管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。     

Investor behaviour and reaching for yield: Evidence from the sterling corporate bond market

We provide evidence on how corporate bond investors react to a change in yields, and how this behaviour differs in times of market‐wide stress. We also investigate ‘reaching for yield’ across investor types, as well as providing insights into the structure of the corporate bond market. Using proprietary sterling corporate bond transaction data, we show that insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers are typically net buyers when corporate bond yields rise. Dealer banks clear the market by being net sellers. However, we find evidence for this behaviour reversing in times of stress for some investors. During the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, asset managers were net sellers of corporate bonds in response to a sharp rise in yields, potentially amplifying price changes. At the same time, dealer banks were net buyers. Finally, we provide evidence that insurers, hedge funds and asset managers tilt their portfolios towards higher risk bonds, consistent with ‘reaching for yield’ behaviour.     

Cluster Analysis for mixed data: An application to credit risk evaluation

Credit risk is one of the main risks faced by a bank to provide financial products and services to clients. To evaluate the financial performance of clients, several scoring methodologies have been proposed, which are based mostly on quantitative indicators. This paper highlights the relevance of both quantitative and qualitative features of applicants and proposes a new methodology based on mixed data clustering techniques. Indeed, cluster analysis may prove particularly useful in the estimation of credit risk. Traditionally, clustering concentrates only on quantitative or qualitative data at a time; however, since credit applicants are characterized by mixed personal features, a cluster analysis specific for mixed data can lead to discover particularly informative patterns, estimating the risk associated with credit granting.     

Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest

Rating agencies produce ratings used by investors, but obtain most of their revenue from issuers, leading to a conflict of interest. We employ a unique data set on the use of non-rating services, and the associated payments, in India, to test if this conflict affects ratings quality. Agencies rate issuers that pay them for non-rating services higher (than agencies not hired for such services). Such issuers also have higher default rates. Both effects are increasing in the amount paid. These results suggest that issuers which hire agencies for non-rating services receive higher ratings despite having higher default risk.     

跨国公司与发展中国家的社会稳定--兼论对中国的影响

跨国公司作为全球化的驱动器既给发展中国家的政治、经济与社会稳定带来正面影响，甚至成为社会稳定的一种标志，但又不可避免地产生一些负面效应。中国要在开放中坚持双赢的策略并加大风险意识，同时应倡导跨国公司承担更大的社会责任。     

股份制取代合作制是历史的必然——对中国农村金融制度选择的思考

目前，合作金融在中国遇到了种种困惑，这不是合作金融本身的错。一方面中国从来就没有建立过真正的合作金融；另一方面合作金融与中国当前的经济环境也不相适应。而那种异化了的合作金融既没有存在的必要，也没有存在的可能。股份制取代合作制是一种历史的必然。     

金融信用之法律制度支撑——一个法经济学视角的解读

金融活动的存在与正常运转有赖于良好的信用制度与法治环境,金融信用是金融业赖以生存的基础。良好的金融信用依靠多种因素的支持,法律制度的健全是关键。本文主要从法经济学的视角提出构建完善的金融信用法律制度体系,以此防范金融信用风险,保障国民经济的增长与发展,进而促进社会的安全与稳定。     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.