Destructive effects of constructive ambiguity in risky times

Unclear bailout policy, underinvestment and calls for greater responsibility by bankers are some of the observations from the recent financial crisis. The paper explains underinvestment as an inefficient equilibrium. Under ambiguous bailout policy agents suffer from a lack of information about the insolvency resolution methods. The beliefs of bankers regarding whether an insolvent bank is liquidated, may differ from those of depositors even if bankers and depositors possess absolutely symmetric information about the economy. This disrupts the flow of funds through the banking channel if the investment climate is characterized by high aggregate risk. The paper suggests policy implications aimed at a reduction of the anxiety of agents and at aligning their beliefs to restore efficiency.     

违约与杠杆周期——一个带有救助的金融加速器模型

我国为应对2008年国际金融危机的冲击采取了一系列经济刺激政策,在发挥“稳增长”作用的同时,也在一定程度上导致我国企业部门杠杆水平快速上升,但与此同时,不良贷款率并没有随企业部门杠杆的上升而显著增加。为了解释企业部门违约与杠杆的周期特征,本文在金融加速器模型(Bernanke et al.,1999)基础上,引入政府对企业部门的违约救助机制,建立DSGE模型进行讨论。进一步地,本文还通过一个不合意的去杠杆政策试验表明,忽略资产价格稳定(或者说金融稳定)前提下的去杠杆政策,反而会使企业部门的杠杆和违约率同时上升到一个较高水平。最后,引入一个盯住预期资产价格的动态救助规则能够发挥稳定经济的作用,并提高社会福利水平。     

EFFECT OF FED POLICY ACTIONS ON THE DEFAULT LIKELIHOOD OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.     

The information content of Eonia swap rates before and during the financial crisis

Before August 2007, implied forward rates in the overnight interest swap rates closely reflected market expectations about the future path of the Eonia, and therefore, about the future course of the ECB’s monetary policy stance. Nevertheless, this link was weakened considerably during the most acute episode of the financial crisis. Using the expectations hypothesis of the term structure as a benchmark model for the determination of the overnight interest swap rates, we find that after May 2010 the monetary transmission mechanism was partially restored when the ECB implemented various ‘unconventional measures’ in response to the financial crisis. On the contrary, liquidity and credit risks are still present in unsecured deposit markets, distorting the pricing and transmission of the ECB monetary policy stance along the Euribor rates. These results should be of interest for regulators, financial institutions, and researchers in European money markets.     

Credit crunch in a small open economy

We construct an open-economy DSGE model with a banking sector to analyze the impact of the recent credit crunch on a small open economy. In our model the banking sector operates under monopolistic competition, collects deposits and grants collateralized loans. Collateral effects amplify monetary policy actions, interest rate stickiness dampens the transmission of interest rates, and financial shocks generate non-negligible real and nominal effects. As an application we estimate the model for Poland-a typical small open economy. According to the results, financial shocks had a substantial, though not overwhelming, impact on the Polish economy during the 2008/09 crisis, lowering GDP by approximately 1.5 percent.     

The Impact of the Federal Reserve's Large‐Scale Asset Purchase Programs on Corporate Credit Risk

Estimating the effect of Federal Reserve's announcements of Large‐Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs on corporate credit risk is complicated by the simultaneity of policy decisions and movements in prices of risky financial assets, as well as by the fact that both interest rates of assets targeted by the programs and indicators of credit risk reacted to other common shocks during the recent financial crisis. This paper employs a heteroskedasticity‐based approach to estimate the structural coefficient measuring the sensitivity of market‐based indicators of corporate credit risk to declines in the benchmark market interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. The results indicate that the LSAP announcements led to a significant reduction in the cost of insuring against default risk—as measured by the CDX indexes—for both investment‐ and speculative‐grade corporate credits. While the unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy have substantially lowered the overall level of credit risk in the economy, the LSAP announcements appear to have had no measurable effect on credit risk in the financial intermediary sector.     

Credit Traps and Macroprudential Leverage

We construct a macroeconomic model with overlapping generations to study credit traps—prolonged periods of stagnant real activity accompanied by low productivity, financial sector undercapitalization, and credit misallocation. Shocks to bank capital tighten banks' borrowing constraints causing them to allocate credit to easily collateralizable but low productivity projects. Low productivity weakens bank capital generation, reinforcing tight borrowing constraints, sustaining the credit trap steady state. Macroprudential policy to limit bank leverage can be welfare enhancing. In the presence of a credit trap, optimal leverage policy is countercyclical.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

“稳增长”与“去杠杆”目标下的双支柱政策协调——基于供求冲击和金融摩擦视角

构建带有金融摩擦的DSGE模型,研究在供给面和需求面冲击下,各种不同类型的双支柱政策组合对稳增长与去杠杆的调控效果及传导机制。结果表明：当遇到技术冲击时,单独使用货币政策改变信贷供给状况可以较好地维护宏观经济的稳定,这也是金融危机之前未重视宏观审慎政策而只是强调货币政策控制经济周期波动的原因所在。面对正向房地产需求冲击,不适用于单纯采取大幅加息等总量措施,而应配合采取收紧LTV等宏观审慎政策,更有针对性地对房地产市场适度降温,避免对整体经济造成冲击,利率政策与LTV政策使经济增长和杠杆率的波动相对较小,政策组合更有效。     

Corporate Bankruptcy in Korea: Only the Strong Survive?

We analyze whether the build‐up of financial vulnerabilities led listed Korean companies to bankruptcy. We find that pre‐crisis leverage is systematically high for both poor performing/slow growing firms and for profitable/fast‐growing firms. Pre‐crisis leverage raises the probability of bankruptcy, which is lower for firms: (1) relying more on (renegotiable) bank credit; (2) with less inter‐firm debt; and (3) having higher interest coverage ratios. Finally, none of these liquidity variables help predict bankruptcies for chaebol‐firms, suggesting that liquidity constraints are more stringent for non‐chaebol. Thus, in a systemic crisis it is not only the strong/healthy that survive.     

Does inequality lead to a financial crisis?

The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms, and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality, credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates, strong growth, rising credit, asset price booms and crises.     

The determinants of vulnerability to the global financial crisis 2008 to 2009: Credit growth and other sources of risk

In this paper, we identify initial macroeconomic and financial market conditions that help explain the distinct response of the real economy of a particular country to the recent global financial crisis. Using four measures of crisis severity, we examine a data set with over 90 potential explanatory factors employing techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Four findings are of particular note. First, we find empirical evidence for the pivotal role of pre-crisis credit growth in shaping the real economy's response to the crisis. Specifically, a 1% increase in pre-crisis lending translates into a 0.2% increase in the cumulative loss in real output. Moreover, the combination of pronounced growth in lending ahead of the crisis and the country's exposure to external funding from advanced economies is shown to intensify the real downturn. Economies with booming real activity before the crisis are found to be less resilient to the global shock. Buoyant growth in real GDP in parallel with strong growth of credit particularly exacerbated the effects of the recent crisis on the real economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of holding international reserves in explaining the response of the real economy to the crisis. The accumulation of international reserves mitigated the harmful effects of financial stress on the real economy, in particular when domestic funding via credit is abundant. The results are shown to be robust to several estimation techniques, including those allowing for cross-country spillovers.     

总量型和结构型货币政策工具的选择与搭配——基于结构性去杠杆视角下的分析

本文基于我国34类工业行业的年度数据,识别信贷配置偏向特征对结构性杠杆的影响,以及货币政策应对效应的特征事实:信贷偏向的存在导致不同产权性质企业杠杆变化呈现异质性,这种异质性所产生的结构性杠杆现象因经济周期不同阶段而异,传统总量型货币政策工具难以有效解决结构性杠杆问题。为更深入理解这一现象以及结构性去杠杆下货币政策最优选择问题,本文通过构建一个同时包含信贷配置偏向特征、企业杠杆结构变化特征、总量型与结构型货币政策工具影响特征的DSGE模型进行分析,研究结果表明:总量型货币政策数量工具的宽松操作可以有效应对技术冲击下结构性杠杆问题;总量型工具紧缩资金供给,结合结构型工具定向紧缩,是应对成本推动冲击下结构性高杠杆问题的较好选择;当经济面临风险冲击下结构性杠杆和经济下行并存问题时,需要结构型货币政策数量工具和价格工具同时操作,紧缩国企贷款,同时降低民企融资成本。     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.     

Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity

In an economy with financial frictions, banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. The liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of Basel III can implement efficiency. Additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly. Micro‐ and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk.     

Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the US and EU before and during the great recession

This paper investigates the links between regulatory arbitrage, financial instability, and taxpayer loss exposures. We model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits from increased leverage and asset volatility at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003–2008. Hypothesis tests indicate that, in both crisis and precrisis years, difficult-to-fail-and-unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Compared to the US sample, safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions are less driven by asset size. Introducing a proxy for differences in government susceptibility to regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. Our findings suggest that authorities in both venues could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on monitoring volatility as well as capital.     

美国次贷危机的信用扩张过度的金融分析

信用扩张过度是指信用货币膨胀速度快于实体经济产出的增长速度。它可以是价格型的、数量型的,也可以是制度型的及市场型的。它是金融危机的根源。这次美国金融危机是信用无限扩张的结果。这种信用无限扩张的主要工具是影子银行。影子银行的目的就通过信用的无限扩张来提高金融资产的杠杆率,过度地使用公共性的金融体系,从而为金融机构谋取利润最大化,但其风险要整个社会承担。     

Bank risk,competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review

The outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and of the European sovereign debt crisis again raised questions about the vulnerability and the behaviour of banking institutions. The unconventional monetary policies that followed have flattened the yield curve and created a low interest rates environment. This can give rise to risk-taking behaviour from banks and can therefore undermine the stability of the banking system with negative impact of the credit supply, corporate investment and real economy. This article proposes a literature review on the main determinants of bank lending and risk-taking decisions, going through the competition in the banking market, the bank connectedness with firms and the role of monetary and banking authorities. The systemic risk concept is also discussed as well as its drivers and potential measures that should be monitored by prudential authorities in order to preserve financial stability.     

Interest rate smoothing and financial stability

Central banks smooth fluctuations in interest rates based on a belief that this policy promotes financial stability. This belief is based on a presumption that the direct effect of less interest rate volatility on a bank's likelihood of insolvency is the predominant effect of this policy. The main point of this paper is that these policies also give rise to indirect effects that lower financial stability. These indirect effects occur because the policy itself alters bank behavior. In effect, if the central bank provides (liquidity) insurance (at zero premia), it may introduce a classic moral hazard problem that encourages risk taking by banks. As a result, to maintain a given degree of financial stability, a bank regulator may, in fact, need to impose a higher prudential capital requirement when an interest rate smoothing policy is in place. The paper concludes that the link between interest rate smoothing policy and financial stability may be more complicated than is generally recognized.     

Sovereign to Corporate Risk Spillovers

The first Greek bailout on April 11, 2010 triggered a significant reevaluation of sovereign credit risk across Europe. We exploit this event to examine the transmission of sovereign to corporate credit risk. A 10% increase in sovereign credit risk raises corporate credit risk on average by 1.1% after the bailout. The evidence is suggestive of risk spillovers from sovereign to corporate credit risk through a financial and a fiscal channel, as the effects are more pronounced for firms that are bank or government dependent. We find no support for indirect risk transmission through a deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals.