盈余管理、控制权私利与投资者保护综述

我国上市公司的盈余管理主要是基于规避政府监管的动机,而这个动机产生的根源是控股股东攫取控制权私利的激励.控股股东为了能够掏空上市公司,需要借助于盈余管理,因此掏空总是伴随着盈余管理.国家层面上的投资者法律保护能够约束控股股东,限制控制权私利,使控股股东失去盈余管理的动机,因此盈余管理与投资者保护负相关.     

大股东控制权、现金流权与公司绩效——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究

以2009年沪市发行A股且采用金字塔控股的137家家族上市公司为样本,用托宾Q衡量公司绩效,对现金流权、控制权、两权分离度对公司绩效的影响进行了分析。研究结果表明:我国家族上市公司最终控制股东现金流权与托宾Q正相关,表现出利益汇聚和激励效应;最终控制股东控制权与托宾Q负相关,存在大股东利用控制权攫取控制权私利现象,并且两权分离度与托宾Q负相关。     

控制权私有收益影响因素研究综述

目前全球大多数公司都采用集中所有权的股权结构,这一结构易使得控股股东攫取控制权私有收益。因此为抑制控制权私有收益的攫取,保护公司相关者,促进公司的积极发展,明确影响控制权私有收益的因素便显得十分重要。本文通过对研究影响控制权私有收益因素研究的梳理,发现了影响控制权私利的三大因素,并对此进行总结。     

信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用与审计师选择——来自深市A股上市公司的经验证据

资金侵占是控股股东利用控制权获取私人利益的重要表现形式,也是其解决资金缺乏的重要途径,普遍存在于信息不对称严重的公司。而有效的信息披露制度则会提高公司透明度,减轻信息不对称程度,保护中小投资者免受控股股东的掠夺。作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,也能够缓解代理问题,对中小投资者起到保护作用。因此,本文选取深圳A股上市公司作为样本,研究信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用以及审计师选择之间的关系。实证结果发现,信息披露质量越高的公司会减少控股股东的资金占用并且倾向于选择高质量的审计师,高质量审计师也能够起到降低控股股东的资金占用的效果。这一研究结果对加强信息披露监管以及审计的治理效应有着重要的启示。     

“股权质押新规”能抑制上市公司控股股东的私利侵占行为吗北大核心

本文以“股权质押新规”颁布为准自然实验场景,研究“新规”对上市公司控股股东私利侵占行为的治理效应。研究结果表明,“新规”通过降低控股股东两权分离度、上市公司的盈余管理程度,进而抑制控股股东的私利侵占行为。进一步研究发现,“新规”对内部控制水平较低的上市公司具有更强的治理效应;扩展性研究表明,“新规”能够降低公司股价崩盘风险。本文研究为“新规”实施的经济后果提供了理论支撑和经验证据,同时对监管层规范上市公司控股股东股权质押行为具有一定的政策启示。     

股权结构能否影响控制权转移后企业治理效率的变化?

本文从控制权转移的动态过程中考察了股权特征因素对控制权交易后公司绩效改善的作用。文章利用1997￣2003年总共249个第一大股东变更的上市公司样本,通过wilcoxon检验等方法证明了控股程度不同的企业在控制权转移前存在显著的业绩差异,而控制权交易引起的股权集中度程度及控股股东持股份额的变化能够引起交易后企业业绩的变化,然而控股股东属性与企业业绩改善的关系并不显著,无证据表明法人股接管控制权后能够改善企业的治理效率。本文的论证在一定程度上肯定了我国控制权市场的外部治理效力。     

控制权私利行为、公司治理及地方政府监管缺陷——基于四川金顶的案例研究

在全流通的情况下,如何让控股股东和中小股东"同甘共苦"是当前一个热门的话题.而在严重的信息不对称情况下,如何有效防范控股股东的道德风险及控制权私利行为又是时下公司治理所面临的艰难的挑战.本文笔者以近期被各大媒体炒的沸沸扬扬的"华伦集团掏空四川金顶"作为案例,来深入分析全流通下控股股东的控制权私利行为,并指出内在的公司治理缺陷,最后得出有关启示及建议.     

股权结构能否影响控制权转移后企业治理效率的变化？

本文从控制权转移的动态过程中考察了股权特征因素对控制权交易后公司绩效改善的作用。文章利用1997-2003年总共249个第一大股东变更的上市公司样本，通过wilcoxon检验等方法证明了控股程度不同的企业在控制权转移前存在显著的业绩差异，而控制权交易引起的股权集中度程度及控股股东持股份额的变化能够引起交易后企业业绩的变化，然而控股股东属性与企业业绩改善的关系并不显著，无证据表明法人股接管控制权后能够改善企业的治理效率。本文的论证在一定程度上肯定了我国控制权市场的外部治理效力．     

金融发展水平、信息透明度与资产替代

本文以我国上市公司2007年1月1日开始执行新的会计准则为契机,具体考察了在各地区政府干预和金融发展水平呈现地区性差异的情况下,信息透明度对股东资产替代行为的影响。研究结果表明,我国上市公司信息透明程度与股东资产替代行为呈显著的负相关关系;当上市公司为国有控股公司时,信息透明度减弱股东资产替代行为的作用降低;在金融发展水平比较低的地区,信息透明度对股东资产替代行为的影响有所减弱。     

资本投向差异与私利攫取——来自中国上市公司控制权转移的经验证据

本文以控制权转移为背景,研究控制权私利攫取驱动下资本投向差异。结果表明,股权投资与控制权私利攫取负相关,固定资产及无形资产投资与私利攫取正相关。进一步研究发现:研发投入与国有公司大股东控制权私利攫取正相关;民营公司大股东通过股权投资提高控制权私利攫取水平;低市场化程度地区,大股东利用股权投资、固定资产及无形资产攫取私利水平显著下降;大股东利益侵占与未来公司业绩负相关,地方国有公司大股东利益侵占尤为严重。结果表明,在资本市场市场化程度日益加深的情况下,控制权私利攫取驱动资本投向差异,为引导政策性资源投入、完善资本市场秩序提供理论及经验支持。     

Equity financing in a Myers–Majluf framework with private benefits of control

This paper generalizes the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by introducing an agency cost structure based on private benefits of control. This new model predicts that many corporate finance variables each have opposing effects on under- and overinvestment. Private benefits exacerbate overinvestment but, interestingly, a small amount of private benefits can enhance firm value by alleviating underinvestment. Likewise, an increase in insider ownership alleviates overinvestment but aggravates underinvestment. When private benefits are small, the adverse effect of insider ownership on underinvestment tends to dominate. When there are considerable private benefits, the incentive-alignment effect of insider ownership is pronounced. Additionally, this model reconciles existing equity financing theories on announcement effects. It helps resolve the puzzle that small-growth firms do not seem to have an asymmetric information disadvantage when they issue new equity.     

Private benefits, block transaction premiums and ownership structure

A simple model shows that both price premiums and standardized block premiums (SBPs) are biased measures of private benefits because they do not account for the transfer of control effectively taking place with the block. This depends not only on the fractional size of the block, but on the whole distribution of shareholdings. We propose an alternative methodology to measure private benefits which makes it possible to weight the size of traded blocks on the basis of their strategic power. We apply our method to a sample of Italian block transactions and show that the traditional method underestimates control rents. The sensitivity of private benefits to net worth, leverage, and nonvoting shares is also examined. Finally, we show how to forecast the price of out-of-sample blocks of shares on the basis of information on company capital and ownership structure.     

Ownership structure,corporate governance and analyst following: A study of French listed firms

This study investigates the effects of some characteristics of the French corporate governance model – deemed to foster entrenchment and facilitate private benefits extraction – on the extent of analyst following. The results show that analysts are more likely to follow firms both with high discrepancy level between ownership and control and those controlled through pyramiding. These findings provide empirical support to the argument that minority shareholders value private information on firms with high expropriation likelihood, asking thence for more analyst services. Additional findings show that analysts are reticent to follow firms managed by controlling family members. This is, in part, explained by these firms’ reliance on private communication channels rather than public disclosure, producing a poor informational environment.     

Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled Firms

We examine earnings management practices of insider controlled firms across 22 countries to shed light on the link between consumption of private benefits and earnings management. Insider controlled firms are associated with more earnings management than noninsider controlled firms in weak investor protection countries. Consistent with the private benefits motive, insider controlled firms with greater divergence between cash‐flow rights and control rights are associated with more earnings management in these countries. Growth opportunities attenuate the association between insider control and earnings management even in weak investor protection countries. We also find some weak evidence that insider controlled firms are associated with less earnings management in strong investor protection countries. Overall, our results highlight a strong link between private benefits consumption and earnings management.     

Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and the outside investors. Both parties need to design a new implicit contract to share the firm's ownership. Using a signaling model, we show that the new controlling shareholder issues signals to outside shareholders to deliver private information on a firm's future economic return and her private rate of appropriation. The ownership stake of the controlling shareholder and the premium embedded in the acquisition price are key parameters. In a controlling ownership system, the equal opportunity rule modifies the relative behavior of controlling and outside shareholders. The quality of information deteriorates but the discipline on appropriation may become stronger.     

PRIVATE BENEFITS: OWNERSHIP VERSUS CONTROL

We empirically decompose private benefits into benefits accruing from ownership and benefits accruing from control. We document that private benefits increase slowly with respect to the ownership level but increase rapidly with respect to the blockholder's likelihood of exercising control. The decomposition of private benefits allows us to quantify the magnitude of nonpecuniary private benefits by examining the block premium when the blockholder's likelihood of exercising control is close to zero. We find that the size of nonpecuniary private benefits ranges from 0.61% to 5.92% of the share price, or 18% to 29% of the total private benefits.     

Takeover Defences and IPO Firm Value in the Netherlands

The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defences and IPO firm value. We report that management frequently uses takeover defences before taking the firm public. The use of takeover defences is primarily motivated by managerial entrenchment. IPO investors anticipate potential conflict of interests with management and reduce the price they pay for the IPO shares if takeover defences are adopted. Although managers internalise this cost of takeover defences to the degree they own pre‐IPO stock, they are likely to gain through private control benefits. Non‐management pre‐IPO owners lose. Their shares are worth less, but different from managers, they do not get offsetting private control benefits. We infer that managers use takeover defences to protect private control benefits at non‐management pre‐IPO owners’ expense.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.     

Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices

Using a data set that provides unprecedented detail on investors' stockholdings, we analyze whether investors take the quality of corporate governance into account when selecting stocks. We find that all categories of investors (domestic and foreign, institutional and small individual) who generally enjoy only security benefits are reluctant to invest in companies with weak corporate governance. In contrast, individuals connected with company insiders are more likely to invest in weak corporate governance companies. These findings suggest that it is important to distinguish between investors who enjoy private benefits or access private information, and investors who enjoy only security benefits.     

Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.