体,则个体纳税人选择税收遵从策略从纳税人群体角度来看就是以一定的概率选择该种策略。面对正常税务检查与严格税务检查并存的环境,纳税人税收遵从博弈稳定均衡策略形成不但取决于税制的特性,而且依赖于其他纳税人的税收遵从决策。依据税收遵从博弈均衡的形成机理,提出建立我国税收遵从激励监督机制的对策。     

“互联网+”背景下税收合作性遵从实现的路径分析北大核心CSSCI

在"互联网+"的背景下,我国税收环境将得以优化,包括涉税信息更加对称、税收征管效率有效提高、纳税人纳税成本大幅降低、纳税人风险甄别机制更加精准等,这使得税收合作性遵从的实现成为可能。本文结合国外有关税收合作性遵从的"遵从坡面模型"进行分析,梳理出可提高我国税收合作性遵从度的具体路径,包括:推行纳税人自我评估制度、进行有效的纳税成本管理以及创造更加公平的纳税环境等。     

论法律维度的税收遵从

法律维度的税收遵从是纳税人依照税收法律规定,正确计算、及时准确申报、按时缴纳税款,并接受税务机关依照法定程序进行管理的行为。税收遵从的法律成本表现为立法成本、执法成本、司法成本和守法成本,立法成本直接影响执法成本、司法成本与守法成本。传统税收文化与现代税法理念的冲突直接表现为纳税人的税收不遵从。本文提出,应从宪法层面、税法层面、税收征管制度层面及税收文化层面对纳税人权利加以保护,从而实现纳税人依法自觉诚信纳税的终极目标。     

纳税遵从意识若干影响因素评析

纳税遵从是一个国家税收征纳关系是否和谐的重要标志，关系着税收法治的进程和税收征管的质量及效率。纳税人遵从税法意识的形成，要受到政治、经济、心理、习惯、环境等诸多因素的影响。本文以纳税人、征税人、用税人等“人”的因素为主线，研究了物质利益诱导、税收行政执法和政府行为对纳税遵从意识的影响，并相应提出了提升纳税遵从意识的对策建议。     

提高我省中小企业税收遵从度的征管策略研究 ——以榆林市为例

税收遵从理论为税务行政提供了崭新的视角来审视现代税收管理中征管与服务的税企关系.当前,针对中小企业的税收遵从现状,我省各级税务部门也进行了一些理论研究与实践探索,但仍处于初级阶段.本文通过借鉴国内外税收遵从理论和征管经验,以促进中小企业纳税人自愿遵从为目标,对我市税收征管模式以及税收遵从程度的基本情况进行分析,提出了以专业平台、专业人员对中小企业实行差别化管理等征管改革策略,以期提高征管效率,对我省税收征管体制创新起到促进作用.     

纳税服务机制设计路径探讨

本文基于机制设计理论,以始于纳税人需求,基于纳税人满意,终于纳税人遵从这一纳税服务工作主线为目标,结合纳税服务实践从纳税服务的基础机制、保障机制、激励机制三个层次探讨符合我国国情的纳税服务机制设计路径,进而完善纳税服务体系构建,促进纳税人税法遵从,提高税收征管质量和效率。     

国外税收遵从成本研究述评

税收遵从成本的效应和特征表明:政府的税收决策必须有利于降低纳税人特别是广大中小企业和个人纳税人的遵从成本,或者至少不会增加其遵从成本。同国际上对税收遵从成本的研究相比,我国至今在这方面的研究还处于起步阶段。     

Reciprocity in Corporate Tax Compliance—Evidence from Ozone Pollution

In a tax—public goods reciprocity framework between citizens and the state, managers view taxes as a payment to the government in exchange for public goods, and hence they adjust their willingness to pay taxes as public good quality changes. We show that corporate tax planning intensity increases with ground-level ozone pollution. Revisions in ozone pollution regulations cause counties that failed the revised and more stringent standards to reduce ozone pollution. Consequently, firms headquartered in these counties reduced corporate tax planning intensity relative to firms in other counties. The ozone-tax link varies in the predicted directions with public attention to pollution, potential welfare loss due to ozone, managers’ stakeholder orientation, taxpayers’ polluting status, political preferences, and civic norms. We also find consistent results for Superfund cleanups of hazardous waste sites. Our research sheds light on reciprocity as a potential mechanism influencing corporate tax compliance.     

Is Tax Harmonization Useful?

It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on international tax competition that an inefficient provision of public goods can only be avoided, if taxes are sufficiently coordinated. In this paper we use a model where governments use commodity and factor taxes in the tax competition game. We show that governments will always choose a second-best efficient tax structure in the Nash equilibrium if they have access to a residence-based capital tax and either a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax. Moreover, we show that tax competition need not foreclose third-best efficiency in a world with a restricted tax policy toolkit.     

税收立法权纵向分权的制度保证

基于地方政府的相对优势,税收立法权适当下放可以提高效率。但是由于政府是由追求自身利益最大化的众多部门和官员组成的,因此,权力的下放应有必要的制度保证。就我国的现状而言,税收立法权的纵向分权应有以下制度保证:加强公共品需求对公共品供给的影响;税收立法权由立法机关掌握;提高财政透明度;严格规范政府间的规则。     

Uncertainty in the Theory of Public Finance

This paper discusses the role that the economics of uncertainty has played in the theory of public finance. From being mostly concerned with its choice-theoretic foundations in the 1950s and 1960s, the theory of expected utility maximisation and risk averse behaviour has contributed decisively to the development of several areas of the theory of public finance. Three of these have been chosen here to illustrate the general point: The theory of taxation and risk taking with focus on portfolio choice, the role of uncertainty in public expenditure analysis (emphasising the effect of public goods provision on private risk taking) and the theory of tax evasion and compliance.     

Indirect tax harmonization and global public goods

This paper identifies conditions under which, starting from any tax-distorting equilibrium, destination- and origin-based indirect tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially Pareto improving in the presence of global public goods. The first condition (unrequited transfers between governments) requires that transfers are designed in such a way that the marginal valuations of the global public goods are equalized, whereas the second (conditional revenue changes) requires that the change in global tax revenues, as a consequence of tax harmonization, is consistent with the under/over-provision of global public goods relative to the (modified) Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization results in redistributing the gains from a reduction in global deadweight loss and any changes in global tax revenues according to the Pareto principle. And this is the case independently of the tax principle in place (destination or origin).     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Agglomeration,tax competition,and fiscal equalization

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It uses a model focusing on the strategic reason for capital taxes to demonstrate that per capita fiscal capacity equalization improves the spatial allocation of capital provided a sufficiently rich (marginally) larger region and sufficiently strong agglomeration externalities. If tax revenue is used to finance public goods, per capita fiscal capacity equalization generally cannot simultaneously eliminate public good inefficiency and spatial inefficiency. However, the achievement of full efficiency for ex ante identical regions requires excessive (full) equalization in the presence (absence) of agglomeration externalities.     

Laffer effect, gross substitution, marginal cost of public funds and the level property of public good provision

This paper examines the Laffer effect in the Ramsey tax-model with linear consumption taxes and a representative consumer. It is assumed that the private goods and the public good are weakly separable. It is demonstrated that if all of the private goods are weak gross complements to each other, then the Laffer effect does not exist, in other words, higher tax rates can always achieve more tax revenue. In contrast, if all of the private goods are strict gross substitutes, then the Laffer effect does exist. Moreover, if all of the private goods are weak gross substitutes, then the government cannot fully acquire the leisure endowment through taxes on consumption goods. We also show that gross substitution works to raise the marginal cost of public funds.     

Two Games of Interjurisdictional Competition When Local Governments Provide Industrial Public Goods

In this paper we investigate two different games of interjurisdictional competition when local governments provide public goods that benefit industry. Governments play a game either in tax rates on mobile industrial capital or in public expenditures. Although the literature suggests that competition in public expenditures is more competitive than in tax rates, this is not necessarily true in the case of industrial public goods. Moreover, in the presence of industrial public goods interjurisdictional competition may also lead to overprovision of public services.     

公共品视角下的审计委托模式研究

现行审计委托模式是造成“独立审计不独立”,进而导致审计失败的主要原因。现代企业的“社会企业”特征,使会计报表及其审计信息具有公共品的属性,审计失败很大程度上是会计报表审计信息这一公共品私人供给模式的失败。公共品的非竞争性和非排他性特征决定了其公共供给模式较私人供给模式更有效率;税务机关作为特殊的公共部门,令其作为会计信息审计的委托人在独立性、激励和实践上更具优势。当然,会计报表审计的税务机关委托模式作为一个新的审计委托模式,其制度需不断完善。