Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates an agent’s time-inconsistent preferences into the Sannikov (2008) contract model to explore the effects of an agent’s preferences on his own behaviors: the incentive effort choice, the optimal retirement time and the consumption flow during his whole career life. We find the agent’s time inconsistency makes it difficult for him to be motivated and makes him need more compensation. An agent’s time-inconsistency erodes both the principal and his own income. The time-inconsistent agent will choose a lower incentive effort level, retire at an earlier time and have a lower consumption flow compared with his time-consistent peer. The time-inconsistent preference exactly influences the agents behavior and makes the agency problem more serious. Therefore, the firm has to cost more to stimulate such a time-inconsistent agent, which will damage the firms profits, as well as the efficiency.     

The effect of supplier industry competition on pay-for-performance incentive intensity

We examine how supplier industry competition affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data to compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure, we predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is incremental to that of the firm's own industry competition previously documented and is robust to alternative measures of supplier competition and to exogenous shocks to competition. Importantly, we show that performance risk and product margin act as mediating variables in the relation between supplier competition and CEO incentive intensity providing support for the theory underpinning our finding. We document that CEO compensation contracts are used as a mechanism to exploit the market dynamics of upstream industries to a firm's benefit. Our findings are economically important as suppliers provide, on average, 45 percent of the value delivered by procuring firms to the market (BEA, 2016).     

科技人才激励因素的组态路径研究——一项QCA分析

人才是科技创新的第一资源，人才发挥作用关键在于激励。但是，鲜有文献对科技人才激励因素的多重互动关系进行研究。以辽宁省247名科技人才为调研对象，采用模糊集定性比较分析方法，探讨激励因素如何共同作用、多重互动影响科技人才工作投入。结果显示：薪酬制度是影响科技人才工作投入的必要条件，影响科技人才工作投入存在3条路径：第一条路径是高绩效考核、高薪酬制度和高工作自主；第二条路径是高绩效考核、高薪酬制度和高组织支持；第三条路径是高薪酬制度、高工作自主、高组织支持和高成就发展。科技人才非积极工作投入存在两条路径，且与科技人才积极工作投入之间存在非对称关系。     

企业金融资产配置对双元创新的影响

以2014-2016年非金融上市公司为样本，研究不同种类的金融资产配置对双元创新的影响，考察高管激励方式在两者之间的调节效应，并基于产权异质性作进一步检验。引入ITCV方法测量内生性问题是否改变了回归结果，以检验结论的稳健性。研究发现：①短期金融资产配置对双元创新不产生蓄水池效应；②长期金融资产配置对探索式创新具有挤出效应，而对开发式创新挤出效应受到产权异质性的影响；③相对于开发式创新，长期金融资产对探索式创新的挤出效应更加显著；④国有企业中，股权激励有助于弱化长期金融资产配置对双元创新的挤出效应，而在非国有企业中，这一调节效应并不显著；⑤相对于探索式创新，薪酬激励弱化长期金融资产配置对开发式创新的挤出效应更加显著。     

The effects of employee stock option plans on operating performance in Chinese firms

As a part of the ongoing liberalization of the marketplace, Chinese regulators adopted the guideline called “Regulation of Equity Incentive Plans (trial)” to allow firms to provide employee incentives through employee stock option plans. Firms began initiating the plans in 2006. We investigate the impact of these plans on firm performance by comparing option-award firms with similar non-award matching firms. The change in ROE for the option-award firms is significantly higher than the matching firms. This is primarily due to their performance holding up better during the global financial crisis while the matching firms’ performance deteriorates. The stock price of these firms shows a positive reaction to the announcement, but no long-term abnormal returns. The better ROE performance for option-award firms is strong for subsets of the sample that are likely to benefit more from incentivized employees; specifically, privately owned firms, firms with higher board independence, and smaller firms. After various robustness tests, we conclude that the higher performance comes from the employee incentives, rather than earnings manipulation, a replacement of cash compensation, a binding of employees to executives, or gaming vesting periods.     

Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading

This paper aims to propose multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading (PSCT). We first construct a multi-unit/single-unit multi-attribute double auction (MS-MDA) for PSCT where suppliers can submit bids on a single unit of one item (i.e., single output restriction). We then relax the single output restriction and propose a multi-unit multi-attribute double auction (M-MDA) for PSCT in which each supplier offers multiple units of one item. Both the MS-MDA and M-MDA mechanisms are incentive compatible, individually rational, budget balanced and computationally efficient. The computational study shows that all proposed mechanisms are of high allocation efficiency and practically implementable.     

群体规则和社会规范影响国企经理改革的实证研究

人们渴望社会认可的动机常常被主流经济学所忽略.Alkerlof等的理论分析表明,这一动机具有重要的激励涵义.能否获得社会认可取决于是否遵从群体规则和社会规范,因此,规则操纵者可以通过两种规则管理方式来影响现存的群体规则和社会规范,从而增进社会福利.本文对国企改革过程中,群体规则和社会规范对国企经理的影响进行了实证研究,发现国企经理确实会受它们的影响,但旨在改变群体规则的物质激励的不同幅度和精神激励的不同形式,对国企经理的影响却大不相同.     

经理激励、负债与企业价值

已有研究表明,经理薪酬与负债都会影响企业价值。然而,作为激励机制的薪酬与作为约束机制的负债在影响企业价值上究竟存在何种关系,尽管文献在理论方面有所探讨,但缺乏相应的实证证据支持。以中国沪深两市2002—2008年间的A股上市公司作为研究样本,本文的实证检验结果表明,无论是以薪酬衡量的显性激励还是以在职消费衡量的隐性激励,经理激励和负债在对企业价值的影响上具有显著的替代关系;同时,这一关系在不同性质的企业中,以及不同市场化水平下具有一定的差异性。本文所得出的研究结论不仅丰富了资本结构、委托代理等相关理论,对于现实中的企业决策也具有较强启示意义。     

基于经理人过度投资行为的控制权配置机制设计

通过建立一个基本分析框架,研究了经理人过度投资行为与控制权配置机制设计之间的关系,研究结果表明,设计适当的控制权配置机制能够有效缓解经理人的过度投资行为,且控制权的配置存在着某些规律性,并由此得到了一些重要结论:当市场机制较为完善或股东的监督效力比较强时,或当投资项目的风险较大而使监督经营行为的成本很大时,经理人应配置更大的控制权;当经理人获取隐性收益的能力和可能性较大时,经理人应配置较小的控制权;配置给经理人的最优控制权及其最优分成比例在激励功能上是互补的,为降低经理人的过度投资而设计的激励机制就是在两者之间进行权衡。文章最后还对缓解我国公司经理人的过度投资行为提出了建议。