内幕交易的民事赔偿问题研究

内幕交易民事责任是规范证券市场行为、防范证券风险不可或缺的重要法律手段之一。然而,我国《证券法》作为规范证券市场的基本法律,对内幕交易的民事责任却未明确规定,导致受害人不能得到有效的救济。因此,加强对内幕交易民事责任的研究很有必要。本文从实践出发,结合侵权责任的构成要件对内幕后交易主体的确定、因果关系的界定、主观过错的认定等方面进行探讨,以期能对建立和完善内幕交易民事责任制度提出一些建设性的意见。     

证券市场内幕交易认定的前沿探索

证券市场内幕交易行为的存在会影响金融稳定与安全,内幕交易的认定是对其进行规制的重要内容。本文通过梳理实践中出现的认定困境、学术争议和域外经验,认为内幕交易的主体认定应以特定身份为原则,不再以非法手段为要件,并增加豁免情形,主观方面可借鉴折中知悉标准,客观方面应不以发生实际结果为要件,信息敏感期间的形成节点则应适当提前,希冀内幕交易认定更具可操作性和合理性,以期对规避内幕交易和证券市场稳定发展有所裨益。     

八类行为被认定为市场操纵

正在试行的中国证监会<证券市场操纵行为认定办法>和<证券市场内幕交易行为认定办法>,认定了连续交易、约定交易、自买自卖、蛊惑交易、抢先交易、虚假申报、特定价格、特定时段交易等8类行为属于市场操纵行为.同时,有关内幕交易主体、行为和内幕信息的认定标准,也更加细化.     

论内幕交易罪的若干问题及立法完善

在我国证券市场的实践中,内幕交易行为屡见不鲜.对于内幕交易行为的刑法规制,在司法实践中还存在一些问题及争议,有待立法进一步的完善.本文主要探讨了三个问题:通过合法手段获取证券内幕信息的人员是否应纳入内幕交易罪的犯罪主体;内幕交易罪的抗辩事由;罚金的处罚依据.分别针对各个问题,提出了相应的看法和解决措施.最后通过总结,做出了立法完善上的建议.     

内幕交易罪主体范围实证研究

关于内幕交易罪主体范围,理论界在具有职务关联的离职人员是否属于内幕交易罪主体、被动获取内幕信息的人员是否属于内幕交易罪主体以及内幕交易罪主体范围是否以第一受领人为限存在分歧。以中国裁判文书网的一审判决案件为视角,总结内幕交易罪主体范围实践现状,发现内幕交易罪主体范围具有扩张性、任意性以及模糊性等实践问题。立法不明确、司法不重视以及理论学界的争议是内幕交易罪主体范围混乱的根源。在当前的立法现状和司法实践下,通过限制内幕信息知情人员与非法获取内幕信息人员范围是准确界定内幕交易罪主体范围的可行之道。     

我国证券市场内幕交易研究

证券市场内幕交易行为扰乱证券市场的正常运行秩序,损害普通投资者的利益。但由于内幕交易手法多样、甄别难度大等原因,监管内幕交易行为一直是我国乃至全世界范围内共同存在的难题。本文从内幕交易形成机制和监管的问题两方面分析如何全面、最优地进行监管,以减少内幕交易行为的滋生。     

期货市场内幕交易监管及认定——美国期货期权内幕交易最新案例的比较视角

本文以近期美国期货市场发生的内幕交易案件为着眼点，具体分析美国商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)最近查处的期货市场利用客户信息型内幕交易行为，即利用客户大笔交易期货及期权的信息抢先下单并以有利的交易价格进行成交获利。案件中，被告在近五年的时间内2000余次实施类似的交易行为，违反了CFTC反欺诈细则及内幕交易监管规定。通过案例比较，分析境内外期货内幕交易行为特征以及认定，为我国期货市场内幕交易监管提供启示。     

内幕交易罪的司法困境及出路研究

近年来内幕交易案件频发,无论是"杭萧钢构案",还是"上海祖龙内幕交易案"都在司法认定方面引起了理论和实务界的较大争议。这充分表明,在认定内幕交易罪的司法实践中仍然存在很多待解的难题。只有在对这些司法难题进行深入剖析的基础上,重构内幕信息的认定标准、改善内幕交易行为的取证路径、强化内幕交易的执法力度、完善机制设计,才能破解司法难题,维护证券市场的公平公正,保障证券法律法规得以遵守和执行。     

内幕交易新动向及其法律规制研究

在资本市场企业并购重组活跃环境下,内幕交易这一资本市场"痼疾"不断呈现出新动向,如行为加剧化、主体多元化等.内幕交易新动向的法律成因主要在于现行法律法规对内幕交易规制的缺陷,即内幕交易法律责任的不力、内幕信息认定标准的不足、内幕交易取证的不易以及上市公司内部控制信息披露机制的不健全.因此,应立足于这些缺陷,完善内幕交易的法律规制,以维护资本市场的健康发展.     

我国内幕交易发现与监督机制研究

内幕交易(Insider Trading)指利用内幕消息进行不对称的交易,以违法获取利益或逃避损失,其实质是使其他投资者处于不利地位并且违背了市场的公平原则,打击了投资者的信心,是证券市场中所固有的一种顽疾。因此,打击内幕交易行为已成为全球证券监管机构面对的重要问题。本文首先对内幕交易的概念作了概述,并且对禁止内幕交易的理论基础进行了探讨,主要是从经济学及法理学的角度对禁止内幕交易进行了深入的分析。随后从比较与借鉴的角度出发,分析了我国香港地区查处内幕交易方面的相关规则及其运行状况,利用香港严打内幕交易的经验并结合我国的实际情况来阐述如何更好的促进中国证券市场内幕交易的发现与监管,从而更好的维护中国证券市场的公平、公开、公正。     

Trading on inside information: Evidence from the share-structure reform in China

We examine stock trading activities in days before Chinese listed firms made public announcement to start share-structure reform. There is significant evidence that, relative to a benchmark period, institutional investors bought more event firms’ shares in the last two trading days prior to announcement. Randomization tests show significant differences in institutional trading activities between event firms and matched control firms, which suggests that some institutions had inside information. Moreover, large trades account for a significant proportion of daily stock price changes in the last 2 days. The evidence is consistent with the prediction by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that, when multiple informed investors acquire the same piece of information, they will trade aggressively. We also find that over the reform period, the median share value change of event firms is 6% higher than that of control firms. Our findings have important implications for enforcement of insider trading regulations in China.     

内幕交易监管与监管困境研究综述

各国对内幕交易的监管基本采取立法的形式，许多学者都探讨了实施内幕交易监管的有效性以及监管效率问题。本文对相关文献进行了梳理，发现从内幕交易监管有效性的纵向比较分析，内幕交易监管并不能达到预期的效果；从横向比较分析，内幕交易监管越严格，越有利于降低内幕交易程度。总体而言，内幕交易监管是必要与相对有效的。因交易者策略与量价甄别指标的主观性而产生了监管困境，降低了监管效率。但是监管总体上可以带给市场的效益高于成本，那么内幕交易监管的实施与不断完善是非常有必要的。     

Do Insider Trading Laws Work?

This paper presents the first comprehensive global study of insider trading laws and their first enforcement. In a sample of 4,541 acquisitions from 52 countries, I find that insider trading enforcement increases both the incidence, and the profitability of insider trading. The expected total insider trading gains increase. Consequently, laws that proscribe insider trading fail to eliminate insider profits. However, harsher laws work better at reducing the incidence of illegal insider trading.     

“Swimming Ducks Forecast the Coming of Spring”—The predictability of aggregate insider trading on future market returns in the Chinese market

This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive(large shareholder)trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66%(72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater information advantage(e.g., executives and controlling shareholders).Corporate governance also affects the predictability of insider trading. The predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies,probably because the "quasi-official" status of the executives in those companies effectively curbs their incentives to benefit from insider trading.The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger profit motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating how the institutional context and corporate governance affect insider trading.     

我国证券市场内幕交易的法学实证分析——来自31起内幕交易成案的统计分析

内幕交易是证券法学界炙手可热、经久不衰的热门课题,关于内幕交易的各种概念、学说、理论被学术界翻炒得烂熟,解剖个案麻雀的精彩论著也不鲜见,但受制于案例、资料和相关数据的局限,少有学者从实证角度,系统性地研究我国内幕交易成案的总体特征。本文力图在传统证券法学研究途径之外,独辟蹊径,通过运用统计、数量分析等经济学科工具,对证券市场成立以来查处的全部31起内幕交易案件加以实证分析,以期得出我国内幕交易案件的发案特征与规律,为打击和防范内幕交易违法行为,修订内幕交易法制提供数据支持和实证参考。     

规制证券短线交易法律制度的现存问题与对策

起源于美国的上市公司内部人短线交易(short-swing trading)收益归入权制度,是证券内幕交易法律规制制度的一个重要组成部分,其立法目的在于通过对上市公司内部人的短线交易收益予以归入这一威慑手段,建立内幕交易的事先防范和吓阻机制,以维持投资者对资本市场公正性和公平性的信赖,保障资本市场的健康、有序发展。本文试从投资者权益保护的视角,在对我国现行的相关法律制度、司法和监管实践进行研究分析的基础上,借鉴美国、日本、韩国、台湾地区等境外成熟市场的成功经验,提出了完善我国短线交易法律规制制度的若干建议与对策。     

Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread

This study examines the intertemporal and cross-sectional association between the bid-ask spread and insider trading. Empirical results from the cross-sectional regression analysis reveal that market makers establish larger spreads for stocks with a greater extent of insider trading. The time-series regression analysis, however, finds no evidence of spread changes on insider trading days. These results suggest that although market makers may not be able to detect insider trading when it occurs, they protect themselves by maintaining larger spreads for stocks with a greater tendency of insider trading. The results also reveal that market makers establish larger spreads when there are unusually large transactions. In addition, this study finds that spreads are positively associated with risk and negatively with trading volume, the number of exchange listings, share price, and firm size.     

Information‐Hedging Disclosures and Insider Trading

I model the effect of disclosure on the tradeoff between information risk, liquidity risk, and price risk for a well‐informed, risk‐averse insider. Revealing some information before trading decreases the variability of the insider's information advantage and thus reduces his information risk. Disclosure also lowers adverse selection costs for market makers, which reduces the insider's liquidity risk by increasing his trading flexibility. However, disclosure increases price risk for the insider because the price fully reflects the revealed information. The reduction in information and liquidity risks outweigh the rise in price risk when the insider is less risk averse because a less risk‐averse insider's information‐based motive for trading is stronger than his hedging motive. The opposite relation holds when the insider is more risk averse. Therefore, a less (more) risk‐averse insider experiences an increase (decrease) in welfare when he discloses some information before trading. Cost of capital and policy implications are identified.     

The Effectiveness of White‐Collar Crime Enforcement: Evidence from the War on Terror

This paper analyzes the impact of changes in regulatory priorities and resource allocation on criminal enforcement of white‐collar criminal activities. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a shock to the FBI's priorities and allocation of investigative resources, as well as variation in the Muslim population in the United States, I examine whether prioritization of counterterrorism investigations after 9/11 is associated with weaker enforcement of laws targeting white‐collar crime. I then use a difference‐in‐differences estimation to study the magnitude of any increase in white‐collar crime resulting from reduced oversight. I find a significantly greater reduction in white‐collar criminal cases referred by FBI field offices that shifted more of their investigative focus away from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism. Further, geographic areas in the jurisdictions of FBI field offices with greater shifts in attention from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism experienced greater increases in wire fraud, illegal insider‐trading activities, and fraud within financial institutions.