地方官员异质性与公共服务供给绩效

本文在一个具有微观基础的一般均衡宏观模型中考察了地方政府的公共服务供给行为。地方政府官员负有提供生产性公共品与非生产性公共品的责任,生产性公共品增进经济产出效率,而非生产性公共品直接增进居民效用。地方政府官员在提供两类公共品的效率与能力上具有异质性,这导致了地区之间的经济增长及公共服务供给绩效上的差异。这意味着,中央可以通过优化官员和地区之间的匹配,促进地方经济发展和居民福利改善。     

国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究

本文尝试从锦标赛的角度为国企竞争理论提供信息经济学模型解释和实证支持。为了达到这一目的,本文从政府干预和共同代理的角度对经典的锦标赛模型进行细化和拓展,以揭示出国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素,并收集2451家地方国有上市公司披露的薪酬差距数据对理论模型进行实证检验。理论模型表明,薪酬差距的扩大和国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛激励的强化会增加国企经营者的努力水平,因而有利于公司绩效的提升。不过,国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛的激励却受到政府行政干预和共同代理问题的制约。实证结果表明,我国地方国有上市公司薪酬差距与公司绩效显著正相关,而与地方政府行政干预和共同代理问题的严重程度显著负相关,从而支持了理论模型。     

心理契约视角下知识型员工激励系统的优化

心理契约是联系员工和组织的心理纽带,是正式劳务合约的有益补充。它改变了传统经济学从"自私自利"的角度研究雇员,把经济契约和心理契约有机结合,有利于提高雇员的积极性,促进组织的高效率。以知识型员工作为研究对象,结合知识型员工及其心理契约的特点,提出优化知识型员工心理契约激励系统的路径。     

苏州创新驿站运行中的激励机制——基于委托代理理论视角的研究

创新驿站是科技中介组织在以网络经济为代表的新经济中一种创新型的组织发展形式,其功能是将技术创新和技术合作等科技资源及服务在中小企业间进行跨区域的配置,以提高中小企业转型和升级的效率。创新驿站在我国正处于发展初期,但是,对于创新驿站如何高效运行的经济学、管理学理论研究却相对滞后。创新驿站的运行效率与工作人员的工作密切相关,文章在文献[9]的基础上,运用委托代理理论,针对苏州创新驿站运行的不同时期,给出激励机制的分析,以促使代理人(创新驿站工作人员)更努力、高效地工作,进而促进创新驿站技术转化率的提高,更好地为中小企业的技术创新和技术合作提供支持性服务。     

基于溢出效益的研发联盟利润分配设计

研究了如何利用利益分配方式作为激励机制,促使研发联盟成员放弃投机行为(即道德风险);对Shapley值法进行修正并以此为分配依据,设计出研发联盟的利润分配机制,以此激励联盟成员自动选择联盟最优投资策略作为自己的研发投资策略;通过理论及数值仿真算例分析证明,采用修正的Shapley值法进行利润分配,能够实现防范道德风险,促进合作研发的成功。     

Management fees and hotel performance in the U.S.

A management company takes care of the day-to-day operations of a hotel and thus has a great amount of influence on the hotel's financial performance. Adopting models from O’Neill, Hanson, and Matilla (2008) and Hua, Morosan, and DeFranco (2015), a set of empirical models, with same-store data from 1471 hotels from 2011 through 2017, was used to test the impact of the total management fee and its subset of the base management fee and the incentive management fee on the hotels' rooms revenue and gross operating profit while controlling for potential confounding factors including chain scale and location.This is the first paper to empirically validate the value of a management contract for both the owners and the management company, including the positive and significant effects that base management and incentive management fees have on hotels’ room revenue and gross operating profit.     

Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry

This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.     

政府人才激励政策对高技术中小企业人才知识结构的影响

运用内容分析方法，对政府人才激励政策文本进行系统梳理，从政策工具视角，将政策划分为供给型、环境型和需求型3类。采用实证分析方法，揭示并检验政府人才激励政策对高技术中小企业人才知识结构的影响机理。研究发现，我国政府人才激励政策偏向于环境型和供给型政策应用，而对需求型政策应用不足、存在缺失；3种类型政府人才激励政策均对高技术中小企业人才知识结构有显著正向影响；企业职工薪酬水平在供给型和需求型政策的影响中起中介作用。结论对于政府完善人才政策、高技术中小企业改善职工薪酬投入、优化企业人才知识结构具有重要启示。     

The impact of deal‐proneness on WTP estimates in incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods

Even after controlling for hypothetical biases, some incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods still produce different willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) estimates. In this study, we compare WTP estimates from three incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods: real choice experiment (RCE), real double‐bounded dichotomous contingent valuation (RCVM), and Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction (BDM). We find that participants’ aggressiveness in obtaining low prices (i.e., “deal‐proneness”) influences WTP estimates in the BDM auction, but not those elicited from the RCE and RCVM. The participants with higher levels of deal‐proneness tend to submit lower bids in the BDM auction. The discrepancies in WTP estimates between different incentive‐aligned procedures are narrower for participants with lower levels of deal‐proneness. Our results indicate that the bids in BDM auctions may be understated and the auction mechanism may induce the “gambling behavior” of people who are deal‐prone. That is, whether the BDM auction is truly incentive‐aligned is again called into question. We also discuss the practical implications for food retailers.     

Agency controls and subsidiary strategic initiatives: The mediating role of subsidiary autonomy

Prior studies examining the impact of organizational controls on subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives have to a large extent failed to find a significant direct association between the two. We argue that this lack of direct association may be due to the fact that the control mechanisms used exert their influence on subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives indirectly by suppressing subsidiaries’ decision-making autonomy. Drawing upon agency theory we consider the effects of two types of controls, monitoring and incentive alignment, as mediated by subsidiaries’ decision-making autonomy. We test this effect on data from 115 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece. The results of our analyses empirically validate this assertion for both mechanisms. Our findings further show that, when both mechanisms are present, one may accentuate the effect of the other, highlighting the value of employing a contingency approach to fully capture the effects of organizational controls on the pursuit of subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives.