Regulating,joint bargaining,and the demise of precedent

Recent decades have seen a fundamental shift in the nature of economic regulation in the United States. Unauthorized by congress, and largely unnoted in legal and academic circles, regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission have changed the regulatory process by linking otherwise unrelated regulatory issues. Examples include tying merger approval to firm commitments to engage in conceptually unrelated build‐outs and other projects of political importance. This linking of issues has several effects, the most prominent being (a) tying regulatory issues changes the outcomes obtained, plausibly in predictable ways; (b) tying in some circumstances allows regulators to extend their authority to issues for which they have little or no legal authority; and (c) tied regulatory bargaining fails to produce valid legal precedent for firm decision making. We provide an analysis of these conclusions by examining the increasing use of consent decrees, voluntary merger commitments, and merger conditions by the Federal Communications Commission, referencing our discussion with a simple model of joint bargaining applicable to regulatory practice.     

General Editor’s Note: Antitrust and Regulatory Update

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Can investors time their exposure to private equity?

Private equity performance, both for buyouts and venture capital, has been highly cyclical: periods of high fundraising have been followed by periods of low performance. Despite this seemingly predictable variation, we find modest gains, at best, to pursuing realistic, investable strategies that time capital commitments to private equity. This occurs, in part, because investors can only time their commitments to funds; they cannot time when commitments are called or when investments are exited. There is a high degree of time-series correlation in net cash flows even across commitment strategies that allocate capital in a very different manner over time.     

Doing Good While Behaving Badly: Checkout Charity Process Mechanisms

Journal of Business Ethics - Companies are increasingly using cause-related marketing campaigns to engage consumers during the purchase process and highlight their own corporate social...     

The initiation of audit committee interlocks and the contagion of accounting policy choices: evidence from special items

Review of Accounting Studies - We document that the initiation of audit committee interlocks is associated with contagion in reported special items. We argue that this is, in part, attributable to...     

Rent Sharing and the Compensation of Head Coaches in Power Five College Football

The monopoly and monopsony power of intercollegiate sports create significant rents, but previous studies of intercollegiate football coaches’ salaries implicitly assume that coaches are paid their marginal revenue products. In a two-stage estimation, we show that coaches share in these rents. The first stage shows that several common measures of coaches’ productivity do not affect an athletic department’s variable revenue. When we include these measures in the second-stage salary equation, their impact on pay reflects bargaining power, not productivity. We also find that several measures of fixed revenue, which are independent of the coach’s performance, increase the coach’s pay.     

To push performance,check the leader’s power motive

The power motive, defined as the desire to impact the behavior and emotions of another person, has long been controversial. On one side, the exercise of power has been put forth as a fundamental human need greater in strength than the need to survive. On the other, it has been vilified for its potentially devastating consequences. We argue the latter view is distorted, and, by relying too heavily on it, we have come to misunderstand the essential nature of power and its use by leaders charged with driving performance. It is not the power motive that leads to corruption and tyranny, but rather how the power motive is channeled into behavior by other personality factors. Consequently, those charged with leader selection should place greater emphasis on how individuals with strong power motives differ in how they channel power. Doing so will support the selection of executives best equipped to deliver organizational performance.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

High‐Frequency Trading and the New Stock Market: Sense And Nonsense

The stock market has been transformed during the last 25 years. Human suppliers of liquidity like the NASDAQ dealers and NYSE specialists have been replaced by algorithmic market making; stocks that once traded on a single venue now trade across twelve exchanges and a multitude of alternative trading systems. New venues like dark pools, and new participants like high‐frequency traders, have emerged to take on prominent roles. This new market has had more than its share of controversy and regulatory scrutiny, particularly in the wake of Michael Lewis’s bestseller Flash Boys. In this article, the authors analyze five of the most controversial new market practices, including various high‐frequency trading strategies and dark pool activities. They set out a simple conceptual framework based on adverse selection and agency problems, and apply that framework to assess the welfare effects of each of the five practices. While much that is criticized is indeed objectionable, other controversial practices are much more complex than popularly imagined and may in fact be socially desirable. They conclude by evaluating a range of potential reforms to equity market structure.     

Chinese economy in the new era

The “new era”, a term introduced by President Xi Jinping, may also be identified as the Xi era, during which China will be transformed from a moderately well‐off to a strong and wealthy nation. In the new era, the Chinese Government will deepen economic reform, widen economic opening and enhance the quality of economic growth. / Our projections show that by 2020, Chinese real GDP per capita, in 2017 prices, will exceed US$10,000, an economic development milestone. By 2031, Chinese real GDP will surpass US real GDP (US$29.4 trillion vs US$29.3 trillion), making China the largest economy in the world. However, Chinese real GDP per capita will still lag behind the US significantly, amounting to only one‐quarter of that of the United States. By 2050, Chinese real GDP will reach US$82.6 trillion, compared to US$51.4 trillion for the United States. However, in terms of real GDP per capita, China will still lag significantly behind, at US$53,000, slightly less than the current level of US real GDP per capita, compared to US$134,000 for the United States.