高管团队薪酬差距对双元创新的影响研究——来自高新技术企业的经验证据

以2011―2018年中国A股上市高新技术企业为研究对象,本文实证检验了高管团队薪酬差距对双元创新的影响。研究发现:(1)整体而言,高管团队薪酬差距促进企业创新,但基于双元创新视角,提高高管团队薪酬差距对探索式创新存在显著的负向影响,而对利用式创新存在显著的正向影响;(2)对面临高环境不确定性的企业和非国有企业而言,高管团队薪酬差距对探索式创新的抑制作用更弱,而对利用式创新的促进作用更强;(3)实施股权激励有利于减弱高管团队薪酬差距对探索式创新的负向作用,但对高管团队薪酬差距与利用式创新之间的关系未表现出显著影响。本文结论丰富了高管薪酬差距对企业创新影响的相关研究,为企业设置合理的薪酬结构提供了经验证据。     

工薪所得税筹划与企业创新

本文结合我国工薪所得税税负较重及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景,探讨工薪所得税筹划是否以及如何对企业创新产生影响。研究发现:(1)工薪所得税筹划程度与企业创新显著正相关;(2)员工应税压力越大,二者正相关关系越显著,且2011年个人所得税税制改革会抑制二者之间的正向关系,表明纳税筹划主要通过降低工薪税负的不利影响,强化薪酬的激励效应,进而促进企业创新;(3)当公司为国有企业或公司处在税收征管强度较大的地区时,二者的正向关系更强;(4)当企业人均薪酬波动较大时,二者的正向关系削弱;(5)当创新员工更有可能是避税行为的受益者时,二者的正相关关系更强。本研究对于降低工薪阶层税负,以及如何提高企业创新意愿,实现创新驱动发展战略,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

董事会断裂带与企业薪酬差距

高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距不仅影响着企业的激励效率与企业价值,还关系到社会的公平与稳定。断裂带是Lau and Murnighan(1998)提出的假想的分割线概念,即可以将团队划分为多个小团体。以2005—2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,本文从董事会断裂带这一视角探索董事会中小团体的差异性对于薪酬差距的影响和后果。本文研究发现:(1)董事会断裂带的存在加剧了企业高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距;(2)分解董事会断裂带的类型后,由深层特征形成的断裂带对于薪酬差距的影响高于由表层特征形成的断裂带;(3)区分行业竞争的程度后,公司所在行业的激烈竞争有助于缓解董事会断裂带造成的薪酬差距扩大;(4)从经济后果来看,董事会断裂带造成的薪酬差距对企业绩效具有显著的负向影响。本文的研究有助于深入理解企业薪酬差距形成的机制及其后果,同时对于完善我国董事会的监督机制也有一定的现实启发。     

员工持股计划与企业创新

本文以2014-2017年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,对上市公司实施员工持股计划与企业创新之间的关系进行了探讨。研究发现,相比未实施员工持股计划的上市公司,实施了员工持股计划的上市公司创新产出更高,员工持股计划有利于促进企业创新。进一步地,员工持股计划持有人数越多,资金规模越大,资金来源于员工薪酬及自筹资金,高管认购比例越高,锁定期越长,越能增加企业发明专利和实用新型专利申请数量,提升创新能力。员工持股计划主要通过降低代理成本、提高企业风险承担能力来促进企业创新。与国有企业相比,非国有企业实施员工持股计划更能增加企业创新产出。论文的研究结论为提高企业创新能力,建设创新型国家提供了经验证据。     

关键下属高管晋升锦标赛的创新激励效应研究

本文以2006-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,探讨关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距如何影响企业创新.研究发现:关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距越大,企业创新产出越高.进一步地,相比整个高管团队内部的薪酬差距,关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响更强;关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距对企业创新的激励效应主要体现在关键下属高管晋升CEO的机会较大时,以及国有企业和技术密集型行业中.此外,降低代理成本是关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进企业创新的重要作用机制,且关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进了企业创新对企业价值的提升作用.本文研究结论对推动企业创新及优化上市公司高管薪酬激励体系具有重要的现实意义.     

非高管股权激励与企业创新:公平理论视角

股权激励管理办法允许上市公司通过股权激励计划对部分非高管员工进行股权激励,但设定激励对象等方面的有关规定对企业的影响却鲜有研究关注。本文从公平理论视角分析我国非高管员工股权激励对上市公司创新的影响,并依据中国上市公司股权激励计划与专利数据实证检验了非高管员工股权激励有效性假说与不公平假说。研究发现,总体上我国股权激励计划能够显著促进企业创新,但非激励员工因薪酬不公平而产生的消极行为在一定程度上削弱了股权激励计划的激励效果。具体而言,在国有控股上市公司以及激励与非激励员工收入差距小的上市公司中,非高管股权激励弱化企业创新的影响明显小于其他公司;而在非高管员工覆盖比例较高的公司中,非高管股权激励计划弱化企业创新的影响不存在。因此适当提高员工股权激励覆盖的范围可以减少激励员工与非激励员工之间因激励错配导致的薪酬不公平问题,有助于提升我国上市公司股权激励计划的创新激励效果。     

内部薪酬差距与公司价值——基于生命周期理论的新探索

本文以我国2005-2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了公司生命周期对内部薪酬差距与公司价值关系的影响。结果发现:(1)总体上,公司内部薪酬差距有利于公司价值,支持了锦标赛理论;(2)结合生命周期考察,内部薪酬差距对公司价值的提升作用在成长期最强,在衰退期最弱,即随着公司生命周期的推移,内部薪酬差距对公司价值的提升作用逐渐减弱;(3)进一步的作用机制分析显示,管理层对于经营绩效影响的重要性以及员工对于公平感的需求是生命周期产生影响的重要机制。在综合得分判别法、留存收益率判别法、企业-行业增长率判别法等多项生命周期度量方法下,上述结论保持稳定。本文的研究为理解内部薪酬差距对公司价值的作用提供了一个崭新视角,也为不同生命周期阶段公司薪酬计划的制定提供了一定理论基础。     

国有商业银行薪酬体制改革及激励目标改进

本文对人民银行广州分行辖区金融业员工收入水平、分配结构和薪酬体制进行了调研 ,调研结果表明 ,我国国有商业银行员工收入水平处于较低层次 ,这不利于其外部市场人力竞争能力的提升 ,其分配结构有欠合理 ,阻碍了其内部激励效率的发挥。要改变其人力竞争劣势 ,国有商业银行必须改革其薪酬制度 :一方面 ,国有商业银行薪酬决定体制应该规避政府的管制政策 ,真正建立企业薪酬体制 ;另一方面 ,银行应该强化绩效和人力资本在收入决定体制中的权重 ,以保证其薪酬体制能够真正激励员工努力。国有商业银行人力资源管理模式的改进必须关注员工职业价值取向的转变 ,这是外资银行进入所带来的最大的挑战。     

国企改革中提高薪酬激励机制的研究

国企改革的目的是增加国有企业的经济实力,激发国有资本活力。人力资本作为企业中最有活力的生产要素,改善员工薪酬激励机制,提高员工的工作积极性,对于国企改革也具有重要的意义。实现员工薪酬薪酬水平适当,结构科学合理,规范进行薪酬管理,有效监督薪酬发放,可以促进企业健康发展,形成科学合理的收入分配制度,增进薪酬的激励作用。     

基于人力资本价值的薪酬模式设计

薪酬问题是人力资本管理的核心问题之一,薪酬作为利益分配的主要手段,其重要性不言而喻。本文提出了基于人力资本价值的薪酬模式,作为一种新的对薪酬的构思与设计,可以激励员工提升符合企业所需的人力资本价值,将企业的发展战略通过薪酬的激励方向体现出来,也有利于人力资本价值信息在财务报表中的披露。     

不同主体收入差距对我国A股上市公司绩效影响的研究

融资结构对企业绩效影响已受到广泛关注和研究,但对企业内不同主体收入差距对企业绩效影响鲜有关注。本文研究表明:管理层薪酬差距、劳动资本收入差距、资本政府收入差距对企业绩效有显著正面影响,管理层员工薪酬差距对绩效只有很小或没有显著性影响;在每个绩效模型中,不同主体收入差距对绩效影响边际效应也不同;企业股份性质、所在地区、企业规模对收入分配差距的绩效影响有调节作用。最后据此提出政策建议。     

Confucian culture and the external pay gap

We examine the impact of Confucian philosophy on external pay gaps, and find that a Confucianist atmosphere is negatively associated with firms’ external pay gaps for both executives and employees. Mechanistically, the Confucian concept of “righteousness” reduces the self-interested motivation of management, in turn reducing executives’ external pay gap; “humaneness” causes management to focus on protecting employees’ rights and interests, benefiting employees’ compensation; and “honesty” improves information disclosure, reducing the external compensation gap for both executives and general employees. The inhibitory effect of Confucian culture on the external pay gap is greater in regions with weak formal institutions and non-state-owned firms, while foreign cultural shocks attenuate the Confucian influence. Finally, the Confucian culture-driven reduction of the external pay gap improves enterprises’ economic efficiency.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy

We investigate some aspects of top management pay in China's listed firms. We find positive pay and performance sensitivities and elasticities for top executives. In terms of magnitude, these sensitivities are similar to those reported in U.S. firms during the 1970s. However, the pay and performance relation is slightly weaker for firms located in less developed provinces. We also find that the pay disparities between top managers and employees are positively related to a firm's performance. Thus, it appears that any deviation away from a manager-worker compensation norm has to be justified by superior firm performance. In additional analyses, we find that managers' perquisites are not related to performance.     

Optimization of a firm's capital structure: A quantitative approach based on a probabilistic prognosis of risk and time of bankruptcy

This article develops a new probabilistic approach to the problem of optimization of a firm's capital structure. The main idea of the approach is straightforward. As a possible firm's bankruptcy is the principal factor restricting the amount of borrowed capital, we assess the probabilities of bankruptcy at various time horizons in the future dependent on the proportion of debt capital and other indices of a firm's current financial position and then calculate how these probabilities influence the firm's value.We identify a set of factors determining conditions of existence and the value of the optimal debt/equity ratio. These include the characteristics of a firm's debt (proportion of short-term component of the debt, cost of service, and maturity horizons of long-term component), characteristics of a firm's ability to pay the debt, and some macroeconomic factors.We represent dependencies of optimal debt/equity ratio and gains in a firm's value on the main influencing factors.The approach is based on real data of real firms and does not use superfluously formalized models. We believe it can be used in practical capital structure decisions although specific calculations must be fulfilled for each firm that needs such decision.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

Women in leadership: an analysis of the gender pay gap in ASX‐listed firms

This study provides evidence that after several decades of fighting for equal pay for equal work, an unexplained gender pay gap remains amongst senior executives in ASX‐listed firms. After controlling for a large suite of personal, occupational and firm observables, we find female senior executives receive, on average, 22.58 percent less in base salary for the period 2002–2013. When executives are awarded performance‐based pay, females receive on average 16.47 percent less in cash bonus and 18.21 percent less in long‐term incentives than males. The results are robust to using firm fixed effects and propensity‐score matching. Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition results show that the mean pay gap cannot be attributed to gender differences in attributes, including job titles. Instead, the results point to differences in returns on firm‐specific variables, in particular firm risk.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

Structure and Level of Remuneration Across the Top Executive Team

This paper details the level and structure of executive remuneration across the executive team from 2006 to 2009. Results indicate that the level and structure of executive pay varies across the executive team. There is a clear delineation between the level and structure of all components of pay for the CEO and Executive 1, and for other executives. Employees of finance firms receive higher levels of pay and greater proportions of bonus than do employees in other sectors. Pay structure in 2009 is different from other years in the study, indicating that the economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 has led to differences in executive pay.