对货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架内在逻辑的思考

本轮国际金融危机以来,金融稳定在中央银行政策目标中的重要性再次得到强化。随着具有顺周期波动特征的金融市场和金融资产规模显著增大,金融管理政策需要更加关注金融稳定和系统性风险问题,货币稳定和金融稳定“双目标”的重要性凸显出来。政策目标的变化相应要求优化和完善政策工具箱,需要健全宏观审慎政策框架作为应对系统性风险的工具,并与货币政策相互配合,形成由货币政策和宏观审慎政策“双支柱”支撑起“双目标”的基本框架,共同维护好货币稳定和金融稳定。在此框架中,货币政策和宏观审慎政策都不可或缺,须相互补充,形成合力,产生“一加一大于二”的政策效应增进效果。健全货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架,有利于把经济周期和金融周期更好地结合起来,把维护经济稳定与促进金融稳定更好地结合起来。下一阶段应进一步健全宏观审慎政策框架,并完善货币政策和宏观审慎政策协调配合的体制机制。     

房价波动、金融稳定与最优宏观审慎政策

本文通过构建包含家庭住房抵押借款摩擦和银行贷款摩擦的动态随机一般均衡模型,重点考察了异质性冲击下房价波动对金融稳定的影响。研究发现,房价上涨会导致银行风险溢价及杠杆率显著上升,进而加剧金融体系的内在不稳定。为降低房价波动及维护金融稳定,选取两类宏观审慎政策工具进行逆周期调控实验,结果表明,在住房需求冲击下,金融管理部门应选取贷款价值比政策,且应对房贷积极调控,而对房价进行中性调控。在最终产品部门生产率冲击、房地产部门生产率冲击及跨期偏好冲击下,应选取资本充足率政策,但对房贷和房价调控力度的把握则存在差异。本研究为厘清房价波动对金融稳定的动态传导机制,以及金融管理部门如何选取宏观审慎政策工具以稳定房价并降低系统性金融风险提供了启示。     

Can interest rates really control house prices? Effectiveness and implications for macroprudential policy

This paper investigates how changes in the central bank policy and retail mortgage rates affected real housing prices in New Zealand during the period 1999–2009. We find that real interest rates are significantly and positively related to real housing prices, indicating that increases in the policy rate may not be effective in depressing real housing prices. By testing interest rates, we also find some evidence of housing price bubbles. Our findings suggest that the central bank could have limited housing price bubbles if it had started to intervene in the housing market prior to 2003. Our results set international exemplars for using policy rates or macroprudential tools to cool the housing market, where the extent of policy rate adjustments is limited by internal or external economic factors.     

宏观审慎政策的国际协调问题研究--基于我国的DSGE模拟分析

本文在两国模型的DSGE框架下引入宏观审慎政策监管机制,把金融摩擦、国际资本流动和宏观审慎政策纳入同一个一般均衡分析框架。通过国际贸易和国际资本流动机制,考察宏观审慎政策的国际影响机制。基于我国的模拟分析结果表明,第一,对于我国来说,宏观审慎政策的国际合作不仅能够有效地应对国内经济冲击,也有助于抵御外部经济冲击。第二,我国推动构建国际宏观审慎政策长效合作机制,有助于积极应对国际资本流动,促进我国资本市场进一步开放。第三,我国宏观审慎政策存在国际溢出效应,但是对其他国家的影响并不明显。     

宏观审慎与货币政策双支柱框架研究——基于系统性风险视角

本轮国际金融危机之后,建立“宏观审慎政策专门盯住金融稳定目标,货币政策主要关注经济稳定目标”的双支柱成为国际社会的普遍共识。本文基于系统性风险视角,深入剖析系统性风险的累积和实现机制,从时间和空间两个维度梳理宏观审慎政策实现金融稳定的有效性,以及货币政策对系统性风险造成的潜在溢出性。目前从系统性风险的时间维度探讨双支柱政策的研究已较为丰富,可以总结为宏观审慎政策的“逆周期调节”机制和货币政策的“资本缺口”机制。从系统性风险的空间维度探讨双支柱政策的研究,也即对双支柱政策如何作用和改变金融机构内部关联网络的研究正成为研究热点。本文从政策工具和影响机制上对空间维度双支柱政策进行了系统梳理。基于以上分析,本文对双支柱政策的制定提出如下建议:时间维度宏观审慎政策要关注并消除货币政策对时间维度系统性风险的溢出性,同时要加强空间维度宏观审慎政策工具的创新力度。     

Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area

Since its creation the euro area suffered from imbalances between its core and peripheral members. This paper checks whether macroprudential policy applied to the peripheral countries could contribute to providing more macroeconomic stability in this region. To this end we build a two-economy macrofinancial model and simulate the effects of macroprudential policy (regulating the loan-to-value ratio) when the core and the periphery are exposed to asymmetric shocks. We find that macroprudential policy is able to substantially lower the amplitude of credit and output fluctuations in the periphery. However, for the policy to be effective, it should be decentralized. Very similar conclusions hold when welfare is considered as the optimality criterion.     

货币、财政和宏观审慎政策的协调搭配研究

本文通过构建包含多部门和多元宏观政策的DSGE模型,对货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策的最优反应规则及其协调组合问题进行了分析。分析结果显示:(1)从社会福利最大化的角度,货币政策可继续盯住通胀和产出的稳定,政府支出和税收政策可分别重点盯住产出稳定和债务稳定,而宏观审慎政策则可重点关注以信贷利差和信贷波动为代表的关键金融变量;(2)货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策,通过合理的搭配和组合使用,能比任何单一政策工具都具有更好的经济金融稳定效应;反之,政策之间的不协调将显著削弱彼此的调控效应,加大经济和金融波动,从而导致显著的社会福利损失;(3)从多种政策协调搭配产生“合力”的内在机制来看,财政政策主要通过增加对产出、通胀、就业和债务等变量的稳定效应,对货币政策产生额外助力,而宏观审慎政策则主要通过稳定金融体系和降低金融风险对货币政策产生助力。上述结论表明,在多种经济金融政策并存的情况下,基于良好设定的政策规则,同时加强政策各部门之间的协调合作,是确保多元政策产生积极合力的重要基础。     

Managing price and financial stability objectives in inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific

Many central banks have adopted explicit objectives for financial stability, raising the possibility of trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. Based on structural vector autoregressions that incorporate both monetary and macroprudential policy shocks for four inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific, we analyse the role of each policy shock in explaining deviations from the other policy’s objective, by applying historical decompositions. The macroprudential measures used in the study affect credit extended to the private sector. We find that there are periods when macroprudential policy shocks have contributed to pushing inflation away from the central bank’s inflation target and when monetary policy shocks have contributed to buoyant credit, suggesting that there have been short-term trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. However, we also find periods when macroprudential policy shocks helped stabilise inflation and monetary policy shocks contributed to financial stability.     

Macroprudential regulation,credit spreads and the role of monetary policy

We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the output-inflation trade-off faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.     

中国金融周期与横向关联:时空双维度相结合视角

宏观审慎政策关注各金融子市场在时间维度上的金融周期和空间维度上的横向关联。本文结合时间维度与空间维度视角,使用股票市场、货币市场、房地产市场以及信贷市场的数据,测算2001—2019年中国金融周期和横向关联的波动特征、作用关系与频域叠加机理。研究结果表明:时间维度金融周期与空间维度横向关联的波动趋势具有一致性。我国金融周期长度约为10.33年,横向关联波动周期的长度约为10.58年。从作用关系上看,首先,我国房地产周期达到波峰后,会对股票市场和信贷市场产生较强的溢出效应。随后,股市周期达到波峰后,会向房地产市场和信贷市场产生较强的溢出效应。最后,我国信贷市场接受股票市场和房地产市场溢出后,信贷周期会逐渐达到波峰。从频域叠加机理的角度看,我国金融子市场间横向关联的波动主要由中低频波段驱动,中低频波段横向关联的持续期在2个月以上。     

耐用品、投资专有冲击与货币政策福利

本文构建蕴含耐用品与非耐用品的两部门DSGE模型,研究投资专有冲击对货币政策及社会福利的影响。投资专有技术进步改进了投资转化为生产资本的效率,放大边际成本波动,增加了厂商调价动机和价格水平变动。即使耐用品价格完全灵活,最优货币政策也无法同时稳定价格和实际GDP。研究发现:(1)耐用品相对价格缺口波动率的上升虽然增加了实际GDP波动,但能够有效地降低投资专有技术对边际成本的冲击,减少价格变动的福利损失。所以两部门投资专有冲击时,央行倾向于稳定价格水平。与其相反,在单部门投资专有冲击和两部门生产技术冲击时,最优货币政策应降低耐用品相对价格缺口波动,稳定实际GDP。(2)对比三种泰勒规则:钉住非耐用品PPI、钉住加权平均PPI及钉住CPI,福利分析发现钉住非耐用品PPI最优,钉住CPI次之,钉住加权平均PPI的福利损失最大。就损失程度而言,投资专有冲击的福利损失是生产技术冲击的2倍,表明投资专有冲击加剧了最优货币政策在稳定价格与实际GDP间的权衡。     

Banking systemic vulnerabilities: A tail-risk dynamic CIMDO approach

This study proposes a novel framework which combines marginal probabilities of default estimated from a structural credit risk model with the consistent information multivariate density optimization (CIMDO) methodology and the generalized dynamic factor model (GDFM) supplemented by a dynamic t-copula. The framework models banks’ default dependence explicitly and captures the time-varying non-linearities and feedback effects typical of financial markets. It measures banking systemic credit risk in the three forms categorized by the European Central Bank: (1) credit risk common to all banks; (2) credit risk in the banking system conditional on distress on a specific bank or combinations of banks; and (3) the buildup of banking system vulnerabilities over time which may unravel disorderly. In addition, the estimates of the common components of the banking sector short-term and conditional forward default measures contain early warning features, and the identification of their drivers is useful for macroprudential policy. Finally, the framework produces robust out-of-sample forecasts of the banking systemic credit risk measures. This paper advances the agenda of making macroprudential policy operational.     

The countercyclical capital buffer and the composition of bank lending

Do targeted macroprudential measures impact non-targeted sectors too? We investigate the compositional changes in the supply of credit by Swiss banks, exploiting their differential exposure to the activation in 2013 of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) which targeted banks’ exposure to residential mortgages. We find that the additional capital requirements resulting from the activation of the CCyB are associated with higher growth in banks’ commercial lending. While banks are lending more to all types of businesses, the new macroprudential policy benefits smaller and riskier businesses the most. However, the interest rates and other costs of obtaining credit for these firms rise as well.     

Effects of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies—Evidence from Four Inflation Targeting Economies

We examine the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in the Asia‐Pacific region, where many inflation targeting economies have adopted macroprudential policies in order to safeguard financial stability. Using structural panel vector autoregressions that identify both monetary and macroprudential policy actions, we show that tighter macroprudential policies used to contain credit growth also have a significant negative impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP and the price level. The similar effects of monetary and macroprudential policies may suggest a complementary use of the two policies at normal times. However, they could also create challenges for policymakers, especially during times when low inflation coincides with buoyant credit growth.     

货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调

本文在梳理学术文献和国际经验基础上,讨论了货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的潜在冲突和协调机制。国际文献的初步结论是,为了同时实现价格稳定和金融稳定目标,大部分情况下需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策反向操作(由于政策的替代性),但有时也需要两者同向操作(由于政策的互补性),最优政策组合取决于宏观冲击的类别和风险的来源。本文认为,选择最优组合是一个复杂的理论和实证问题,除了冲击类别和风险来源外,不同的金融体制和经济周期阶段也会影响选择结果。因此,货币政策当局与宏观审慎当局之间需要建立有效的协调机制,并加强对货币政策和宏观审慎政策“溢出效应”的分析能力。基于上述理论,针对我国“双支柱”决策的现状和问题提出如下改革建议:一是从法律上明确中央银行的金融稳定职责。二是建立在同一框架内分析货币政策与宏观审慎政策的方法和工具。三是将金融监管部门的主要宏观审慎政策决策权集中至中央银行。四是建立货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调流程与机制。     

Optimal Macroprudential Policies and House Prices in Korea

This article investigates the impacts of the macroprudential policy of limitation on credit growth in housing market on Korean economy to find empirical and theoretical implications. Empirical results based on VAR models show that macroprudential policies like LTV and DTI in Korea have significant and persistent effect on real household credit and real house price. This article further addresses implications of optimal macroprudential and monetary policy in Korea by employing a standard DSGE model. The results suggest that the time-varying macroprudential policy responding to the borrower’s debt to income ratio is most effective in stabilizing household debt among the macroprudential policy rules considered, but produces a moderate downturn of the economy.     

货币政策能够兼顾稳增长与防风险吗？——基于动态随机一般均衡模型的分析

为构建金融有效支持实体经济的体制机制,需平衡好稳增长、调结构和防风险三者间的关系。在此背景下,本文在两部门新凯恩斯主义动态随机一般均衡模型中引入异质性抵押约束,探讨货币政策如何兼顾稳增长和防风险,进而促进金融更好地服务实体经济。本文模拟结果显示:(1)降低利率和强化国企抵押约束可促进稳增长与稳杠杆。推动国企贷款利率趋于市场水平并降低非国企贷款成本,积极发挥结构性货币政策工具的作用,将增进其政策效果;(2)2008-2016年宏观杠杆率上升主要与国企抵押约束过松有关,2017年后利率对宏观杠杆率的调控增强;(3)宏观审慎政策框架下,货币政策盯住宏观杠杆率,并根据政策目标和经济背景适时调整利率与杠杆率的内生关系,能够优化货币政策效果。对于降低利率和强化国企抵押约束的政策组合,根据宏观杠杆率的变化同向调整利率水平有利于经济稳步增长和宏观杠杆率趋稳。     

House Price Booms,Current Account Deficits,and Low Interest Rates

Domestic factors, such as credit and preference shocks, can explain the negative correlation between house prices and the current account in the U.S. and several other countries before the recent crisis. These shocks, however, cannot account for the fall of world real interest rates observed in the data. Expansionary monetary policy shocks in the U.S., coupled with exchange rate pegs to the dollar in emerging economies, are crucial to understanding the evolution of the real interest rate. Yet, monetary policy factors play virtually no role for house prices and the current account.     

Financial frictions and real implications of macroprudential policies

I model a number of imperfections in financial intermediation that have implications for real economic activity in a production economy with technological risk. Partially opaque firms are financed by both debt and insider equity. Banks have market power over borrowers. There can be a prior bias in public beliefs about aggregate productivity (business sentiment). I investigate the dependence of equilibrium on the biased business sentiment and a prudential policy instrument (a convex dependence of bank capital requirements on the quantity of uncollateralized credit). Loss given default can be reduced by both a monetary restriction and a macroprudential restriction. Real implications of both are very similar in the aggregate, but macroprudential policies are more advantageous for bank earnings. On the other hand, the policies considered here are unable to reduce the number of defaulting firms (default frequency). Economic activity is highly sensitive to ??leaning against the wind?? actions on both fronts, so that using a macroprudential instrument to intervene against an asset price bubble has tangible welfare costs comparable to those of a monetary restriction. The costs can be offset by fine tuning capital charges as a function of corporate governance on the borrower side (specifically, by discouraging limited liability of borrowing firm managers).     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.