Athletic contests and individual robberies: an analysis based on hourly crime data

Using hourly data on individual robberies, this article employs a novel approach to investigate the relationship between athletic contests and individual robberies in Memphis, Tennessee, a well-known entertainment destination, with its iconic Beale Street locale, in the US. Empirical results indicate that home basketball games hosted by the NBA’s Memphis Grizzlies and those hosted by the University of Memphis Tigers are associated with increases in individual robberies, while away games are not associated with such an increase. This finding is consistent with the hot spot theory of crime, as large numbers of individuals travel to the games, thus providing additional opportunities for crime.     

The economic analysis of offender’s choice: Old and new insights

The economics of crime has followed the basic Becker model (1968), according to which a criminal act results from a rational decision based on cost-benefit analysis. This paper surveys some extensions to Becker’s model, by giving some emphasis to earlier work that tries to explain differences in offender’s choice across places. At the end, the paper analyses the contribution of Steven Levitt (the new Gary Becker), which has stimulated an empirical renaissance in the economic analysis of crime. His new book (co-author Dubner) Freakonomics (2005) offers a new argument in understanding why crime fell in the 1990s in the USA. I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for his valuable comments, which improved the final version of this paper. I would also like to thank Steven Levitt for sending me his unpublished work. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Killing for Money and the Economic Theory of Crime

There is a large literature on the economics of crime and punishment, yet surprisingly little attention is paid to the receipt of money for crime. “Contract killing” is surprisingly neglected not only by economists but also by social scientists in general. In this paper, I look at the case not of professional gangster “hitmen” but of individuals who have found themselves in a position where they wish to have a killing carried out. This discussion does not condone the practice any more than an economic analysis of suicide is an inducement to individuals to kill themselves. To the lay reader, the cases where an individual feels the need to pay for killing may seem to be such that rationality is not a likely form of behaviour. However, the economics of crime has adopted the use of the rationality postulate as a heuristic for all types of crime.     

Strong and weak ties in employment and crime

This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighborhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions.     

Economic cost–benefit analysis of the addictive digital game industry

This study attempts to estimate the economic costs and benefits of the addictive digital game industry. Addiction to digital games induces economic costs such as increase in crime, facilities investments for curbing addiction, increase in counselling costs and other welfare losses. As a case study, we investigate the digital game industry in South Korea which is known to have one of the highest rates of game addiction. According to our calculations, the annual cost of game addiction is estimated to be approximately $3.5B while the annual benefit is approximately $24.3B ($3.7B for addicted user market). The proportion of the total costs to total benefits from the game industry is an alarming 14% (95% for addicted user market). We offer some policy recommendations.     

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective

Even among themselves, criminals are not seen as trustworthy. Consequently, a criminal organization needs to incentivize its members, either by threats of violence or by rewarding good behavior. The cost of using violence depends on the resources police allocate to investigating intraorganizational violence. This means that the police may affect the choice of an incentive scheme by the criminal organization. The design of the optimal strategy for crime control has to take this into account. We develop a model of an infinitely repeated criminal labor market where (i) a criminal organization hires and incentivizes members, and (ii) peripheral crime (crime outside the criminal organization) is a stepping stone to a career in organized crime. We establish that there are two possible optimal strategies for the police. (i) There are situations in which the optimal strategy for the police is to use all of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals. (ii) In other situations, the optimal strategy for the police is to spend the minimum amount of resources to ensure that the criminal organization cannot punish disloyal criminals, and spend the rest of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals.     

Crime,inequality and unemployment in England and Wales

A model of crime is developed based on principles from the existing literature with some original insight. The implications of the model are that income inequality and unemployment are important explanatory variables for crimes motivated by economic gain, but do not offer much explanatory power for other types of crime. Panel data of UK regions over the years from 2002 to 2007 are then used to test these predictions. The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that crime is an economic phenomenon.     

Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games

This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume other players do so as well. We define an agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE), which applies QRE to the agent normal form of an extensive form game and imposes a statistical version of sequential rationality. We also define a parametric specification, called logit-AQRE, in which quantal-choice probabilities are given by logit response functions. AQRE makes predictions that contradict the invariance principle in systematic ways. We show that these predictions match up with some experimental findings by Schotter et al. (1994) about the play of games that differ only with respect to inessential transformations of the extensive form. The logit-AQRE also implies a unique selection from the set of sequential equilibria in generic extensive form games. We examine data from signaling game experiments by Banks et al. (1994) and Brandts and Holt (1993). We find that the logit-AQRE selection applied to these games succeeds in predicting patterns of behavior observed in these experiments, even when our prediction conflicts with more standard equilibrium refinements, such as the intuitive criterion. We also reexamine data from the McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) centipede experiment and find that the AQRE model can account for behavior that had previously been explained in terms of altruistic behavior. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Testing threats in repeated games

Under most game-theoretic solution concepts, equilibrium beliefs are justified by off-equilibrium events. I propose an equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, called “Nash Equilibrium with Tests” (NEWT), according to which players can only justify their equilibrium beliefs with events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. In NEWT, players test every threat that rationalizes a future non-myopic action that they take. The tests are an integral part of equilibrium behavior. Characterization of equilibrium outcomes departs from the classical “folk theorems”. The concept provides new insights into the impact of self-enforcement norms, such as reciprocity, on long-run cooperation.     

高低级别公职人员经济犯罪隐蔽性比较研究

在实地调研了2008-2010年430个公职人员经济犯罪案例的基础上,将其分为两类,即高级别和低级别不法公职人员经济犯罪。统计分析发现,高级别比低级别更加隐蔽。通过有序逻辑回归模型分析发现:影响高级别公职人员经济犯罪隐蔽性的主要是潜伏期、犯罪次数、所得来源种类等经济犯罪因素;影响低级别公职人员经济犯罪隐蔽性的主要是年龄、教育程度、家庭状况等个人因素;犯罪总金额则是影响高级别和低级别两者的共同因素。     

STREET CRIME AND STREET CULTURE*

A model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime, a street culture, where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak. There are social benefits to street reputations, but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it. The model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns, disproportionate victimization of the young and poor, and high variance in rates across small distances. The model generates novel implications for policy and social science, including a negative effect of social capital.     

论作为保险人法定免责事由的故意犯罪认定立场

被保险人故意犯罪作为保险人的法定免责事由,其立法根据在于防止道德风险、维护社会公共秩序和善良风俗、避免保险制度被滥用。对作为保险人免责事由的故意犯罪认定与刑法保持一致之立场,既符合保险法与刑法各自的功能与立法目的,不违背保险法把被保险人故意犯罪作为保险人法定免责事由的立法根据,也是由保险法免责要件规范的不明确性决定的,同时也符合保险合同疑义利益解释规则的基本原理。     

Does private security affect crime?: a test using state regulations as instruments

Private security is employed to deter criminals from attacking specific targets, presumably not to produce general deterrence. Indeed, private security generates negative spillovers as criminals substitute non-protected targets for protected targets. Specific deterrence efforts may generate positive spillovers too, however, by raising the expected cost of committing crimes, thereby reducing crime in an area. The hypothesis that private security deters crime at the state level is tested. The demand for private security in an area is expected to be simultaneously dependent on the level of crime; so, an instrumental variables approach is employed in a panel-data fixed-effect model using state-level data from 1998 to 2010. Instruments for the amount of private security are state-wide licensing regulations for firms specializing in providing security, since these regulations should influence entry. Some state-level measures of violent and property crime are shown to be negatively and significantly related to increases in private security, suggesting that private security generates a general deterrence effect.     

Mixed markets and crime

This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targets and the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit.The paper's key results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less-protected targets suffer. Second, an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing. This is an instance of a political incentive externality, where private policing affects the objective function of the government. Specifically, it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the Samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good. Third, the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing. In effect, private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening. This, in turn, may lead to an increase in the severity of crime. Fourth, the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient, and, in some situations, mixing may reduce the utility of all targets.     

Interconnected games and international environmental problems

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of interconnected games and to show its relevance for modeling international environmental problems. It is argued that an interconnected game approach to international environmental problems may enhance cooperation and provide an alternative to the use of financial side payments to induce countries to cooperate. Two types of interconnected games are distinguished in this paper, i.e. direct sum games and tensor games. In the former all the constituting isolated games are games in strategic form and in the latter they are repeated games. In both cases the interconnected game can be interpreted as a multiple objective game, but only the setting where a trade-off is made for the vector-payoffs is considered. In addition to the formal definition of these types of interconnected games, some elementary results concerning Nash equilibria of such games are derived.Folmer and v. Mouche: Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen, Postbus 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands; Ragland: University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0256, U.S.A. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the EAERE conference in Stockholm, June 1991. The authors appreciate comments made by conference participants and journal referees.     

环境监管失职罪刑法适用之完善对策

作为渎职犯罪的一种,环境监管失职行为的入刑,表明了中国对环境保护的重视与远见。自环境监管失职罪从1997年《刑法》修订入刑适用至今,本罪在司法实践中,已出现不少法律适用上的困惑与难题亟需妥善解决。主要从环境监管失职罪的实施现状、存在问题、国外的相关规定以及中国所应采取的相关对策为视角,探求针对环境监管失职犯罪实施的完善对策,以期为环境保护起到加强作用。     

Did you really take a hit? Understanding how video games playing affects individuals

This study addresses the important and recurring question of whether playing video games is detrimental to the socio-economic development of a person. It does this by using novel data from the Taking Part Survey in England to establish whether games playing is associated with particular socio-economic characteristics and/or other forms of cultural participation. The results do not indicate any obviously negative effects of video games playing: rather, those who play are typically better educated and no less wealthier, and games players are also more likely than non-games players to participate in other forms of culture, particularly active forms of participation. These findings are reinforced when comparing the characteristics of individuals who did and did not play video games when younger.     

Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Examining the link between crime and unemployment: a time-series analysis for Canada

We use national and regional Canadian data to analyse the relationship between economic activity (as reflected by the unemployment rate) and crime rates. Given potential aggregation bias, we disaggregate the crime data and look at the relationship between six different types of crimes rates and unemployment rate; we also disaggregate the data by region. We employ an error correction model in our analysis to test for short-run and long-run dynamics. We find no evidence of long-run relationship between crime and unemployment, when we look at both disaggregation by type of crime and disaggregation by region. Lack of evidence of a long-run relationship indicates we have no evidence of the motivation hypothesis. For selected types of property crimes, we find some evidence of a significant negative short-run relationship between crime and unemployment, lending support to the opportunity hypothesis. Inclusion of control variables in the panel analysis does not alter the findings, qualitatively or quantitatively.