浅议会计信息失算

一、会计信息失真的主要原因 （一）会计信息失真的理论分析。依据现代西方经济学中的契约理论，委托代理制下，会计信息失真的内在原因在于：第一、委托人与代理人的效用函数不一致且存在激励不相容。代理人除了寻求以货币衡量的物质报酬以外，还致力于一些非物质性的因素来实现自身效用的最大化，委托人追求效用最大化的目标则是企业价值最大化。同时所有者与经营者之间存在激励不相容，即一方追求效用最大化会损害另一方实现效用最大化，     

风险资本市场财务治理机制的新制度经济学分析

风险资本市场财务治理是借助财务契约在风险资本投资者、风险资本家和风险企业家之间配王刺余财务索取权和剩余财务控制权,是为了降低三者之间产权交易成本而设计的一种制度装置.在上述财务治理主体中,兼有物质资本所有者与人力资本所有者二重身份的风险资本家是最重要的财务治理主体.从总体上讲,风险企业的财务控制权呈现出明显的状态依存性.我国风险企业财务治理模式创新的基本思路是:在主要的财务治理主体之间建立剩余财务收益权和剩余财务控制权对称性的制度安排.进而健全风险企业的财务激励与约束机制.     

风险资本市场的治理结构研究

风险资本的运作过程一般分为两个相互联系的环节:一是风险资本家筹资组成以有限合伙制为典型形式的风险投资中介机构--风险投资基金;二是风险投资基金对风险企业进行投资.即风险资本运作过程中存在所谓双重的委托--代理关系.本文围绕投资者与风险资本家之间的合同关系、风险资本家与企业家之间的合同关系,以及风险资本市场信息披露制度就风险资本市场的治理结构创新进行研究.     

从制度耦合看国企高管薪酬激励安排

近年来,国企高管的高薪一直是国内舆论关注的焦点,在国企高管薪酬引起舆论广泛关注背后值得深入探讨的是:对薪酬的争议是在金融危机这一特定背景下,人们的道德与公平诉求,还是薪酬机制出现同题.目前世界各国公司高管的薪酬基本是按照委托代理的激励兼容理论设计的,基于在信息不对称下,经营者的经营才能只能被激励,不能被强制的理解,为调动经营者的积极性,确保公司有效运行,需要通过激励兼容机制诱导代理人采取委托人期望的行为.     

现代商业银行委托代理风险的产生与纠正

在商业银行的委托代理制度下,委托人为追求高成长速度对代理人授权过度,使代理人在商业银行经营组织内部形成了绝对的权力,一般员工与代理人形成了利益同盟关系,拒绝或是不能向委托人提供经营信息;委托人与一般员工之间没有形成直接的利益关系,因而互相也没有形成信息交换关系,这就使得委托人无法改变与代理人之间的信息不对称,形成了委托人对代理人的激励与监督的不对称,从而形成了委托代理风险.要消除委托代理风险,商业银行就要保持一种稳健的增长速度,改变委托人对代理人授权过度;同时从多途径入手,保护员工的利益,使委托人与一般员工之间建立信息补偿渠道,改变信息的不对称.     

国有商业银行现行经营者薪酬制度的弊端分析

国有商业银行现行经营者薪酬制度设计中的"激励空缺",使委托人(国家)难以对代理人(经营者)进行有效的监督和约束,进而引发国有商业银行的委托代理成本高昂,各级代理人创租、寻租严重,经营者行为短期化以及人才流失严重等深层矛盾.     

中国商业银行经理层股票期权激励制度研究

<正>一、商业银行经理层经济激励方案效果比较商业银行经济激励的形式日趋多元化,既有固定收入,又有非固定收入或风险收入,既有现期收入,又有远期收入(如股票期权、退休金计划等)。在不同的薪酬合同激励约束下,经营者的行为是不同的,有必要通过对比分析经营者的行为异同来考察哪种激励方案是较为可取的。下面本文将四种基     

股票期权激励的成本——收益分析模型和相关变量分析

股票期权激励兼具报酬激励和所有权激励的功能,作为一种长期激励工具,在薪酬激励组合中占有重要的地位。但实施股票期权激励对于委托人和代理人而言,有着各自的成本和收益,本文将通过模型研究,得到影响双方利益的相同变量,并对变量进行分析。正常状态下的股票期权激励模型的参数,可以实现股票期权的激励功能,但代理人可以通过对相关变量的调控、操纵股票价格的变化,在非正常状态下实现侵占委托人权益的目的。文章也提出了一个通过增加代理人犯罪成本的模型,来防止非正常状态的出现。     

委托代理理论与提高对国有银行经营者监管的有效性

本文从经济学的角度,利用委托代理理论的分析框架探讨了导致目前国有银行经营者引致的金融风险问题.通过分析认为,国有银行经营者引致的金融风险的根源在经营者的道德风险,委托人与代理人效用目标不一致、信息不对称、合同不完全是国有银行经营者道德风险产生的基本因素,国有银行产权结构与内部治理结构不完善、缺乏经营者有效激励机制、经营者"双重"身份、人情关系文化与寻租行为、内控机制不完善、市场竞争的监督约束作用弱等是导致国有银行经营者道德风险的特殊因素.本文最后提出降低经营者道德风险,防范经营者引致的金融风险的思路,以提高对经营者监管的有效性.     

人力资本财务激励与约束创新研究——基于美国风险投资的分析

对人力资本实施有效的财务激励和约束是风险投资运作过程中一项关键性制度创新.人力资本财务激励与约束的对象主要包括风险资本家人力资本和企业家人力资本,涵盖风险资本从筹资、投资到退出三个循环阶段.不同循环阶段的人力资本财务激励和约束都涉及到控制权收益、货币收益与声誉资本,但在具体的激励与约束方式上又存在着差异.     

Public Policy for Venture Capital

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.     

The role of government in the venture capital market with asymmetric information

Information asymmetry increases the risks undertaken by venture capitalists. The present study departs from the tendency in earlier analyses to attribute the problem of information asymmetry to the entrepreneur only. In view of the obvious social benefits that the development of the venture capital industry brings, the government should take upon itself to consider tax incentives and changes to regulatory policies in order to attract venture capital investments. Three scenarios are portrayed here to examine the issue of asymmetric information in the venture capital market: (1) when both the venture capitalist's and entrepreneur's efforts are observable and the government incentive policy is available; (2) when the entrepreneur's effort is unobservable but the venture capitalist's is observable and government tax incentive is available; and (3) when the entrepreneur's effort is observable but the venture capitalist's effort is unobservable, and regulatory monitoring and government tax incentives are uncertain. This investigation reveals that the tax incentive policy and regulatory measures put in place by the government can significantly and positively affect the outcome of the entrepreneurial project by reducing information asymmetry.     

DOES VENTURE CAPITAL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE STOCK MARKET?

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.     

Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and Expropriation

Why do some start‐up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To address this question, I study a model in which the venture capitalist can evaluate the entrepreneur's project more accurately than the bank but can also threaten to steal it from the entrepreneur. Consistent with evidence regarding venture capital finance, the model implies that the characteristics of a firm financing through venture capitalists are relatively little collateral, high growth, high risk, and high profitability. The model also suggests that tighter protection of intellectual property rights encourages entrepreneurs to finance through venture capitalists.     

Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture Capital in Strategic Alliances

This study documents a new value-added role of venture capitalists and addresses important questions about how resources are combined to create firms. As part of the nexus of contracts surrounding a firm, strategic alliances can be viewed as relational contracts that blur firm boundaries. This paper provides evidence that alliances are more frequent among companies sharing a common venture capitalist. The effect is concentrated in alliances in which contracting problems are more pronounced, consistent with venture capitalists utilizing informational and other advantages in providing resources to firms. Further, these alliances improve the probability of exit for venture-backed firms.     

Experience,screening and syndication in venture capital investments

We consider a theoretical model that offers a rationale for the syndication of venture capital investments: syndication improves the screening process of venture capitalists and prevents competition between investors after investment opportunities are disclosed. The analysis identifies the costs of syndication in terms of investment decisions or post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. These costs depend crucially on the level of experience of venture capitalists. The model generates empirical predictions concerning the determinants of syndication and the characteristics of syndicated deals.     

On the role of inexperienced venture capitalists in taking companies public

We use venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) to identify and examine the comparative advantage of inexperienced venture capitalists. We argue that, vis-a-vis more established counterparts, younger venture capital firms have a comparative advantage at producing soft information about relatively opaque start-up companies due to their organizational structure. We then quantify an outcome—IPO initial return—from the matching of venture capitalists and start-up companies that demonstrates how this comparative advantage arises. Our findings thus reveal an important aspect of how inexperienced venture capitalists support start-up companies.     

Venture capital budgeting — Carry and correlation

We analyze venture capital budgeting in a model with agency conflicts among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investors. Our three-player setting is crucial for the analysis of compensation to venture capitalists. We focus on the venture capitalist's decision to invest in correlated enterprises, and we emphasize the importance of information and the venture capitalist's role in resolving adverse selection on the entrepreneurial side. The importance of information increases the minimum carried interest offered to the venture capitalist, whereas correlated projects decrease it. The carried interest is determined by the size and level of correlation in his portfolio. Our analysis provides predictions in line with a number of empirical observations, e.g. that venture capitalists typically receive a carried interest which is “sticky” around a 20% level.     

Liquidity Risk and Venture Capital Finance

This article provides theory and evidence in support of the proposition that venture capitalists adjust their investment decisions according to liquidity conditions on IPO exit markets. We refer to technological risk as a choice variable in terms of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm in which the venture capitalist invests, and liquidity risk as the current and expected future external exit market conditions. We show that in times of expected illiquidity of exit markets (high liquidity risk), venture capitalists invest proportionately more in new high-tech and early-stage projects (high technology risk) in order to postpone exit requirements. When exit markets are liquid, venture capitalists rush to exit by investing more in later-stage projects. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that conditions of low liquidity risk give rise to less syndication. Our theory and supporting empirical results facilitate a unifying theme that links related research on illiquidity in private equity.     

Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms

This article examines the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of private firms in their portfolios. If venture capitalists are intensive monitors of managers, their involvement as directors should be more intense when the need for oversight is greater. I show that venture capitalists' representation on the board increases around the time of chief executive officer turnover, while the number of other outsiders remains constant. I also show that distance to the firm is an important determinant of the board membership of venture capitalists, as might be anticipated if the oversight of local firms is less costly than more distant businesses.