管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

高管薪酬:激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据

近年来中国上市公司的高管薪酬增长迅速并引起社会的广泛关注。本文收集了2004-2008年中国上市公司前三名高管的薪酬水平,考察高管薪酬与公司绩效、高管控制权、政府管制及代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:(1)高管薪酬仅与ROA显著正相关,但与资产获现率(经营净现金/总资产)及股票收益率没有显著的正相关关系。(2)高管的薪酬水平随着其控制权的增加而显著提高。(3)对比国有公司,非国有公司的高管更容易利用其控制权来提高自身的薪酬水平。(4)高管高薪并未有效降低公司的代理成本,反而提高了代理成本。本文的研究结果证实了我国上市公司的高管在其薪酬制定中存在明显的自利行为,且这种自利行为降低或者消除了薪酬的激励作用。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

金融关联能否影响民营企业的薪酬契约?

本文以2007-2012年我国A股民营上市公司为研究对象,以引入金融关联高管的公司作为金融关联样本,以没有建立金融关联的公司作为配对样本,运用双重差分法(DID)和倾向得分匹配法(PSM)实证研究了金融关联与民营企业薪酬契约的关系。研究发现,相对于配对公司,民营企业引入金融关联高管后其高管的薪酬水平显著提高。同时,金融关联高管的薪酬越高,企业高管整体薪酬水平增幅也越大。研究结论表明,金融关联高管相对高的薪酬参照点是影响我国民营企业高管薪酬增长的重要因素。     

中国民营上市公司高管薪酬的决定因素

本文采用2003-2008年度在沪深两地上市的民营企业样本,对中国民营上市公司高管薪酬的决定因素进行实证.分析结果显示,高管薪酬与公司运营绩效、董事会结构和公司所有权结构均有显著的正相关关系.具体来讲,公司的营业收入、净利润和每股收益与高管薪酬均有显著正相关关系;董事长兼任总经理,独立董事在董事会所占比例较高时,公司高管的薪酬也会有正的增长;而高管持股数较多时,高管薪酬也会有较大幅度的正增长.本文希望通过实证分析,对中国公司治理,尤其是高管薪酬设计的进一步优化提供数据支持和政策建议.     

集团所属政府层级、内部资本市场与子公司高管薪酬——来自国企集团下属上市公司的数据

国有企业高管薪酬的决定机制是国企改革的关键因素。本文基于2004-2017国企集团下属上市公司数据,考察具有中国制度特征的国有企业集团中,内部资本市场如何影响子公司高管薪酬。研究发现:(1)央企集团内部资本市场对子公司高管薪酬有明显抑制作用,这主要源于央企集团面临的严格监管和业绩考核压力;相反,地方国企集团子公司高管则通过内部资本市场获取更高薪酬,这源于地方政府政绩诉求下集团总部和子公司高管之间的合谋,进而为子公司高管提供了更大的自利空间。(2)央企集团内部资本市场对高管薪酬的治理作用在无总部关联、高管权利低的子公司中更为突出;地方国企集团子公司高管利用内部资本市场自利的现象在有总部关联的子公司中更加突出。(3)央企集团内部资本市场同样能够有效抑制子公司高管的在职消费,而地方国企集团总部则同样会放纵子公司高管利用内部资本市场增加在职消费。本文有助于深化认识国有企业集团内部资本市场的作用,并厘清国企高管薪酬的影响因素。     

政府补助、管理层权力与国有企业高管超额薪酬

本文以国有上市公司2010-2016年数据为样本,通过中介效应模型和分行业的机制检验方法验证政府补助引致管理层权力扩张,进而增加高管超额薪酬的机理。研究结果显示政府补助与高管超额薪酬呈正相关关系,管理层权力对政府补助之于高管超额薪酬具有中介效应,相较于管制行业,政府补助非管制行业所带来的管理层权力扩张效应更加明显。进一步研究发现:政府补助与央企管理层权力的关系不显著,政府补助引致地方国有企业管理层获得更多的超额薪酬,东部地区地方国有企业高管获得超额薪酬低于中西部地区,大规模地方国有企业高管获得超额薪酬低于中小规模企业。最后对政府补助下管理层权力的治理提出相应的建议。     

管理层权力、高管薪酬变动与公司并购行为分析

本文探究了不同产权性质下管理层权力对薪酬利益驱动所带来的大规模并购行为的作用机制。研究表明,在中央国有上市企业和聘请职业经理人担任高管的民营上市公司中,管理层权力解释了公司间薪酬水平变动、并购后市场业绩的明显差异。地方国有上市公司在并购活动中其高管薪酬的变动受到高管权力的影响甚微,企业规模起到了决定性因素,而控股股东或家族成员直接担任高管的民营公司在发生并购时其管理层薪酬的变动与并购交易的规模、并购的复杂程度和CEO努力程度更加相关,相对而言薪酬安排更具有契约有效性。本文的研究丰富了管理层权力和公司并购的理论内涵,并为管理层权力影响下的并购行为提供了更为深入和细致的经验证据。     

高管薪酬激励、终极控制权与现金分红研究——基于上证A股上市公司的经验证据

上市公司高管薪酬近年来受到资本市场上各类投资者、监管部门的密切关注.本文利用Tobit模型对我国上证A股上市公司2009-2012年分红状况进行实证研究,结果发现:上市公司高管货币薪酬、股权薪酬与公司现金分红之间并非存在简单的线性关系,而是存在显著的倒U型关系,说明上市公司高管薪酬激励并非越高越好,而是应当控制在适度的范围内;非国有控股上市公司高管薪酬明显高于国有控股上市公司,非国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励与现金分红水平无关,高管更看重公司的长远发展.     

Managerial compensation

We review the existing literature on managerial compensation, with particular reference to the two contrasting views about its main driver. On the one hand, managerial compensation is seen to be the result of a market-based mechanism which ensures that managers have adequate incentives to maximize shareholder value. On the other hand, it is regarded to be a means whereby self-serving executives skim corporate profits and expropriate shareholders. We find that most of the existing literature supports the latter view as executives tend to benefit from windfall earnings and are able to extract rents in the presence of weak corporate governance.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Managerial Placement and Entrenchment

Using data on companies that have implemented private placements in China from 2011 to 2016, we examine the discount on private placements, short-term stock returns, and long-term performance after the placements. Our goal is to determine whether the prevailing certification and entrenchment hypotheses can explain managerial placements. We find that the participation of managerial investors has a significant and negative impact on short-term stock returns. Such a negative effect can also be found on issuing companies’ long-term profitability. Moreover, managerial placements have a higher discount than nonmanagerial placements. Our findings suggest that managerial placement is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis but not the certification hypothesis.     

Managerial incentives and risk-taking

We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta.     

Managerial incentives for attracting attention

This paper studies the mechanisms which motivate managers to engage in cheap talk and attract the market's attention in a credible way. We consider stock split announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, and press releases issued by firms to the media as proxies for managerial cheap talk. We show that: (a) managerial performance‐related pay contracts incentivize executives to attract attention; (b) analysts increase their coverage of firms following cheap talk; and (c) chief executive officers are punished for attracting attention when market prices do not increase following cheap talk. The results are stronger for firms which are most in need of attention.     

Managerial ability and debt maturity

We examine whether and how managerial ability affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The demand for shorter maturity debt is expected to be higher in firms operated by high-ability managers, who possess the superior skills needed to anticipate firms’ economic prospects and communicate their private information, thereby alleviating information asymmetry and bolstering their reputation. We document that firms with high ability managers are associated with more short-term debt financing. The effect becomes stronger for firms facing severe information asymmetry problems, unconstrained firms or high quality firms. Supportive evidence is found from the analysis of short- and long-term debt issuance activity. Our findings remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and debt maturity choice, and are not driven by omitted variable bias, endogeneity concerns or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the signalling theory for debt maturity structure and contributes to the literatures on managerial ability.     

Managerial succession and firm performance

We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO. Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements.     

Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

In this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conservatism as measured by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings declines with managerial ownership. The negative association between managerial ownership and asymmetric timeliness of earnings is robust to various controls, in particular, for the investment opportunity set. We thus provide evidence of a demand for conservatism from the firm's shareholders.     

Managerial Ownership and Corporate Hedging

Abstract:  Using information on 443 UK non-financial companies, this work provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that managerial risk aversion is an incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging position. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are at the centre of the decision about the firm's risk profile but are not relevant as determinants of the decision to hedge. This is rather associated with factors enhancing the firm's expected value (underinvestment, scale economies, tax savings).     

Managerial attitudes and corporate actions

We administer psychometric tests to senior executives to obtain evidence on their underlying psychological traits and attitudes. We find US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. In addition, we find that CEOs are significantly more optimistic and risk-tolerant than the lay population. We provide evidence that CEOs' behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies. Further, we provide new empirical evidence that CEO traits such as risk-aversion and time preference are related to their compensation.