资本结构、企业绩效与管理层薪酬的关系研究

本文从企业绩效和资本结构两个角度研究其对管理层薪酬的影响作用,同时考虑了在不同资产规模下,企业绩效和资本结构与管理层薪酬的关系。本文将管理者薪酬设定为因变量;企业资本结构和绩效设定为自变量,通过多元回归的方法分析企业资本结构、企业绩效与管理者薪酬三者之间的关系,研究结果表明:上市公司管理者薪酬与现金流资产比率、资产收益、企业负债率正相关,与企业各项负债率负相关;在不同的资产规模条件下,企业管理者薪酬与资本收益及企业负债之间表现的关系各有不同。     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

我国上市银行高管团队内部薪酬差距、股权集中度与绩效研究

本文以我国银行业绩效为出发点,以上市公司强制披露管理层薪酬为背景,结合公司股权集中度,利用我国沪深两市银行业15家上市公司2006～2010年的年报数据,实证分析了银行业绩效对其股权集中度的影响及高管团队内部薪酬差距、股权集中度对银行绩效的影响。研究结果显示:银行业绩效与股权集中度呈负相关关系;薪酬差距与银行绩效方面,高管团队内部薪酬差距对银行业绩效具有正向影响作用,符合竞赛理论的预期,这也为企业高管团队内部薪酬的制度设计带来政策启示。     

企业内部薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的实证研究

薪酬差距和组织绩效关系的研究大多采取同期的截面数据。本文认为薪酬差距的激励效果具有滞后性,进而提出了高层管理团队内部薪酬差距、高管团队/员工的薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的理论假说,并以我国上市公司为样本进行实证研究。实证分析的结果发现:高管团队薪酬差距对组织未来绩效ROA有负向的影响,但是技术复杂性、企业人数和高管团队薪酬差距的交互作用对未来绩效ROA有正向的影响;高管/员工薪酬差距对组织未来绩效ROA没有显著的影响,但是,技术复杂性、企业人数和高管/员工薪酬差距的交互作用对未来绩效ROA有正向的影响,而当企业最终控制人类型为国有股份时,高管/员工薪酬差距和组织未来绩效之间表现出负向的关系。论文最后对研究结论和局限性进行了讨论,并提出了未来研究建议。     

内部薪酬差距的激励效应:来自银行业的经验证据

本文选取我国上市银行为样本,研究了上市银行内部薪酬差距对银行经营绩效的影响.鉴于国有银行薪酬制度受国家相关政策的影响,本文在研究时将样本分为国有银行和股份制银行两类.研究结果显示:银行的经营绩效与银行内部薪酬差距呈非线性关系,适当的薪酬差距对银行绩效具有正向的促进作用,但过大的薪酬差距反而降低银行绩效;国有银行绩效与薪酬差距之间的关系更加敏感;监事会与独立董事没有对银行绩效产生正面的促进作用.     

内部薪酬差距与公司价值——基于生命周期理论的新探索

本文以我国2005-2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了公司生命周期对内部薪酬差距与公司价值关系的影响。结果发现:(1)总体上,公司内部薪酬差距有利于公司价值,支持了锦标赛理论;(2)结合生命周期考察,内部薪酬差距对公司价值的提升作用在成长期最强,在衰退期最弱,即随着公司生命周期的推移,内部薪酬差距对公司价值的提升作用逐渐减弱;(3)进一步的作用机制分析显示,管理层对于经营绩效影响的重要性以及员工对于公平感的需求是生命周期产生影响的重要机制。在综合得分判别法、留存收益率判别法、企业-行业增长率判别法等多项生命周期度量方法下,上述结论保持稳定。本文的研究为理解内部薪酬差距对公司价值的作用提供了一个崭新视角,也为不同生命周期阶段公司薪酬计划的制定提供了一定理论基础。     

高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩敏感性——来自A股制造业上市公司的经验证据

本文以679家A股制造业上市公司2007～2009年间1946个时间序列的观测值为研究样本,实证检验了高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩之间的敏感性。实证结果表明:对制造业上市公司而言,高管薪酬与业绩是同向变化的;高管年龄越大,企业经营的惰性越大;高管的教育水平没有显著影响公司业绩;两职兼任利于管理层制定高薪酬,但是并没有显著提高企业绩效;管理层股权激励并没有显著提高公司业绩,但有助于管理层利用权力获取高额薪酬;财务杠杆成为拉低高管薪酬的反向力,一定程度上既有助于激励管理层实现组织目标,又能限制管理层利用权力从企业获得高薪酬。     

并购行为提升高管薪酬效应的内在机理——基于管理层权力理论视角的分析

并购作为一项最为重要的资源整合战略,是高管实现企业价值提升的首选手段。但是现实情况中,随着企业并购活动的发生,无论并购绩效如何,高管的薪酬都在不断增加,并购可能成为高管利用权力追求个人利益最大化的机会主义行为,这现象似乎违背了最优契约理论。本文结合我国的现实背景,选取2009—2011年深沪两市的A股国有控股上市公司1674个样本数据作为研究对象,对管理层权力、并购行为和高管薪酬之间的关系进行实证研究,探究管理层权力对高管基于薪酬动机诱发并购行为的影响。研究发现,管理层权力与高管薪酬呈现显著正相关关系;并购行为具有提升高管薪酬的效应;在管理层权力控制下,并购行为与高管薪酬显著正相关;并购公司管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响比非并购公司更大。实证表明,存在高管利用权力通过并购的途径提高自身薪酬的行为。在管理层权力理论的逻辑体系下,高管薪酬是目的,并购行为是手段;并购行为影响高管薪酬是现象与途径,而管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响才是本质与内在机理。     

政治关联--高管薪酬对企业绩效影响探析

本文以企业政治关联为突破点,探究不同产权性质的企业的政治关联对高管薪酬的影响,以及对企业绩效的影响。研究发现,影响高管薪酬的其他经济因素被控制下,无论是国有企业和民营企业,有政治关联的高管会获得更高薪酬。在国有企业中,有政治关联的高管薪酬与企业绩效显著负相关;在民营企业中,有政治关联的高管薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关。     

信息技术业薪酬差距与企业绩效的相关性研究

本文以我国信息技术业上市公司2006-2010年年报数据为基础,结合行业特点,对信息技术业上市公司高管—员工薪酬差距与企业绩效的相关性进行实证研究。结论显示:高管—员工薪酬差距对企业绩效具有负向影响作用,为企业制定薪酬制度带来启示。     

企业内部薪酬差距与人力资本结构调整

本文考察薪酬差距如何影响企业内部的人力资本结构变动。基于员工不同教育程度划分人力资本层次,本文研究发现:(1)薪酬差距的增加显著降低了大学学历员工的比例,同时提升了高中及以下学历员工的比例;(2)通过构造工具变量和基于全球性经济危机的场景设定,我们发现薪酬差距和人力资本结构之间存在显著的因果关系;(3)在薪酬差距水平较高的情况下,薪酬差距的增加显著吸引了更有可能进入企业中高层的高学历员工。在薪酬差距水平较低的情况下,扩大薪酬差距显著提升(降低)了高中及以下学历(大学学历)员工比例,一个可能原因在于不同学历员工的议价能力存在差异。(4)薪酬差距与人力资本结构变化之间的相关性主要体现在规模较大、管理者平均年龄较低的企业。(5)人力资本结构在薪酬差距影响创新的过程中发挥了显著的中介效应,薪酬差距提升了研究生和本科学历员工比例,促进了企业创新。     

企业出口与工资差距——来自中国制造业的证据

从世界银行企业投资调查数据中可以发现,中国出口企业内部的工资差距高于非出口企业。由于处在生产技术结构与所在地区比较优势更为接近的行业中的企业,在没有保护和补贴的情况下具有自生能力,能够获得较高的剩余,所以这类企业在开放竞争的条件下资本积累速度更快,在资本技术互补的假设下,增加了对更高技能劳动力的需求。出口对企业内高级管理者与中层管理者及普通员工的工资收入差距具有正向影响,当产业的资本劳动比与整个制造业的资本劳动比越接近时,出口对企业内收入差距的影响越大。     

Working capital as a firm performance savior? Evidence from Scandinavian countries

This study examined the relationship between working capital management (WCM) and firm performance in Scandinavian markets from 2007 to 2020. The initial data set comprised 8821 observations; only 5331 yearly observations remained after data filtration. The data are extracted from a reliable Bloomberg database. This empirical study adopts a multiple regression analysis for unbalanced panel data on Scandinavian markets, reporting an inverse relationship between WCM and firm performance measured through return on assets, gross operating income, and market-to-book value ratio. The control variables also showed a significant relationship order. To assess the robustness of our baseline regression results, we considered various indicators, (i) including alternative measures of firm performance, (ii) excluding the 2008 global financial crisis period, and (ii) running all countries in one equation as a group analysis. This study adds to the existing literature and outlines how efficient WCM can help managers to improve firm performance.     

‘Managerialism’, ‘ownerism’ and risk

This paper proposes that managers, having the value of their human capital dependent on the performance of the firm they manage, and being unable to diversify away this risk, are expected to attempt to reduce their employment risk internally by project selection or by income smoothing, intended to stabilize the firm's income stream. An empirical investigation shows that manager-controlled firms exercise ‘income smoothing’ to a greater extent than owner-controlled firms, have relatively lower unsystematic risk and perhaps lower systematic risk.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Technological change and the growing inequality in managerial compensation

Three of the most fundamental changes in US corporations since the early 1970s have been (1) the increased importance of organizational capital in production, (2) the increase in managerial income inequality and pay-performance sensitivity, and (3) the secular decrease in labor market reallocation. Our paper develops a simple explanation for these changes: a shift in the composition of productivity growth away from vintage-specific to general growth. This shift has stimulated the accumulation of organizational capital in existing firms and reduced the need for reallocating workers to new firms. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract when firms accumulate organizational capital but risk-averse managers cannot commit to staying with the firm. A calibrated version of the model reproduces the increase in managerial compensation inequality and the increased sensitivity of pay to performance in the data over the last three decades. This increased sensitivity of compensation to performance provides large, successful firms with the glue to retain their managers and the organizational capital embedded in them.     

Managerial ability and firm risk-taking behavior

In this study, we show that managerial heterogeneity plays an important role in firm decisions. Our view is that in addition to the effects of previously examined determinants, firm decisions are affected not just by the managers’ explicit mandate to maximize firm value, but also by the ability of the manager in managing the firm. We find that high-ability managers and low-ability managers have opposite effects on firm behavior and firm value. High-ability managers are receptive to risk-taking whereas low-ability managers refrain from risk-taking. High-ability managers cut capital expenditures but spend significantly more on research and development projects; low-ability managers reduce both capital expenditures and research and development expenses significantly. High-ability managers are associated with higher levels of firm focus than low-ability managers. Managerial ability is negatively associated with firm leverage. In addition, our results show that high-ability managers are associated with increases in firm value whereas low-ability managers are associated with decreases in firm value.     

A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents

We develop a dynamic agency model in which payout, investment, and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintner's (1956) target adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment.     

Allocate Capital and Measure Performances in a Financial Institution

This paper provides a model for allocating capital and measuring performances for financial institutions. The methodology relates the economic valuation of the balance sheet to the market value of the firm. In so doing, each business unit is evaluated on an economic basis, and the capital allocated to these units is related to the risk premiums that the market demands. The paper's results have broad applications for corporate managers, risk managers, and other market participants in managing financial institutions to increase shareholders' value.