Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

食品安全规制能提高生产者福利吗？——基于不同规制强度的检验

食品安全规制涉及政府、生产者和消费者三方利益主体的博弈。已有文献主要关注政府规制对减少生产者违规概率、提升食品安全水平和消费者福利所产生的作用。本文从生产者福利视角考察企业参与食品安全规制是否存在“收益率溢价”效应，以此对中国食品安全规制的间接效果进行实证检验。首先采用倾向得分匹配模型考察食品安全规制对企业资产收益率的平均影响效应，然后采用广义倾向得分匹配模型和门槛模型进一步考察不同规制强度与企业资产收益率的非线性关系。研究表明，当前食品安全规制对参与规制企业产生了“收益率溢价”的间接效果,但随着规制强度的扩展，企业资产收益率呈现先上升后下降的“倒U型”变化，具有显著的双重门槛特征，当企业持有4项质量认证证书时为“最优规制强度”。最后结合当前中国实际，解释了上述结论产生的原因及政策含义。     

Accounting practice,fiscal decentralization and corruption

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with a high-quality accounting practice. In contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.     

Mandatory disclosure,greenhouse gas emissions and the cost of equity capital: UK evidence of a U-shaped relationship

This paper examines the effects of disclosing greenhouse gas (GHG) information mandatorily on the cost of equity capital (COC) using a longitudinal unbalanced panel database of the United Kingdom's FTSE 350 firms for the period 2011–2016. We use a nonlinear panel quantile regression (PQR) model to examine the relationship between GHG disclosure (GHGD) and COC in the United Kingdom. This technique was supplemented by conducting a two-step generalised method of moment (GMM) estimation to address any concerns related to the potential existence of endogeneity problems. Our findings suggest that high-level GHGD appeared to be negatively associated with COC up to a certain level, which is known as the turning point; then, any increase in GHGD is likely to increase the COC. This means that the nonlinear association between GHGD and COC is evidenced in our study and takes a U shape. Likewise, our findings are associative of a moderating effect of the 2013 carbon disclosure regulation (CDR) on the GHGD–COC nexus. We argue that mandatory GHGD and GHG risk are linked so that those companies that are associated with higher GHG risk have a tendency to be better disclosers. Consequently, we urge regulators to design GHGD regulations in a way that mirrors corporate environmental risk and leads to a lower COC in order to align the interests of corporations with those of the society at large.     

Monitoring the foreign exchange rate benchmark fix

ABSTRACT

We develop a Manipulation Index (ManIx) that captures the potential manipulation intention of dealers during the World Markets/Reuters (WMR) benchmark (London Close) period at 4 pm London time through a unique algorithm and simulation. The application of this model (using a dataset with dealers’ identities) can identify banks that are prone to potential manipulative behavior. The results concerning the identified banks are validated by the regulatory investigations. Implementation of this algorithm allows regulators better direct their limited resources towards more targeted in-depth investigation.     

跨越竞争丛林与范式重构：全球治理改革进程中的疫苗产业创新治理

疫苗作为新冠疫情防控的最关键手段之一，已在各国抗疫中发挥积极影响。疫苗研发、生产、注射意愿以及全球分配的公平性与可及性等一系列问题日益受到世界关注。分析全球治理改革中，疫苗作为一种全球公共产品的创新治理问题，讨论疫苗产业发展特征与创新规律演化，剖析西方国家疫苗产业创新治理困境以及“竞争丛林”逻辑，阐释中国行动方案及对全球治理改革的贡献。最终提出疫苗产业创新治理机制对推动全球治理改革的政策含义。     

严监管背景下农信社合规风险管理体系建设

2018年,银行业监管环境进一步趋严,不但强调对银行的监管,更提出了对监管人员职责的监管,这种严格的外部监管环境对农信社的合规风险管理带来了极大的挑战。农信社合规风险管理体系的建设和完善已势不容缓。论文提出了农信社合规风险管理体系建设要从战略定位、文化渗透、防线搭建、专业专职化、考核和追究六个维度入手,推进合规风险管理长效机制的建设。     

中国国有企业改革：经验、困境与出路*

作为国有企业产权改革主要模式，“混合所有制”改革是否有助于确保国有资产保值增值，是否有助于推动中国经济可持续发展等问题仍存在探讨空间。本文基于对于改革开放以来中国国有企业改革的成就和教训的考察，指出“混合所有制”可以作为竞争性部门国有企业改革的一个过渡形式；对于垄断央企的改革应该充分借鉴国际上自然垄断行业的改革经验，打破行政垄断，推动竞争性框架建立，并切实实现从“管企业”逐步调整为“管资本”，通过改革实现国有资产的保值增值，并为经济创造新的增长点。     

Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.     

Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.