The tradeoff between growth and equity in decentralization policy: China's experience

This paper investigates the potential tradeoff between economic growth and regional equity in the design of fiscal decentralization policy in the context of China's experience. We develop a theoretical model of fiscal decentralization, where overall national economic growth and equity in the regional distribution of fiscal resources are the two objectives pursued by the central government. The model is tested using panel data for 1985–98. We find that fiscal decentralization in China has led to economic growth as well as to significant increases in regional inequality.     

中国式分权下的区域创新绩效研究---基于资源获取与资源配置视角的分析

依据资源基础理论,财政自主权作为一种有价值、稀缺、不可完全模仿、组织可利用的财政资源,是地方政府取得良好区域创新绩效的来源;使用2007—2016年中国分省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据,实证检验了财政分权对区域创新绩效的影响。研究发现:①财政分权对区域创新绩效具有显著的正向影响,在考虑财政分权异质性、创新绩效异质性、创新强度、内生性等问题后,结果依然稳健;②地方政府在运用支出自主权为获取良好的区域创新绩效时,存在"软约束"问题,即收入分权对支出分权与区域创新绩效之间的关系具有约束作用但不显著,可能的原因在于转移支付的"公共池"效应与创新锁定效应。     

Decentralization and local pollution activities: New quasi evidence from China

Traditional fiscal federalism theory holds that decentralization may improve the provision of public goods and services. However, the social welfare field with strong externalities may face different incentives and behavioural logics. This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the causal relationship between decentralization and local pollution. In this paper, we focussed on China's widely spread decentralization reform, which substantially expanded the economic and social management autonomy of county governments. Using the difference-in-differences method and a panel dataset from 1998 to 2007, we found that the reform would compel affected counties to loosen environmental regulation, adopt financial and fiscal policies that would actually support heavy-pollution industries' rapid economic growth. Overall, the reform led to a significant increase in local pollution, thus worsening the overall environmental quality. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis indicated that the reforms generated net gains in social welfare, but the substantial environmental costs cannot be ignored.     

Decentralization,social capital,and regional growth: The case of the Italian North-South divide

This paper aims to show how a region's constant level of social capital may have a very different impact on its economic growth depending on whether the central or the local level of government is responsible for regional policy.Our case study is the economic performance of Northern and Southern Italy in the post-World War II period, when a long phase of regional convergence came to a sudden halt in the early 1970s. We focus on the economic effects of the 1970s institutional reforms on government decentralization and wage bargaining. Our main hypothesis is that decentralization allocates the provision of public capital to institutions, the local ones, more exposed to a territory's social capital. Since social capital is lower in the Southern regions, decentralization made their developmental policies less effective from 1970 onwards, and regional inequality increased.We build an endogenous growth model augmented to include the interaction between social capital and public investment as well as the reform of the Italian labour market. We calibrate our model using data of the Italian regions for 1951–71. Our quantitative results indicate that decentralization triggered the influence of local social capital on growth and played a central role in halting the convergence path of the low-social-capital regions.     

Decentralization and political institutions

Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests Riker's [Riker, W. (1964) “Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance,” Little, Brown and Co, Boston, MA.] theory that the results of fiscal decentralization depend on the level of countries' political centralization. We analyze cross-section and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years. Two of Riker's predictions about the role of political institutions in disciplining fiscally-autonomous local politicians are confirmed by the data. 1) Strength of national political parties significantly improves outcomes of fiscal decentralization such as economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. 2) In contrast, administrative subordination (i.e., appointing local politicians rather than electing them) does not improve the results of fiscal decentralization.     

Does fiscal decentralization promote the inflow of FDI in China?

This paper tests whether China's fiscal decentralization promotes the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Using provincial panel data during 1995–2002, we find that fiscal decentralization has a positive and significant effect on inward FDI, after controlling for other factors, and fixed time and province effects in both LSDV (Least squares dummy variables) regression and system GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimations that address the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. The results are robust to six measures of fiscal decentralization that consider budgetary amount, extra-budgetary funds and inter-governmental transfers. A simple theory is offered to explain the findings. The results during 1987–1994 are further contrasted. Policy implications are also presented.     

分权、区域竞争与倒U形分权效应曲线研究

财政分权能够促进区域经济增长吗?分权能够一视同仁地促进不同地区相同程度的经济增长吗?文章通过构建区域间追赶模型指出:(1)财政分权在带来区域竞争激励并促进增长的同时,也导致了地方政府行为的异化,从而使得分权的增长效应呈现"倒U形"曲线状.曲线背后的逻辑在于"政治锦标赛"下的竞争压力对不同发展阶段的地区并不一样,不同压力来源可能诱发出地方政府的不同努力水平.(2)利用全国县级面板数据,通过构造四类财政分权指标,证实了分权促进区域内经济增长且依据收入水平的变化呈现倒U形曲线的基本推论.     

中国财政分权、金融发展、 工业化与经济增长的省际差异

本文采用1978-2006年中国28个地区的省际面板数据建立了检验财政分权、金融发展、工业化与经济增长之间长期关系的协整模型（co integration model）,并采用完全修正的最小二乘法（FMOLS）对模型进行估计。本文把地方政府官员参与政治晋升锦标赛竞争的行为影响经济绩效的假设引入对分权化改革过程的分析,对中国改革开放以来地方政府之间的竞争何以在促成经济总量高速增长的同时又导致各地区在财政分权、金融发展、工业化和经济增长方面呈现出差异的原因进行了分析,进而得出本文的分析结论并对其政策含义进行了讨论。     

中国的财政分权与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证

在Barro、Davoodi和Zou模型的基础上,本文构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用1980-2004年省级面板数据,采用随机效应回归方法,分阶段实证研究了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响.实证研究发现,财政分权总体上促进了我国的经济增长,而且我国财政分权的经济增长效应存在显著的跨区差异,东部地区的财政分权经济增长优势高于中西部地区.作者认为,财政分权体制下地方政府财政行为的差异与公共支出构成的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异的重要原因.     

财政分权的中国模式与OECD模式——分税制是财政集权吗

本文在完整的财政分权内涵上比较分析了1995—2009年中国与OECD国家的财政分权情况,结果发现,不管是收入还是支出,中国中央与地方政府的财政分权程度都远远高于发达国家,呈现出中国政治集权下的财政分权和OECD政治分权下的财政集权两种模式。中国的财政支出分权程度与经济增长和财政均等化存在显著的正向相关关系,而这在OECD国家是不显著的。在中国的财政分权结构中,结构偏向的经济性支出成为地方政府财政支出重点和经济增长的重要推动力量;扩张的预算外支出成为增加财政收入的重要途径。所谓“事权与财权匹配”问题的实质是公共职责不清晰和预算软约束的地方政府收支扩张的财政机会主义倾向。财政分权改革的后续深化方向是在明确规范化地方政府公共职责和硬化预算约束的基础上适度财政集权化。     

地方政府支出竞争与地区投资行为——中国式财政分权框架下的实证研究

中国财政分权体制下,地方政府间的财政支出竞争广泛存在。建立纳入财政支出分权、地方政府财政支出及支出竞争的企业投资决策计量模型。结论显示:地方政府财政支出横向竞争和纵向竞争对地区投资行为影响具有差异性并存在长期效应。为实现地方政府支出竞争的良性发展应将更多的资源投入到有利于提高地区整体投资环境的领域,同时继续完善中央和地方关系。     

The regionalization of indian politics and its implications for economic reform

Is political decentralization an impetus for economic liberalism, or are state and local governments impediments to a rigorous reform process? This article describes India's federal system, the growth of regional parties and governments, the changing balance of power between India's state and central governments, and the deterioration of state administrations, then assesses the economic reform and human resource policies of the states. The factors which slow the pace of reforms (politically unstable governments, fiscal populism, organized local interests, patronage and rents for party and government officials) and those that push for reforms (fiscal deficits, the need for investments in infrastructures, and inter-state competition for private investment) are analyzed.     

Market Orientation and Regional Economic Disparities in China

The change in China's regional output disparities can be attributed to the variation in market orientation in individual regions, and the change in China's livelihood disparities can be attributed to the weakening of government intervention in the form of regional income redistribution in the reform process. The study suggests that China should accelerate economic growth of backward interior regions by deepening market-oriented reforms on the one hand, and help residents in these regions by strengthening fiscal transfer from richer to poorer regions on the other.     

The role of Provincial Government Spending Composition in growth and convergence in China

China’s development policy since 1978 has differed across regions. With rapid aggregate growth has come widening regional inequality. The fiscal decentralisation reforms in 1994 shifted political pressure onto provincial officials to boost local growth through local public investments. These investments affect regional convergence by counteracting regulatory frictions in factor accumulation, and can also determine steady-state growth. However, the effect of public spending allocations across physical and human capital on growth and convergence processes is empirically unexplored for Chinese provinces. We take provincial time-series data on public spending by category, finding local public spending and its components augment convergence rates differently across regions. Spending on education and health contributes significantly more to growth and convergence than capital spending, confirming that the public capital-spending bias is not a local growth-optimising strategy. We suggest a policy of aligning local government promotion incentives to human capital targets to correct local resource misallocation.     

新常态下的人力资本与经济增长——综合金融资本和创新创业的理论建模

在国内外形势的双重影响下,中国经济步入了"新常态"的阶段,放缓的经济增长步伐带来新的矛盾和挑战,经济增长模式从以往的粗放型逐渐向集约型转变,但以往的经济理论在经济新阶段都具有一定的局限性.本文使用主流宏观经济学前沿的建模方法将现有的四大经济增长理论囊括在一个综合模型中,把人力资本投资、金融资本投资、实物资本投资、创新创业活动、纳什博弈机制有机地结合在统一的分析框架下,对经济增长理论文献做出重要的概括和拓展.通过校准赋值和数值模拟,得出理论模型的基本结论:人力资本积累虽然可以通过创新和创业促进经济增长,但是其效果仍是递减的,呈现出新古典增长模型的属性.     

政府关注视角下财政分权对社会参与研发积极度的影响——一个中介效应模型检验

揭示财政分权影响社会参与研发投入的规律对于我国加强和完善地方政府研发投入管理具有重要意义。理论研究表明，财政分权对社会参与研发积极性的影响存在一条由地方政府研发关注度作为中介变量的中介路径。基于此，以2009—2017年中国内地31个省市面板数据为样本，选取地方政府研发关注度作为中介变量，运用基于Bootstrap方法改进的中介效应模型，就全国、分地区、分时段的财政分权对地方政府引导社会参与研发投入的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：从全国和分地区看，财政分权对地方政府引导社会参与研发投入的影响均存在不同程度的中介效应或直接作用，财政分权程度提高会对地方政府引导社会参与研发投入产生不同程度的正向影响。从分时段看，财政分权对社会研发积极度影响的中介效应不存在时段差异。     

资本性支出分权、公共资本投资构成与经济增长

本文建立一个财政分权框架下的两部门内生增长模型,从理论上分析最优公共资本投资配置及其对经济增长的影响,并以我国全国和省份经济数据为基础对本文理论分析进行实证检验。分析表明,我国公共资本投资构成不尽合理,全国和地方公共物质资本投资比重明显偏低;中央和地方政府间公共资本投资事权划分也欠妥,资本性支出分权水平明显过高。这些结论对于我国今后财政政策的合理调整、政府间事权的科学划分具有重要意义。     

DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT,POPULATION AGEING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA: A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract. Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a given ageing profile of the population to forecast the growth path of China's economy during the twenty‐first century, this study finds that: population ageing leads to declining economic growth as labour supply shrinks and the rate of physical capital formation declines; households’ material living standards improve, albeit at a declining rate; falling domestic investment partially offsets declining national savings; and the resulting saving‐investment surplus generates a current account surplus and capital outflows. Finally, the main force that can sustain China's economic growth against the backdrop of population ageing is productivity improvement.     

The PRC's long-run growth through the lens of the export-led growth model

We explain China's remarkable growth performance over the last three decades through an export-led growth (ELG) model, where countries need to export to pay for their imports. We show that China's actual long-run growth rate is well approximated by its balance-of-payments equilibrium (BOPE) growth rate, defined as the long-run growth rate consistent with current account equilibrium. This growth rate is given by the ratio of the growth rate of exports to the income elasticity of imports. We estimate the latter using the Kalman filter, which allows us to obtain a time-varying estimate of China's BOPE growth rate. We find that the average value of China's BOPE growth rate during 1981–2016 was about 11 percent but fluctuated significantly over time and declined notably after 2007. It is estimated to be 5.9 percent in 2015. We then discuss the determinants of China's BOPE growth rate and of the income elasticity of imports, with the help of the Bayesian Model Averaging technique. The analysis highlights the role of the composition of aggregate demand as the main driving force, both for its direct effects on the income elasticity of imports, and for the indirect effects on export growth via capital accumulation, in particular fixed asset investment. Our analysis has important implications to understand China's transition to a “New Normal” of a lower growth rate and the effects of the external and internal rebalancing strategy pursued from the early 2000s.     

地方财政行为是否驱动了中国贸易 收支的动态调整*——基于异质性动态调整模型的分析

本文利用1997-2013年中国省际层面的面板数据，借助异质性动态调整模型从动态视角考察了地方财政行为对中国贸易收支调整速度的影响。研究结果显示：（1）平均而言，在地方财政行为的驱动下，中国实际贸易收支向最优水平动态调整的速度约为0045。总体表明，地方财政行为对中国贸易收支的驱动性影响较弱，引致实际贸易收支向最优水平调整的速度也较为缓慢。（2）财政支出分权的强化会制约贸易收支的调整速度，贸易收支调整呈现“相对惰性”。财政收入分权的提高和预算内财政支出的扩张能够加快实际贸易收支向最优贸易收支调整的速度，助力贸易收支实现平滑调整。预算外财政支出和财政收入的变化对调整速度则不会产生显著性影响。（3）贸易收支的调整速度呈现显著的区域异质性。本文的结论表明，现阶段中国要实现贸易收支的平衡调整路径，中央及地方政府必须把握好财政行为与贸易收支的动态联动关系。