Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the the default and prepayment embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender, and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, arrangement fees, prepayment penalties, any MIG premiums required, and co-insurance exposure. With empirical inputs, this model may eventually be useful as a mark-to-value proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining valued added accounting, appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business drivers. Fixed-rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed-rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We compare endownment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatilities.     

Strategic default,workout, and commercial mortgage valuation

This paper extends existing equilibrium commercial mortgage pricing models by endogenizing negotiated workout into the usual noncooperative lending game. Workout is a feasible subgame strategy for the lender to play whenever foreclosure transaction costs exist for either party to a loan transaction. In particular, negotiated workout solutions Pareto dominate the foreclosure alternative when default occurs. To obtain our results, we embed a cooperative bargaining game within a noncooperative mortgage loan/default game. We also address the valuation wedge problem that occurs when foreclosure transaction costs are introduced. Through the notion of replacement game equilibrium, we find symmetric mortgage pricing solutions that eliminate the valuation wedge and thus suggest that lending will occur in commercial real estate mortgage markets even when foreclosure transaction costs exist.     

The “Rent-To-Own” mortgage and prepayment risk

The most important risk factor in the mortgage and mortgage-backed security market has been prepayment risk. Various innovations have arisen to deal with it but none hedge it fully. The Rent-To-Own (RTO) mortgage discussed here is a mortgage instrument that reduces or even reverses prepayment risk. It does so by creating an incentive structure within the framework of the mortgage contract that penalizes prepayment when interest rates are low and rewards it when interest rates are high. This is the opposite of standard mortgages. The RTO incentive structure is based on a unique buyout feature. Borrowers who want to buy out the financial interest of the lender may do so whenever they want, but the buyout price is a negative function of the market interest rates prevailing currently, that is, at the time of the buyout. Hence the lower these rates, the higher the buyout price. Other advantages of the RTO mortgage are also described.     

Index Option Pricing Models with Stochastic Volatility and Stochastic Interest Rates

This paper specifies a multivariate stochasticvolatility (SV) model for the S & P500 index and spot interest rateprocesses. We first estimate the multivariate SV model via theefficient method of moments (EMM) technique based on observations ofunderlying state variables, and then investigate the respective effects of stochastic interest rates, stochastic volatility, and asymmetric S & P500 index returns on option prices. We compute option prices using both reprojected underlying historical volatilities and the implied risk premiumof stochastic volatility to gauge each model's performance through direct comparison with observed market option prices on the index. Our major empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, while allowing for stochastic volatility can reduce the pricing errors and allowing for asymmetric volatility or leverage effect does help to explain the skewness of the volatility smile, allowing for stochastic interest rates has minimal impact on option prices in our case. Second, similar to Melino and Turnbull (1990), our empirical findings strongly suggest the existence of a non-zero risk premium for stochastic volatility of asset returns. Based on the implied volatility risk premium, the SV models can largely reduce the option pricing errors, suggesting the importance of incorporating the information from the options market in pricing options. Finally, both the model diagnostics and option pricing errors in our study suggest that the Gaussian SV model is not sufficientin modeling short-term kurtosis of asset returns, an SV model withfatter-tailed noise or jump component may have better explanatory power.     

Time series models of mortgage choice: Evidence of lender influence

Unit root, co-integration, and Granger Causality are used to test specification of a generalized time series model of mortgage choice. Unit root tests determine that both the fixed-adjustable spread (FAsp) and the proportion of ARM originations (AP) are first difference stationary. The cointegrating vector between FAsp and AP was found to be weak, raising questions regarding their long-term relationship. Causality tests determined that ARM originations Granger causes the fixed-adjustable mortgage spread (APFAsp) rather than FAspAP. This result suggests that mortgage originators adjust the current FAsp spread based on last periods allocation. The coefficient vector for this specification was unstable and became increasingly negative during the 1980s.     

Negotiated versus Cost-Based Transfer Pricing

This paper studies an incomplete contracting model to compare the effectiveness of alternative transfer pricing mechanisms. Transfer pricing serves the dual purpose of guiding intracompany transfers and providing incentives for upfront investments at the divisional level. When transfer prices are determined through negotiation, divisional managers will have insufficient investment incentives due to hold-up problems. While cost-based transfer pricing can avoid such hold-ups, it does suffer from distortions in intracompany transfers. Our analysis shows that negotiation frequently performs better than a cost-based pricing system, though we identify circumstances under which cost-based transfer pricing emerges as the superior alternative.     

Bank lending ‘manias’ in theory and history

A popular view of banking crises sees them as consequences of prior bank lending manias. Such manias are supposed to be especially likely in legally unrestricted banking systems, where banks can issue notes and are not subject to statutory reserve requirements. Here it is argued that the bank lending mania hypothesis (1) exaggerates the role of subjective factors, including bankers' confidence or optimism, as a stimulus to bank lending, and (2) is not supported by evidence from past, legally unrestricted banking systems.     

The impact of settlement period on sales price

This study is an empirical investigation of the impact of settlement period on sales price while controlling for marketing period and standard explanatory variables. The hypothesized positive relationship between settlement period and sales price is confirmed by the results of this study. The estimated coefficient on settlement period is 0.0008 meaning that our market, on average, exacts a premium of 0.08 percent per day of settlement period beyond a norm of 60 days. The estimated coefficient on marketing period (a control variable) is –0.0003 meaning that our market, on average, requires a discount of 0.03 percent per day of marketing period. Our findings show the relative importance of settlement period in making real estate pricing decisions.     

A General Theorem on the Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk

In this paper, the concept of absolutely riskier than is introduced to generalize Gollier's (Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 522–535) necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparative statics of a change in risk for risk averters. The restrictive assumption that the payoff function is monotonic in the risk is relaxed. The policymaker's choice problem, the newsboy problem, and a farmer's example are used to illustrate how easily the monotonicity assumption is violated. Finally, some important properties of the concept of absolutely riskier than, such as its relation with the concept of second-order stochastic dominance, are illustrated using the farmer's example.     

Do mortgage rates vary based on household default characteristics? Evidence on rate sorting and credit rationing

Credit screening models suggest that lenders vary loan rates and debt ceilings across applicants on the basis of credit risk. We argue that regulatory constraints such as Fair Lending Laws may preclude rate sorting while increasing lender use of debt ceilings to adjust for applicant credit risk. Using household data from the 1983 SCF, we find that mortgage rates do not vary with applicant credit risk whereas related studies find that debt ceilings vary with borrower risk attributes. Together, these findings support arguments that regulatory constraints reduce rate sorting while increasing the use of non-price terms in the mortgage contract.     

Institutional disparities in the pricing of adjustable rate mortgage loans

In recent years, commercial banks and savings and loan associations in South Florida have consistently offered initial adjustment period teasers, or subsidies, on their adjustable rate mortgage loans (ARMs). This study adopts the size of the initial subsidy as a proxy for a lender's willingness to offer ARM loans and develops an econometric model which relates the size of the teaser to a series of internal variables (other lending parameters), and external variables (financial market conditions).The results suggest that subsidization policies are not identical across institutions. Specifically, savings and loan associations seem to be less willing than commercial banks to accept the interest rate exposure inherent in ARM lending when future loan rates are constrained by adjustment limits. Consequently, the study argues that the character of a lender's existing assets influences its reactions to the risk/return properties of new assets.This paper has benefitted greatly from the comments of the Journal's reviewers. Responsibility for remaining errors rests with the author.     

Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises

In a world of high capital mobility, the threat of speculative attack becomes a central issue of macroeconomicpolicy. While first-generation and second-generation models of speculative attacks both have considerablerelevance to particular financial crises of the 1990s, a third-generation model is needed to make sense of thenumber and nature of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. Most of the recent attempts to produce such amodel have argued that the core of the problem lies in the banking system. This paper sketches another candidatefor third-generation crisis modeling—one that emphasizes two facts that have been omitted from formal modelsto date: the role of companies' balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and that of capital flows inaffecting the real exchange rate.     

On a Simple Econometric Approach for Utility-Based Asset Pricing Model

The Journal of Finance has published an important paper entitled A Simple Econometric Approach for Utility-Based Asset Pricing Model by Brown and Gibbon (1985). The main purpose of this paper is to extend the research of Brown and Gibbons (1985) and Karson, Cheng and Lee (1995) in estimating the relative risk aversion (RRA) parameter in utility-based asset pricing model. First, we review the distributions of RRA parameter estimate . Then, a new method to the distribution of is derived, and a Bayesian approach for the inference of is proposed. Finally, empirical results are presented by using market rate of return and riskless rate data during the period December 1925 through December 2001.     

Contracts for the sale of residential real estate

I propose a model where the terms of a real estate broker's contract influence both the broker's and theseller's choices. Given equal contract, higher quality, and thus higher priced on average, houses will sell in less time. Thus, simple conditions suffice to show that a competitively set commission rate should fall as the average price rises and, since a seller's cost of waiting are higher for higher quality houses, a cartel's commission rate should rise with the average price. Because this model studies the effects of alternate contracts on observable variables such as the price of a house and its time-till-sale, its implications are testable.     

Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence

This paper reviews conflicting theories of company tax incidence impliedby the alternative new and traditional views of dividends andexamines their contrasting policy implications. Whereas, under thetraditional view, closer integration of the corporate and personalincome tax systems is suggested, an alternative policy orientationemphasizing the non-distorting features of the classical system is impliedby the new view. Even if the traditional view is accepted, theimplications for design and reform of the company tax vary widely underalternative specifications of domestic and international tax policy objectives. Schedular alternatives to global income taxation are alsoconsidered.     

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation

Prior research has documented a kink in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this kink. Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.     

Are There Sectoral Anomalies Too? The Pitfalls of Unreported Multiple Hypothesis Testing and a Simple Solution

The recent emphasis on sector-specific investment strategies has led to the emergence of industry-specific calendar anomalies, notably the technology sector summer swoon. A standard t-test implies that these price movements provide arbitrage opportunities. However, this test fails to account for the many tests that may have preceded the swoons discovery. We propose the use of the Bonferroni correction to account for this unreported testing. Its application reverses the conclusions about the summer swoon and finds no evidence of calendar-based price patterns in any other sector. We also use the Bonferroni correction to revisit previously documented, market-wide, anomalies. Conclusions about the most widely cited anomalies (e.g., the January effect) are unchanged, but evidence for some other anomalies is substantially weakened. Our results emphasize that in evaluating a proposed anomaly, sectoral in nature or otherwise, it is crucial to account for the hypotheses that were likely to have been tested but not reported.     

The Impact of Risk-Based Premiums on FDIC-Insured Institutions

This paper examines the effect of a series of announcements leading to the approval of risk-based deposit insurance premiums on returns to stockholders of commercial banks. Utilizing risk-weighted capital ratios and measures of overall risk, we group banks according to one of the nine-tier insurance categories subsequently defined by the FDIC. During the period in which the new insurance system was considered and approved, we found that stockholders of well-capitalized, healthy banks experienced wealth changes significantly different from those experienced by less than well-capitalized, less than healthy banks. Although many argued the premium range in the initial insurance schedule was insufficient, the results show that this initial risk-basing marked an important change in the relative burdens imposed by FDIC insurance.     

Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?

The maintenance of financial stability is facilitated by well-designed safety-net arrangements aimed at limiting the risk of disruption in the financial system (crisis prevention) and the consequences of disruption if it arises (crisis management). An important element of crisis management is the lender of last resort (LOLR) function. This article reviews the main ideas on LOLR reflected in the academic literature, going back to Henry Thornton almost 200 years ago.