国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究

本文尝试从锦标赛的角度为国企竞争理论提供信息经济学模型解释和实证支持。为了达到这一目的,本文从政府干预和共同代理的角度对经典的锦标赛模型进行细化和拓展,以揭示出国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素,并收集2451家地方国有上市公司披露的薪酬差距数据对理论模型进行实证检验。理论模型表明,薪酬差距的扩大和国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛激励的强化会增加国企经营者的努力水平,因而有利于公司绩效的提升。不过,国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛的激励却受到政府行政干预和共同代理问题的制约。实证结果表明,我国地方国有上市公司薪酬差距与公司绩效显著正相关,而与地方政府行政干预和共同代理问题的严重程度显著负相关,从而支持了理论模型。     

中国节能服务产业发展协同激励路径优化对策

从系统形成与系统运行两阶段入手,分析了协同视域下中国节能服务产业发展系统失灵问题,进而提出了产业发展协同激励路径传导模型,从时间、方法、逻辑3个维度剖析了产业发展激励要素协同作用机理。针对中国节能服务产业激励政策文件的分析,从激励主体协同、激励措施协同、激励过程协同3个层面分析了节能服务产业发展激励路径内在问题及致因,由此提出了基于价值共创、组合优化、循环反馈的协同激励路径优化对策。     

Procurement auctions with entry of bidders

In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry. We show that if potential bidders are uninformed before entry, commitment to a plain, nondistortive auction is optimal. In contrast, if potential bidders learn all their private information before entry, the optimal mechanism entails the same distortions as in Laffont and Tirole's static model.     

个人收入分配的选择之道

收入分配关系到一国经济长期、稳定的发展。传统的分配理论关注的是个人拥有的资源禀赋和国家政策与个人收入的关系,将收入分配看成是不受个人影响的因素决定的,忽视个人在收入分配中的作用。本文试图从个人的信息量的不平衡、需求偏好、风险偏好以及决策后形成的扩散效应来分析个人选择对收入初次分配和再次分配的影响。     

Mixed up? that’s good for motivation

We show that career concerns can arise in the absence of ex ante uncertainty about an agent’s type, if his unobservable actions influence future productivity. Implementing effort in mixed strategies allows the principal to endogenously introduce uncertainty about the agent’s ex post productivity and generate reputational incentives. Creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal, even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This finding for an environment with imperfect commitment contrasts with standard agency models, where implementing mixed strategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies can also be implemented.     

刍议团队管理三要素

本文论述的“团队管理”，不是仅着眼于“团队管理”的某一方面，而是从整体上把握“团队管理”的内涵，把“团队管理”真正看成一个有机的系统。本文先论述团队组织产生的具体背景原因，并把“形成团队的三要素”归纳为：物质的激励机制、向心力、挑战性的目标，再以此分析为基础，对“团队精神”、“行政组织”、“国有企业改革”等理论问题进行初步的探讨、归纳，力求准确而全面地揭贡“团队管理”的本质，为解决实践中出现的问题提供了一个新思路。     

开放源代码组织的激励机制及成功要素

本文分别从内容激励和过程激励两方面分析了开发源代码组织的激励机制,并提出开放源代码组织成功必须具备的三个因素:模块化开发和自治式管理模式、有效的信号发布机制和保护产品的共有知识产权不被私人侵犯。     

关于我国高校后勤企业人力资源管理的探讨

人力资源的竞争已成为高校后勤企业竞争的关键,因此,加强人力资源的管理与开发已成为我国高校后勤企业取得竞争优势的重要法宝。本文分析了我国高校人力资源管理面临的问题,并提出了相关的优化措施。     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

产品质量认证能否提高农户技术效率——基于山东、河北典型蔬菜种植区的证据

本文基于河北廊坊、山东寿光两地典型蔬菜种植区的1388份微观数据,利用超越对数随机前沿生产函数构建技术效率微观分析框架,在此基础上运用倾向得分匹配法构建反事实假设,估计三种不同类型的产品质量认证对农户技术效率的平均处理效应,并基于回归调整方法对产品质量认证影响农户技术效率的内部机制进行分解,评价产品质量认证对技术效率提升的具体作用路径。研究结果表明:有机农产品认证与绿色食品认证对农户技术效率具有显著的提升作用,农户的技术效率分别提高0.218和0.196;而无公害农产品认证没有显著提升农户的技术效率。考虑到某些不可观测的因素并采用稳健性估计后,该结论仍然稳健成立。此外,对效率增长的分解结果显示,有机农产品认证和绿色食品认证对技术效率的提升作用按贡献率大小依次来源于溢价激励的提升、成本压力的作用、组织支持的增强。