创新驱动先前实践对建设目标的影响

基于各省出台的创新型省份建设方案，运用省级政府面板数据，实证研究了创新型省份建设对预期建设目标的影响。结果发现，创新型省份建设仅对可操控程度较高、完成难度较低的建设目标具有显著影响，而对可操控程度较低、完成难度较高的建设目标无显著影响；高强度激励对建设目标实现的影响作用较大。公开建设方案、科学设定建设目标、促进多部门参与、建立监督和评估机制是改进创新型省份建设和推进创新驱动发展战略实施的重要突破口。     

Agricultural landowners⿿ response to incentives for afforestation

Previous research has shown that afforestation of agricultural land is a relatively low-cost option compared to energy-based approaches for mitigating net carbon dioxide emissions, and that financial incentives affect landowner behavior and can be used to increase carbon sequestration on private land. In this paper we use stated preference data from private landowners in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. to examine the key factors affecting participation in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation. We also estimate the corresponding potential for carbon sequestration and its cost. Our results suggest that incentive payments would significantly and positively affect landowners⿿ level of enrollment in a tree planting program.     

构建高校预算绩效评价机制的思考

高校预算绩效评价机制,是高校预算绩效管理的重要制度安排。本文探讨构建高校预算绩效评价机制的思路:采取定性指标与定量指标相结合的方法,设计一套基本支出和项目支出绩效评价指标体系,建立以效果为导向、责任与激励相结合的高校预算绩效管理责任制度。     

THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS ABOUT MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT: A POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE?

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen ( 2001 ), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.     

Dynamics of judicial service supply chains

Behavioral issues, coupled with temporary capacity imbalances, dictate the characteristics that a service supply chain assumes in the long run. The paper looks at a service chain in which two factors, backlogs and incentives, influence human agent processing times and, hence, service supply chain capacity. The paper finds that servers within the supply chain change their processing speeds in order to maintain a backlog of cases that is acceptable and credible. The backlog must not be too small, so as to avoid the impression that work is scant and there is idleness; but it must not be too large, so as to avoid the impression of laziness. Simultaneously, the paper finds that there are implicit incentives in the formal hierarchy that impinge upon throughput rates at certain stages of the supply chain: agents upstream try not to overwhelm their bosses' stations downstream with excess work. Hence, this paper looks at the effects of perceived backlogs within service supply chains and also at capacity unbalances that stem from such incentives. The study explores these issues in the context of a managerial intervention in a judicial service supply chain. The study identifies the structure of a seemingly unstructured decision execution that leads to the observed outcomes. The research results in a preliminary system dynamics model that suggests several operational steps to overcome bottlenecks and incompetency.     

Adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards by Greek non-listed companies: The role of coercive and hegemonic pressures

In this paper, we examine the motivations for preparers in Greek non-listed companies to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Previous literature has focused on listed companies and assessed the effect of IFRS on market efficiency to justify its adoption. Using data from a cross-sectional survey and from interviews with senior managers, our analysis indicates that the motivations to adopt IFRS in Greece are not primarily related to the technical competence of the standards. We draw insights from literature on institutional theory and hegemony based on the Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Gramsci, and show that the decision to comply with IFRS can also be motivated by coercive and hegemonic pressures, which are exerted by powerful institutional constituents as they interact with organisations’ strategic interests at the international and national level. The adoption of IFRS is driven predominantly by the pressures exerted by parent companies on their subsidiaries and by the legal requirements of the state, but also through borrowing and debt-contracting requirements as enforced by civil society actors, such as financial institutions. This mobilisation of power plays a pivotal role in supporting the establishment of IFRS among non-listed companies.     

When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts’ Incentives

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts’ incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.     

The integration substitute: the role of controls in managing human asset specificity

As the integration solution to the problem of specific assets cannot be replicated on human asset specificity because slavery is illegal, economic theory states that control systems substitute for integration through a balanced structure to help align diverse interests. To understand the intricate design features of the balance, we examine a case‐study firm. For low human asset specificity, the restriction and segregation of usable decision rights link with standards. However, incentives are traced to individuals only to the extent task deviations do not create relevant future costs that are difficult to be self‐corrected. For high specificity, incentives are related to outputs rather than outcomes, because outcome variations reduce the attractiveness of maintaining the balance. Subjective assessment is used as an efficient alternate ‘balancing’ solution and decision control is shared when available subjective data are inadequate.     

New market socialism: a case for rejuvenation or inspired alchemy?

The aim of this paper is to examine the relative merits anddrawbacks of two recent models of market socialism proposedby Bardhan and Roemer. This is done, first, by putting thesemodels into the perspective of the history of economic thought.Thus, after presenting the basic elements of the early Langemodel as well as the Austrian and ‘new information economics’critiques, the necessary comparisons and contrasts are madeto see what new light these new models bring into this debate.In addition, the internal consistency and coherence of thesemodels is checked in terms of their own proclaimed goals. Last,a more radical methodological critique is provided.     

The Forgotten Risk: Financial Incentives

Summary  The number of risks that are taken into account by risk managers has grown over the years, but they still have a blind spot for the danger that remuneration schemes and financial incentives can lead to more risk taking. Such an effect constitutes a regime change, making standard statistical analyses of previous data obsolete. Common remuneration contracts for hedge fund managers and bank traders provoke risk taking and lead to volatile results. The incentive structure of rating agencies sheds doubts on the quality of their judgment. Risk managers should address the behavioral effects of incentive schemes, both inside and outside their firm. Incentive schemes should be corrected in such a way that only long-term results pay off. CEO, ABN-AMRO Bank and former Minister of Finance. These comments were prepared for the occasion of the Jelle Zijlstra Lecture by Martin Hellwig at the VU University, Amsterdam, May 27, 2008, when Gerrit Zalm was CFO of DSB Bank.