双元控制主体构架下现代企业会计控制分析

会计是企业管理的重要工作内容,会计工作质量很大程度上影响了企业管理质量.随着现代信息技术的的发展,企业会计控制水平也在不断提升.在会计控制当中,信息不对称、利益不同等是影响会计控制的重要因素,也是阻碍企业发展的重要因素.因此,在现代企业会计控制中,采用双元控制主体构架意义重大.本文首先分析了基于双元控制主体构架下企业会计控制的意义,然后探究会计控制的重要性,最后对基于双元控制主体框架现代企业会计控制优化方案进行阐述,以供参考.     

双元控制主体构架下现代企业会计控制的新思考

现代企业所有权和经营权的分离 ,形成企业中客观存在的两个控制主体 ,即企业所有者和受托经营者。双元控制主体间的利益不一致、信息不对称 ,是造成现实中我国企业会计信息失真的重要原因 ,这已成为我国现代企业健康发展的严重障碍。因此说 ,加强现代企业会计控制是保证我国现代企业制度顺利实施的根本保障机制。双元控制主体构架下现代企业的会计控制必须以“协调”作为会计控制的目标 ,设计激励与约束并重的控制思路和方法 ,并建立多层次的会计控制体制。     

现代企业会计管理模式新探

市场经济体制下,建立现代企业制度,建立现代企业会计管理模式成为必然。企业已成为独立的商品生产者、经营者和劳务的提供者,具有法人资格,变为经济实体,确立了主体地位。现代企业制度下企业自主经营和管理的主体地位,也决定了会计为其服务的主体地位。特别是对企业在经营和管理过程中所涉及到的一些重大决策,例如经营战略确定、投资项目的选择、资金运作的控制、成本费用的管理、效益目标的实现等等。一定要充分发挥会计参与预测、决策和控制的重要职能。为此,应按照企业经营和管理的价值需要,建立会计决策运行的管理系统机制,并全方位地发挥其参与作用。首要的问题就是要搞好清产核资,并做到真实可靠。同时,还要根据资产     

CFO书架

作者:骆家马龙出版社:大连出版社企业并购内部控制与风险管理内容简介:《企业并购内部控制与风险管理:理论·实务·案例》针对企业并购活动的过程和特点,将整个并购活动明确划分为并购决策、并购接管、并购整合和并购评价四个阶段,并从控制目标、执行主体、监督主体、控制内容、控制方法等五方面构建了并购交     

影响纳税人税收遵从决策的因素

税收遵从决策是纳税人行为选择的一个复杂过程,其中起作用的因素很多,除了经济因素,还包括非经济因素。按照经典的逃税模型——A-S模型①所揭示的主要因素是稽查概率和罚款率,除此之外影响纳税人遵从决策的因素还包括:税收遵从成本、税制、纳税人个体特征、对政府的满意程度以及税收文化等。     

价值共创行为与资源拼凑对社会企业绩效的影响：以组织学习为调节

遵从“投入—过程—产出”理论范式和价值共创分析逻辑，构建囊括价值共创、资源拼凑、组织学习与社会企业绩效的有调节的中介模型，探究价值共创行为对社会企业双元绩效的影响机理，以及资源拼凑的中介作用和组织学习的调节效应。通过问卷调查，获取314份社会企业数据，采用结构方程模型（SEM）检验研究假设。结果发现，价值共创行为对社会企业经济绩效和社会绩效具有显著促进作用；资源拼凑在价值共创对社会企业双元绩效的影响中起到部分且为有调节的中介作用；组织学习在价值共创、资源拼凑促进社会企业双元绩效中均起着正向调节作用。     

ESG表现会促进企业双元创新吗？

本文以2010～2020年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验ESG表现对企业双元创新的影响，以获得政府实施ESG政策的启示，同时增强企业可持续发展能力。研究发现：（1）ESG表现正向影响企业双元创新；（2）机构投资者持股在ESG表现对企业双元创新的影响中起正向调节作用；（3）当上市公司透明度越高时，ESG表现对企业双元创新的正向调节作用越大；（4）ESG表现对颠覆式创新的促进作用在非国有企业、东部地区以及污染行业企业中更显著。     

实际控制人身份在银行信贷决策中的作用——基于对会计信息替代视角分析

从传统意义上讲,银行在信贷决策过程中主要看重企业的会计信息,但是作为非正式信息的实际控制人身份在银行信贷决策中也发挥重要作用。通过运用我国上市公司的经验数据检验实际控制人身份对会计信息的影响,研究表明,相对于会计信息,银行在信贷决策中更关注企业的实际控制人身份,尤其是在低制度环境中,这种关注更加明显。     

基于流程的战略性并购内部控制评价研究

企业并购交易过程的复杂性,导致了并购活动的较高失败率,因此对整个并购活动实施内部控制和建立合理的内控评价体系是十分必要的。本文通过对相关文献的研究以及对企业并购实务的调查,将并购交易分为边界清晰的决策、接管、整合及评价四个流程,并明确了相应流程的风险所在及内控重点,构建出一套包含控制目标、执行主体、监督主体、控制内容与控制方法的较为完整的并购内控评价体系,以期防范和控制企业并购过程中的多种风险。     

经营决策听合并报表——基于合并报表信息特征的财务决策

会计报表信息是财务决策、控制分析和业绩评价的主要依据。但是现行财务管理技术和分析指标都是对单个企业的普通财务报表而言的。然而集团企业的普及和发展使合并报表成为报表的主体类型。由于合并会计报表编制基础、过程处理、方法使用、程序繁琐等诸多方面的特殊性，合并报表的财务决策也就有其不同之处。本旨在分析基于合并会计报表的财务决策与控制的几个特殊问题，旨在引起大家的特别关注。     

Tax evasion in a Cournot oligopoly with endogenous entry

If an additional competitor reduces output per firm in a homogenous Cournot oligopoly, market entry will be excessive. Taxes can correct the so-called business stealing externality. We investigate how evading a tax on operating profits affects the excessive entry prediction. Tax evasion raises the number of firms in market equilibrium and can alter their welfare-maximising number. In consequence, evasion can aggravate or mitigate excessive entry. Which of these outcomes prevails is determined by the direct welfare consequences of tax evasion and the relationship between evasion and the tax base. We also determine conditions which imply that overall welfare declines with tax evasion.     

论偷税故意

在税收执法实践中,认定偷税是否应考虑行为人的主观故意性一直是争议最为激烈,且至今没有解决的问题之一。这一问题得不到解决,不但会对纳税人造成不公平,同时也会极大地损害税务机关自身的形象,侵蚀纳税人对税法的遵从度和对税务机关的信赖度。如果从习惯法来理解偷税的故意性,从偷税与偷税罪的关系以及近期国家税务总局一些相关的规范性文件来进行分析,可以拓宽解决这一问题的思路。     

The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion

We study the effectson tax enforcement and tax policy of unintentional complianceerrors by taxpayers and administrative errors by tax auditors.The government can impose both penalties for misreporting andrewards for honest reporting. Maximal sanctions will not be appliedbecause errors are possible, so evasion cannot be eliminatedcostlessly. Under optimal policy intentional evasion can be deterred,but innocent tax evaders must be penalized whether they haveunintentionally evaded or have been mistakenly convicted. Thisdeters intentional evasion, but limits redistribution. Withoutrewards for honest reporting, the revelation principle need notapply, so intentional evasion can occur.     

逃税规模的衡量

逃税造成了政府财政收入的减少,因而政府理所当然地关心社会中的逃税程度,而且逃税程度的大小也代表了一国税务机关税收征管成效的高低.因此从这个意义上讲,对逃税规模的衡量就显得必要了.不过,由于纳税人的逃税行为是隐蔽的,故很难对逃税规模进行直接有效的衡量,尽管如此,还是存在一些方法从侧面去测算一国的逃税规模的.     

Collusive tax evasion and social norms

Although collusive tax evasion by buyers and sellers of commodities and also by employers and employees is widespread all over the world, it has rarely been analyzed in the tax evasion literature. To fill this gap and to compare collusive tax evasion with independent tax evasion, this paper develops a simple noncooperative game-theoretic model and confirms the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper focuses on the effect of social norms and theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the tax compliance norm has a stronger negative effect on the magnitude of collusive tax evasion than on independent tax evasion. The reason for this result is that in a collusive tax evasion game with multiple equilibria social norms affect the range of equilibria and act as an equilibrium selection device, whereas social norms need to be strongly internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly.     

结合逃税的最优税收理论研究评述

最优税收理论主要研究税制的最优设计问题,而逃税理论主要致力于政府的最优执行问题,最近出现了将这两种理论结合起来的研究趋势。结合逃税的最优税收理论,包括最优所得税和最优商品税等内容,研究结果表明:结合逃税的最优税收理论并不能得出比标准最优税收理论更为明确的政策结论,其还有待于进一步的研究和发展。     

Fighting Tax Evasion by Discouraging the Use of Cash?

We propose a bargaining model of tax evasion with a seller that offers a price discount to a buyer in exchange for a cash payment without a receipt, which allows tax evasion. We study the effect on evasion and government revenue of two policy instruments: a tax on cash withdrawals (TCW), which imposes a cost on the buyers who pay cash, and a tax rebate conditional on having the receipt. The tax rebate reduces evasion but it is costly if tax evasion is low. The TCW reduces evasion only if it is set at a sufficiently high rate, which must be higher the larger is the mass of cash users. We also show that the implementation of a TCW, which poses several challenges, is easier if the cost of cash hoarding is high.     

The relationship between culture and tax evasion across countries: Additional evidence and extensions

This study builds on the work of Tsakumis et al. [Tsakumis, G. T., Curatola, A. P,. & Porcano, T. M. (2007). The relation between national cultural dimensions and tax evasion. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16, 131-147] by conducting further empirical analysis of the relationship between Hofstede's [Hofstede, G. H. (1980). Cultures consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications] cultural dimensions and tax evasion across countries using multiple measures of tax evasion to gain additional evidence on the subject. Moreover, this study extends the preliminary international tax evasion model developed by Tsakumis et al. [Tsakumis, G. T., Curatola, A. P,. & Porcano, T. M. (2007). The relation between national cultural dimensions and tax evasion. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16, 131-147] to examine, along with culture, the impact of legal, political, and religious variables on tax evasion across countries. Based on data from 47 countries, and after controlling for economic development, the regression results indicate that the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance and the lower the level of individualism, legal enforcement, trust in government, and religiosity, the higher is the level of tax evasion across countries. These findings remain robust to multiple measures of tax evasion. Government policymakers should find the results of this study useful in assessing the likelihood of tax evasion from cultural, legal, political, and religious perspectives, and in developing tax reform policies to reduce tax evasion.     

Tax Evasion,Investment Shocks,and the Consumption Puzzle: A DSGE Analysis with Financial Frictions

Recent studies identify Marginal Efficiency of Investment (MEI) shocks as important drivers of the business cycle. However, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models struggle to explain macroeconomic comovements between consumption and the key real variables after a MEI shock. Moreover, engaging in tax evasion practices is often an answer to financial constraints, which have been recognized as important determinants of cyclical fluctuations as well. We use a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model, that combines tax evasion with financial frictions, to simulate a MEI shock. We show that entrepreneurial tax evasion can solve the comovement problem to a fair extent.     

国际税收协定与反避税

税收协定除对所得消除双重征税外,还有防止偷逃税(“财政逃避”)的重要目的。税收协定和反避税之间的关系十分紧密,反避税是税收协定的一个重要内容,是各国谈签协定的主旨之一。本文从反避税角度对协定中可能出现的协定滥用和避税问题进行了列举,并提出适时修订协定、完善国内法规、有效打击跨国偷逃税活动的建议。