产品市场竞争的治理效应实证研究

本文实证研究产品市场竞争是否对企业的“第二类代理问题”具有治理作用,结果显示:产品市场竞争以及合理的公司内部治理机制有助于降低大股东的掏空程度;在行业中处于竞争优势的公司其大股东掏空程度往往更大.在对大股东掏空的影响上,产品市场竞争与一些公司内部治理机制之间存在着互补的关系.研究表明要缓解大股东的掏空问题,应在进一步完善公司内部治理机制的同时,更多地降低行业进入壁垒以提高行业内部竞争性.     

大股东异质性、退出威胁与财务报告质量——基于我国融资融券制度的自然实验

本文基于我国融资融券制度,采用双重差分模型检验大股东退出威胁对财务报告质量(FRQ)的治理效应及大股东异质性的影响.研究发现,退出威胁能有效提升FRQ,但会因大股东异质性而存在差异,具体表现为大股东数量越多、总体持股比例越高,退出威胁对FRQ的提升越显著;相比国有大股东(个人大股东),非国有大股东(机构大股东)退出威胁更能提升FRQ.进一步分析发现,非国有性质的企业更利于大股东退出威胁发挥治理作用;大股东可能的退出行为对管理层和控股股东均能产生威胁;退出可信度更强时退出威胁的治理效应越强;当管理层持股以及控股股东财富更为集中时,退出威胁的治理效应越强.本文研究对企业优化股东构成以及融资融券的扩容具有一定启示.     

我国农业上市公司终极控制人性质、两权分离度与公司运行特点

本文以2006-2009年我国农业上市公司为研究样本,考察了终极控制人性质与两权分离度与上市公司运行特点的关系。研究发现,国有控制上市公司相对于非国有控制上市公司,相对费用项目偏高,我国农业上市公司的日常运行行为习惯与其终极控制人性质有很大关系,但对两权分离度的敏感程度一般。其中具体的原因和影响,其浪费与掏空之间的关系值得我们继续深入探讨。     

我国农业上市公司终极控制人性质、两权分离度与公司运行特点

本文以2006—2009年我国农业上市公司为研究样本．考察了终极控制人性质与两权分离度与上市公司运行特点的关系。研究发现．国有控制上市公司相对于非国有控制上市公司，相对费用项目偏高，我国农业上市公司的日常运行行为习惯与其终极控制人性质有很大关系，但对两权分离度的敏感程度一般。其中具体的原因和影响，其“浪费”与“掏空”之间的关系值得我们继续深入探讨。     

银行竞争、终极控制与债务配置结构

本文研究了影响上市公司债务配置决策的内外动因。研究发现,终极控制人对强势债权人监管的规避动机会直接影响上市公司债务融资决策,具体表现为:终极控制人两权分离度越大,银行借贷比例越低、公开债务比例越高。进一步地,银行竞争作为影响银行债权治理效力的外部因素,其业内竞争加剧会弱化单个银行债权人原本强势的监管效力,终极控制人规避动机减弱,并由此提升其银行借贷比例。本文研究支持了"终极控制人规避强势债权人监管"的立论,为公开市场投资者与政府监管部门防范终极控制人道德风险、完善债券市场建设以及加强银行业风险防范提供了经验证据。     

中小银行大股东治理与银行风险 ——一个文献综述

防范大股东道德风险是中小银行治理需要关注的重要问题.通过梳理中小银行大股东治理风险相关文献,从银行业特殊性、股东治理的风险、如何防范大股东治理风险等方面总结其中的主要观点与结论.银行业特殊性使得大股东承担风险意愿较强,且可能直接"掏空"银行.银行公司治理机制间相互影响,银行监管是银行整体治理机制的重要组成部分,对银行整体治理效果有重要影响.因此,防范中小银行大股东道德风险,需要从强化监管、形成良好的股权结构、影响大股东风险承担意愿、限制可能的"掏空"行为等方面进行综合考虑.我国中小银行类型较多,对各类银行机构存在的主要问题,要针对性弥补治理短板,综合考虑整体治理机制对大股东的激励约束作用,有效防范大股东道德风险.     

机构投资者持股、高管激励与大股东掏空抑制

激励和监督是公司治理最基本的重要手段,从这两方面入手探讨机构投资者持股、高管激励对大股东掏空抑制的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股不仅可以抑制大股东掏空行为,还可以增强高管激励的力度;此外,利用中介效应检验模型,还发现机构投资者抑制大股东掏空的路径,即机构投资者主要通过高管激励中介影响大股东掏空行为。研究结论可以丰富公司治理的研究问题,为解决现实中存在的大股东掏空行为提供借鉴。     

融资融券的治理效应研究——基于公司盈余管理的视角

本文以我国融资融券交易试点为背景,研究融资融券对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。采用双重差分模型,我们发现,对比控制组公司,成为融资融券标的证券后,融资融券公司的应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理显著降低;在市场化程度较高的地区,融资融券能够抑制盈余管理,而在市场化程度较低的地区,融资融券的上述作用并不明显;进一步考虑公司内部股权结构的影响,对于大股东缺乏制衡的公司,只有处于市场化程度较高的地区,融资融券对盈余管理的约束作用才能体现,此时外部市场环境的影响更加明显。这些结果表明,融资融券具有公司治理效应,其发挥有赖于外部市场环境的建设。     

公司控制权、股权制衡与融资偏好实证研究

本文以公告公开股权融资和发行公司债融资预案的A股主板上市公司为研究样本,研究公司控制权、股权制衡与债权融资偏好的相关性。研究发现,终极控制人为国家的公司形成了内部人控制,与债权融资偏好负相关。当大股东持股比例逐步下降到36%以下时,大股东持股比例与债权融资负相关;股东间制衡作用与债权融资偏好正相关。     

企业数字化转型能抑制大股东掏空吗？

数字化转型是数字经济背景下企业形成竞争优势的关键，在公司治理中发挥着积极作用，影响着企业决策。本文以沪深两市2016—2020年的A股非金融公司为研究样本，实证检验了企业数字化转型对大股东掏空的影响。研究发现，企业数字化转型会抑制大股东的掏空行为。机制检验结果表明，企业数字化转型能够通过增强信息透明度和提高机构投资者持股比例来抑制大股东的掏空行为。进一步研究发现，在非国有上市公司和中西部地区的上市公司中，数字化转型对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用更显著；此外，市场化进程较低地区公司的数字化转型对其大股东掏空行为的抑制效果更显著。     

金字塔式控股结构与上市公司资本运作的机会主义倾向

在处于金字塔式控股结构的上市公司中,反映实际控制人责任承担能力的现金流权与其影响公司决策的控制权是分离的,由此形成了责任与权利不对称的负外部性。不同于以往研究,本文从纵容市场炒作和资本运作这一新的视角,实证考察金字塔式控股结构下控股股东及其背后实际控制人资本运作的机会主义倾向,以此揭示金字塔式控股结构存在的其他负外部性。研究表明,随着金字塔结构复杂程度的增加,处在金字塔式控股结构下的上市公司的股票更具有“彩票股”的特征、非金融企业的金融资产配置更多,且会进行更多的关联资本运作,但这些行为并没有带来预期的企业绩效改善,而在很大程度上演化为以实现控股股东及其背后实际控制人财富短期快速增值为目的的机会主义资本运作行为。因而,金字塔式控股结构在一定程度上助长了“脱实向虚”的资金流动趋势,并加剧了资本市场的波动。如何抑制金字塔式控股结构的负外部性由此成为促使我国资本市场有效助力实体经济发展的关键环节之一。     

Corporate value,ultimate control and law protection for investors in Western Europe

This paper analyses both ultimate ownership and investors’ protection in determining corporate value for a sample of firms from 12 Western European countries. The analysis is based on two data sets which consider the presence of an ultimate controller, as well as, the level of separation of cash flow rights and voting rights in the controlling stake. It examines the effect of the rights given to both creditors and shareholders, and the degree to which these rights are enforced with a measure of the efficiency of the judicial system. The main findings suggest that it is likely that firms tend to adjust their ultimate controlling structure to overcome the value-decreasing risks associated with country laws that offer low investors’ protection. This information is a valuable tool for managers in order to strategically adapt institutional corporate governance practices.     

Can short selling improve internal control? An empirical study based on the difference‐in‐differences model

Based on pilot margin trading in China, this study examines how short selling affects internal control quality in listed firms. Using the difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that compared with control firms, firms that are eligible for short selling significantly improve their internal control after they are designated as underlying securities. We consider the effects of state ownership and external auditors. The improvement in internal control is only significant for non‐state‐owned firms and firms audited by non‐Big 4 auditors. These findings indicate that short selling can improve firms’ internal control and play a role in their corporate governance.     

上市公司大股东的“掏空”路径及制衡机制研究

在中国股权相对集中或高度集中的上市公司中,由于控股股东或大股东掌握着公司的实际控制权,大股东的自利天性与机会主义行为可能导致其利用资金占用、关联交易、股利政策和内幕交易等种种手段实现大股东掏空。为遏制大股东掏空现象的泛滥,需从内部治理和外部制衡两个角度,构建大股东掏空的内外部制衡机制,以保护中小股东权益的不受侵害。     

Ownership,analyst coverage,and stock synchronicity in China

This study examines how ownership structure affects the information environment of publicly traded firms in China. We hypothesize that concentrated ownership and the associated separation of ultimate control and ownership rights create agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors leading controlling owners to withhold firm-specific information from the market. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effect of ultimate ownership structure and analyst coverage on stock return synchronicity. We find that a greater separation of control and ownership rights increases the response coefficient of stock return synchronicity to analyst coverage. This result is robust to endogeneity, a series of robustness checks, and an alternative hypothesis based on noise trading. The incentive of controlling owners to limit firm transparency thus leads analysts to disseminate more market-wide information.     

中国式卖空机制与高管减持——基于融资融券分步扩容的准自然实验

本文以我国的融资融券制度为背景,结合双重差分模型,研究卖空机制对上市公司高管减持行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非融券标的,可融券标的公司高管的月减持比例在允许卖空后下降22%,这种抑制作用在小规模、高盈余平滑度以及非国有公司中体现得更为明显。其次,成为可融券标的后,股价定价效率提高,高管减持收益显著下降。进一步地,本文将高管的减持行为分为定期性与投机性两类,发现卖空机制显著抑制了高管基于信息优势和股价偏差的投机性减持行为。     

金字塔股权结构、股权制衡与终极股东侵占

上市公司终极股东行为深受金字塔股权结构形态和内部权力配置及结构的影响。我国上市公司的经验数据表明上市公司终极股东侵占行为选择与金字塔股权结构形态特征正相关,与两权分离程度负相关。金字塔股权结构的内部制衡机制不仅直接影响股东侵占行为,并能够强化金字塔基本形态的影响作用。为保护中小股东的权益不受侵占,应完善公司治理结构,规范信息披露制度,并加强对上市公司大股东的监管。     

The connection between gender diversity and firm performance: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper examines the factors influencing female board membership in Taiwan over the period from 1996 through 2017 and the potential impact of female board representation on firm performance. With 16,477 firm-year observations, our findings show that Taiwanese firms with higher board independence and institutional ownership tend to have lower female board representation. In examining performance implications, the results suggest that board gender diversity is positively associated with firm performance overall. This positive relationship is even stronger in small firms, where female directors may have more influence. In subsample analysis based on lowest and highest ultimate control ownership, we document that the positive impact of board gender diversity is mainly driven by firms that have high ultimate control ownership. Our findings suggest that, in environments with weak corporate governance, female board members may act as effective monitors, especially in smaller firms. Regulators and firms in developing economies with weak corporate governance environment should encourage gender diversity on boards.     

Short-selling restrictions and firms’ environment responsibility

We examine the effect of short selling on firms’ environmental pollution control behavior. Using novel data from Chinese listed firms, we demonstrate that when the short selling of stocks is permitted, the respective firms invest more in pollution protection. Consequently, ex ante threats to short selling could potentially explain firms’ investment in pollution protection. In contrast, we do not find a positive relation between margin trading and firms’ pollution protection expenses. We further discover that the effect of short selling is more pronounced in firms with lower institutional ownership and lower market competition. These findings shed light on the role of short sales in pollution abatement.     

Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability

This study identifies a new economic benefit of common institutional ownership, which refers to the increasingly contentious phenomenon of U.S. firms sharing stockholders with their industry competitors. We find a significantly negative relation between common ownership and insider trading profitability. The disciplinary effect of common ownership on opportunistic insider trading is particularly evident when the information effects of common ownership are greater, when common owners are more likely to benefit from positive governance externalities, and in the subset of trades made by opportunistic insiders. Using the exogenous variations in common ownership induced by financial institution mergers, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis and find consistent results. We also provide evidence that common owners encourage firms to impose ex-ante restrictions on insider trading and take ex-post actions to discipline opportunistic insiders by voting against management. Overall, our findings suggest that common institutional shareholders have information advantages, governance incentives, and effective means to constrain opportunistic insider trading.