终极控股股东行为与会计稳健性的实证研究

本文以2003—2009年沪深A股主板上市公司为样本,采用配对检验和多元回归的方法,研究了终极控股股东与会计稳健性有效需求不足假说和利益侵占假说。研究发现:(1)终极控股股东控制权比率越高的组,会计稳健性越小,即或有控股样本公司会计稳健性高于相对控股组样本公司,而相对控股样本组公司又高于绝对控股组样本公司;(2)终极控股股东控制权与所有权分离程度越大,会计稳健性越低;(3)终极控股股东为国有性质的公司会计稳健性高于民营性质的公司。本文的研究深化了我们对新兴市场国家制度环境下会计稳健性理解,同时对进一步规范会计稳健性相关的制度安排和监管具有重要的启示和政策意义。     

论会计稳健性对我国国有控股上市公司过度投资的制约作用

本文主要从会计稳健性角度探讨其对国有控股上市公司过度投资的制约作用。首先,从理论上分析会计稳健性的"及时确认损失,推迟确认收益"的特有治理机制可以制约国有控股控股上市公司因信息不对称和委托代理导致的过度投资。然后,分析国企的股东和债权人为减少国企过度投资带来的损失,对会计稳健性是有需求的,即会计稳健性对国企过度投资的制约是现实存在的。最后,结合国有控股上市公司特有的治理特征进行分析,得出会计稳健性在特有的环境中治理作用被弱化。因此,本文最后为了会计稳健性更好发挥对国有控股上市公司过度投资制约作用提出两方面建议。     

信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用与审计师选择——来自深市A股上市公司的经验证据

资金侵占是控股股东利用控制权获取私人利益的重要表现形式,也是其解决资金缺乏的重要途径,普遍存在于信息不对称严重的公司。而有效的信息披露制度则会提高公司透明度,减轻信息不对称程度,保护中小投资者免受控股股东的掠夺。作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,也能够缓解代理问题,对中小投资者起到保护作用。因此,本文选取深圳A股上市公司作为样本,研究信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用以及审计师选择之间的关系。实证结果发现,信息披露质量越高的公司会减少控股股东的资金占用并且倾向于选择高质量的审计师,高质量审计师也能够起到降低控股股东的资金占用的效果。这一研究结果对加强信息披露监管以及审计的治理效应有着重要的启示。     

上市公司定向增发注入资产的规制

控股股东以定向增发方式向上市公司注入资产，可以减少关联交易、避免同业竞争、增强独立性，还可以提高上市公司资产质量、改善财务状况、增强持续盈利能力。本文立足证券市场立法和监管实践，从保护投资者角度出发．围绕强化公司治理和提高信息披露质量两个最重要的环节，对国内上市公司控股股东以定向增发方式，向上市公司注入资产的有关案例进行研究分析，以期为完善相关制度规定提供对策建议。     

建立现代企业制度中的财务与会计问题

公司治理的完善与否直接影响现代企业制度的实施进程。所有权与经营权的分离是现代公司治理的重要特征,按照委托代理关系,我国上市公司存在着先天性的制度缺陷,表现在国有股权控制权不明确,国有股权过于集中,内部人控制现象严重,“三会”不能起到对公司管理层应有的控制作用等。为建立现代企业制度,完善公司治理结构就需要从财务治理、内部控制、会计监管和信息披露角度进行分析。     

规范我国会计信息披露制度的对策思考

理论界对我国上市公司会计信息披露问题成因的研究,一般认为:"内部人控制"是产生披露问题的根本原因,会计规范制定与实施方面的局限性则是直接原因,注册会计师执业质量不高和监管的弱化使股市成为会计信息披露问题滋生蔓延的土壤.针对上述问题,笔者认为应主要通过以下措施来完善我国上市公司的会计信息披露制度.     

监管模式变更有助于提高会计信息可比性吗?——基于信息披露分行业监管视角的经验证据

基于2015年上市公司信息披露监管模式由"辖区监管"转向"行业监管"的背景,借鉴制度变迁理论考察信息披露分行业监管对会计信息可比性的影响.研究发现:相对于辖区监管模式,分行业监管模式能显著提升会计信息可比性,而且在受到重点监管和发布信息披露指引的行业内公司效果更好.这种监管模式变更对会计信息可比性的提升效果在机构投资者持股比例高和内部控制质量低的公司更显著,信息透明度的改善成为分行业监管模式提高会计信息可比性的一个重要机制.可见,信息披露分行业监管政策的实施已经成为健全信息披露监管体系、构建内外部治理结构互动机制、提升会计信息透明度以及提高会计信息可比性的一项重要制度.     

税收政策、股权结构与董事会特征对会计稳健性的影响——基于问卷调查的实证研究

稳健性又称谨慎性,是会计信息质量的一个重要特征。会计稳健性原则是在会计理论与会计实务发展的基础上产生的,普遍应用于企业财务管理过程中。本文从税收政策、股权结构与董事会特征三个方面提出上市公司会计稳健性影响因素的理论假设并构建相关模型,并以问卷调查的方式收集了326家上市公司的相关数据,对我国上市公司跨级稳健性影响因素进行了实证分析。研究显示:上市公司股权结构中管理层持股比例负向影响会计稳健性水平,股权制衡正向影响会计稳健性水平,国有控股负向影响会计稳健性水平;董事会特征中两职分离正向影响会计稳健性水平,董事会规模负向影响会计稳健性水平,独立董事正向影响会计稳健性水平;高税负的税收政策,上市公司会计稳健性水平相对高,低税负的税收政策,上市公司会计稳健性水平相对低。     

强制性制度变迁与盈余稳健性——来自深沪证券市场的经验证据

本文以1995—2004年深沪两市全部A股上市公司为研究样本,考察会计制度的强制性变迁是否显著提高我国上市公司会计盈余的稳健性。研究结果显示,1995—1997期间上市公司会计盈余不具有稳健性,意在提高上市公司稳健性水平的《股份有限公司会计制度》的实施并未实质性增强1998—2000期间会计盈余的稳健性水平,而更为积极贯彻国际通行的稳健会计政策的《企业会计制度》的实施则显著提升了2001-2004期间我国上市公司会计盈余的稳健性。然而,单独对盈利公司所作的进一步检验却表明,2001—2004期间会计盈余显示的稳健性特征主要是由于亏损公司"洗大澡"造成的。研究结果表明,单纯转变会计准则并不能改善会计信息的质量,除非附以相配套的强有力的法律和执行机制。     

财务报告问询函对会计稳健性的影响:直接效应与溢出效应

基于非处罚性监管的视角，考察财务报告问询函对收函公司会计稳健性的直接效应，以及与收函公司具有联结关系的公司会计稳健性的间接影响即溢出效应。结果发现：财务报告问询函能提高收函公司的会计稳健性，并对与收函公司具有审计师联结和高管联结关系的上市公司（简称“关联公司”）的会计稳健性产生积极的监管效应；正式制度与非正式制度的异质性会导致问询函监管效应的差异，即在交易所监管力度较强和社会信任环境更好时，财务报告问询函对收函公司及具有审计师联结关系的关联公司的会计稳健性影响更明显，但对具有高管联结关系的关联公司的会计稳健性影响并不显著。     

Institutional incentives and earnings quality: The influence of government ownership in China

We examine the effect of government ownership and its associated institutional incentives on firms’ earnings quality using a sample of Chinese firms during the transitional economy between 1998 and 2005 when state-owned and non-state-owned firms were traded in the stock exchanges. We find that, in China, state-owned firms exhibit a lower earnings quality property than non-state-owned firms. Particularly, state-owned firms have more earnings smoothing, more frequently managed earnings toward target, less frequent timely recognition of losses, and less value relevance, relative to non-state-owned firms. We also find that state-owned firms have significantly higher discretionary current accruals than non-state-owned firms. We conclude that the Chinese government, through its controlling ownership of state-owned firms, creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively influence these listed firms’ financial reporting.     

Are Controlling Shareholders Influencing the Relationship Between CSR and Earnings Quality? Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This article examines how controlling shareholders may affect the relationship between the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings quality. We find that controlling shareholders have a significant impact on the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality; the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality is significantly positive in privately owned enterprises but not state-owned enterprises; and, among state-owned enterprises, the relationship is weaker at enterprises controlled by the central government than at those controlled by local governments. Our article highlights the differential impacts of controlling shareholders on the relationship between CSR and earnings quality.     

Excess perks and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

We investigate the impact of excess perk consumption on crash risk in state-owned enterprises in China. To enjoy excess perks, executives in state-owned enterprises have an incentive to withhold bad news for extended periods, leading to higher future stock price crash risk. Consistent with this assertion, we find a positive correlation between excess perks and crash risk. The findings are robust to the inclusion of other determinants of crash risk identified in the literature, such as earnings management, conditional conservatism, and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. The results still hold after accounting for possible endogeneity issues using a two-stage least squares estimation. Earnings management (conditional conservatism) helps amplify (lessen) this impact. Moreover, better external monitoring mitigates the impact of excess perks on firm crash risk. We further find that the impact of excess perks on crash risk is more pronounced in firms whose executives are approaching retirement and persists for at least two years.     

政府控制对审计质量的双重影响

本文从上市公司和会计事务所的产权性质与区域属性的角度,研究了政府控制对审计质量的影响。研究发现,国有企业和本地会计事务所审计的公司的盈余管理水平较低;而较低的盈余管理水平能够降低审计师出具非标意见的概率;同时,国有企业在控制了盈余管理水平的情况下,其得到非标意见的概率相对要低。研究结果表明,政府控制对审计质量的影响具有双重性:一方面,政府控制增强了会计事务所的"本土知识"优势和抵御公司压力的能力,进而提高了公司报表质量;另一方面,政府控制依据它对审计市场的控制降低了出具非标意见的概率,损害了审计质量。     

Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU

The ongoing global financial crisis has led to the largest increase in state intervention since the Great Depression. Direct government ownership in publicly-traded corporations has increased dramatically since 2008. How will this increase in public ownership affect the governance of these erstwhile private companies? We examine the impact of government ownership on corporate governance using a sample of firms from the European Union, a region that is relatively familiar with active government participation. Our main finding is that government ownership is associated with lower governance quality. We further show that while government intervention is negatively related to governance quality in civil law countries, it is positively related to governance quality in common law countries. Finally, we find that the preferential voting rights of golden shares are especially damaging to governance quality.     

内部控制与异质机构持股的治理效应

本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。     

Is cross-listing a panacea for improving earnings quality? The case of H- and B-share firms in China

This study examines whether cross-listed Chinese H- and B-share firms exhibit higher earnings quality relative to non-cross-listed A-share firms based on seven accounting- and market-based earnings quality attributes, including accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, conservatism, timeliness and value relevance. We find that earnings quality does not differ between cross-listed and non-cross listed firms in terms of accrual quality, timeliness and value relevance, and that H- and B-share firms report earnings with lower quality in terms of persistence and predictability. We also find that the B-firms report smoother earnings, while the H-firms report more conservative earnings. The results of a battery of cross-sectional, endogeneity and sensitivity analyses either confirm our primary findings of no earnings quality difference or reveal lower earnings quality for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-listed firms. Considering that cross-listing in China is primarily driven by government decisions, our findings suggest that, without proper incentives, cross-listing is not likely to be a panacea for higher quality financial reporting.     

Accounting conservatism and corporate governance

We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally, we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier manner.

Institutional Ownership Type and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran

Institutional ownership is an important factor in corporate governance. Institutional investors play important roles in firms because of their substantial shareholdings and their capability to monitor managers. However, the question is whether they are capable of monitoring the managers. The literature has provided different evidence for the monitoring role of institutional investors. This study attempts to provide insights into the monitoring roles of institutional investors by examining the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Institutional investors are classified into two groups, namely active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, based on their monitoring power in Iran. A multidimensional method is used to measure the various aspects of earnings quality, such as earnings response coefficient, predictive value of earnings, discretionary accruals, conservatism, and real earnings management. The results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership has positive effects on proxies of earnings quality. Nonetheless, passive institutional ownership does not have any power to affect earnings quality. Moreover, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that institutional ownership leads to more earnings quality and not the reverse.