Public debt,bailouts, and common bonds

We look at a model where countries of different sizes provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants can give rise to optimal expenditure levels, but countries can induce bailouts. We study the characteristics of these bailouts in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and how these characteristics are affected by the introduction of common bonds. Partial substitution of common for sovereign bonds has two implications. First, it lowers the average and marginal borrowing costs of countries which may be eligible for bailouts. This effect leads to higher borrowing in these countries irrespective of their bailout expectations. Second, the lower borrowing costs mitigate the incentives of countries to induce a bailout and, therefore, constrain the parameter set for which a soft budget constraint equilibrium exists. As a result, the introduction of common bonds can also be in the interest of those countries that provide the bailouts.     

中国公共预算约束软化的体制成因：理论分析与实证检验

科学和民主的预算管理制度建立前,税制和分税制对政府预算约束有重要作用。中国税制和分税制缺乏内生约束机制,地方政府有空间和激励突破预算框架参与过度财政竞争,使公共预算约束软化。根据公共预算软约束的估计和面板 probit模型,1994年的税制和分税制改革整体硬化了全国预算收入约束,但导致东部的预算收入约束软化,且未改善预算支出约束。现行税制和分税制下,不规范的税收优惠政策、投资扩张冲动和专项转移支出依赖是导致公共预算约束软化的重要机制。     

Optimal taxation and OECD labor taxes

We derive simple expressions for optimal labor taxes under different assumptions about government bond markets. We use these to examine OECD labor taxes, estimate the excess burden of taxation and assess the ability of optimal tax models to match the data.Optimal labor taxes are driven by: (i) a term reflecting Ramsey considerations which makes labor taxes vary positively with employment and (ii) a martingale component, reflecting the excess burden of tax, which shows persistent responses to shocks to the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Under complete markets (when governments can issue a full set of contingent securities) only the first factor is relevant. We find substantial evidence that incorporating incomplete markets into the optimal taxation model is critical for empirical success. However, we find strongest support for the martingale component and only weak evidence for the Ramsey component.     

The effect of VATs on government balance sheets

The value-added tax, VAT, has become a popular means of raising funds for governments around the world. Countries seeking to reduce variation in tax revenues as well as raise revenue to solve deficits often consider a VAT, and the IMF in particular has become an advocate for the tax for countries seeking tax reform. For all its popularity, its ability to deliver on these promises remains understudied. Countries with a lower cost of raising funds may instead choose to spend more instead of paying down their debts. This paper uses matching techniques to estimate the impact of a VAT on government debts and deficits. The tax is associated with falls in central government debt and deficits as well as expenditures as a share of GDP. There is limited evidence of increases in tax revenue and increases in stability of government spending. The choice of VAT rate is positively correlated with deficit reduction, and the effects of the tax are heterogeneous with respect to the probability of adoption of the treatment and what taxes it is replacing.     

Does reduced trade tax revenue affect government spending patterns?

Many skeptics of trade liberalization in the developing world argue that lowering trade taxes can cause significant fiscal pressures in countries particularly reliant on these taxes and result in a reallocation of resources away from important development goals. This paper evaluates whether there is evidence that central governments systematically change the composition of spending priorities in the wake of lowered trade tax revenues as a share of total government revenues. We find no systematic evidence for this concern in a sample of 51 developing countries for the 1991 through 2005 period.     

Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Government Financing

This paper investigates the dynamic properties of intergovernmental financing during a fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among local governments, which operates with soft budget constraints because of concessionary region-specific transfers from a central government. The existence of intergovernmental transfers induces the free-riding behavior of local governments, thereby bringing considerable deficits to the central government. Raising local and/or national taxes is desirable for fiscal reconstruction, but is unable to attain the Pareto-efficient fiscal reconstruction. Taxes on lobbying activities, combined with uniform transfers, induce earlier concession and can attain the Pareto-efficient outcome in the long run.     

Taxes

This is a compendium of notes on taxes. Section 2 presents a general tax scheme. It is a tax on value added by labour and capital that does not favour one or the other. Section 3 contrasts taxation of business income for pass-through entities and corporations. Section 4 discusses property taxes as taxes on housing services and so a form of income tax. Section 5 turns to wealth taxes. The closing Section 6 attempts to explain why people donate to nonprofits but minimise tax payments to governments, even though governments and nonprofits engage in many of the same activities.     

“营改增”影响地方政府税收努力研究

基于随机前沿分析法（SFA）测算2011-2015年我国地方政府税收努力程度,并运用双重差分法考察“营改增”对地方征税行为的影响。研究发现：“营改增”将地方税（营业税）变为共享税（增值税）,显著降低了地方政府税收努力程度;改革对税收努力的冲击受经济发展水平、转移支付额度和税收返还的影响,获取转移支付收入和税收返还越多的地区税收努力下降速度越快。后“营改增”时期,如何提高税收效率,缓解地方财政收入对转移支付和债务收入的依赖性,是理顺中央和地方财税关系,完善财税收入体系的重要问题。     

Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from Regional Health Expenditure in Italy

In Italy, public expenditure reduction is achieved through a revision of social security and health care programs. In particular, public health expenditure control has been implemented through a reform that imposes more stringent budget rules to local governments and a considerable reduction in grants-in-aid from the central government. This paper investigates empirically whether the response to this decrease in categorical lump-sum grants from the central to local governments results in an asymmetric response to intergovernmental grants. Hard budget and soft budget constraint hypotheses are estimated by using a sample of cross-sectional and time observations covering the 20 Italian regions over the period 1989–1993. The main finding is the existence of a standard and a super flypaper effect in both models. The introduction of the soft-budget constraint hypothesis results in a stronger effect of grants and a lower response of own resources which shows that local governments prefer to incur some deficit instead of reducing health care expenditure.     

Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.     

地方政府债务管理及危机处置的国际经验借鉴

地方政府举债是工业化、城市化的必然选择,合理举债有利于地方财政的高效运转,但若监管错位、过度举债则有可能引发债务危机。自2014年起,我国赋予地方政府发债权,随着近年来收益类专项债的扩容,地方政府债务规模不断扩大,同时融资平台、政府引导基金等各种形式的隐性债务风险依然突出。当前地方政府债务风险被视为“灰犀牛”,亟需引起重视和关注。本文通过梳理美国、日本、巴西地方政府债务危机产生的原因和处置方式,总结国外地方政府债务管理和危机处置的有效经验,并结合现阶段我国地方政府债务管理中存在的预算软约束、发行主体单一、债务透明度差、评级和监管缺位、预警和处置机制不完善等主要问题,提出相关对策建议。     

税收优惠政策清理的价值取向、政策评估与顶层设计

地方税收优惠政策泛滥是中国财税领域长期存在且饱受争议的问题,积弊已久的税收优惠政策已经严重干扰到了市场资源配置与竞争公平性。2014年国家出台了系列政策,对地方税收优惠政策进行清理,采取“一刀切”的方式,要求坚决取缔一切不合法、不合规的地方优惠政策,忽视了地方政府利益现实诉求和区域经济发展差异,未全面调整处理好优惠政策背后的中央与地方利益关系,导致执行半年的清理行动搁置。因此,接下来的税收优惠清理行动需要兼顾地方利益诉求与央地关系调整,围绕建立税式支出预算监测报告机制,使税收优惠的作用及因此减少的税收收入显性化,并纳入预算管理程序;统筹结合税制改革,调整税收优惠清理路径;研究赋予地方一定税收优惠立法权的可行性,完善转移支付机制等顶层设计,以全面深化税收优惠体制改革。     

Do government preferences matter for tax competition?

This paper explores how government preferences affect capital tax decisions of a country. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and income equality, compete for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out in data from OECD countries over the years 1990–2012, is that an increase in government preferences for pursuing economic development relative to income equality makes countries’ horizontal tax reactions stronger. Unlike the existing studies, our result contributes to the tax competition literature by highlighting the importance of government preferences in determining the extent of tax competition among countries and so offering a novel explanation for the widely observed heterogeneous tax policies across countries.     

地方竞争是否阻碍了地方政府债务绩效的提升？——理论框架及空间计量研究

本文从举债行为策略视角考察地方竞争对地方政府债务绩效的影响。 首先,从不同地区间举债行为策略互动的视角对地方竞争如何影响地方政府债务绩效进行理论诠释,其次,在采用Global超效率DEA方法测度地方政府债务绩效的基础上,突破空间独立性假设,运用空间杜宾模型对地方竞争影响地方政府债务绩效的效果及空间外溢性进行实证检验。研究发现,在地方效用最大化目标导向下,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都对债务增速产生了较为显著的正向影响和空间外溢效应,导致地方采取主动扩大债务规模的举债行为策略。与此同时,随着债务规模的持续增长,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都将对债务绩效产生“规模报酬递减”的负向影响和空间外溢效应,尤其是公共投资竞争的影响效果更加明显。进一步地,如果考虑到可能存在预算软约束现象,地方竞争还将与预算软约束行为相结合,对债务绩效产生了“使用效率递减”的负向影响。本文结论为通过债务合理使用来促进经济高质量发展,防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。     

适当下放地方税立法权完善税收立法体制

当前中央和地方税收立法权划分中存在一些问题和矛盾。要化解这些矛盾、解决这些问题,需要在借鉴历史和国外经验的基础上,区别不同的地方税税种,分层次、有限度、可控制地下放部分税收立法权,完善税收立法体制,健全分税制财政管理体制以至整个财税体制。     

Local tax rebates,corporate tax burdens,and firm migration: Evidence from China

Conflicts of interest between local governments and the central administration in China have yielded many local policies that only serve the interests of local governments. The policy of first levying and then rebating taxes is an example of how local governments eschew the national tax regulations to boost local economies rather than national interests. In 2001, the Chinese government announced the termination of local tax rebates, which had some expected outcomes. We find that local governments complied with the new tax policy even though it no longer allowed local governments to grant tax incentives. However, some companies found ways to avoid the greater tax burdens by moving their business registration locations to tax havens. We also find that firms controlled by local governments were less likely to change registration locations. Our study examines the national tax regulation in China and explores how tax rules influence company decisions. In addition, we show that non-tax incentives, such as local economic development, may also influence company decisions.     

Tax structure,size of government,and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938

We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.      

Tax competition and federal equalization schemes with decentralized leadership

Regional governments compete by setting capital taxes in anticipation of the central government’s fiscal equalization and income redistribution policies. I start by demonstrating that the constrained socially optimal allocation satisfies the Pareto efficient conditions; therefore, it may be first best. It is also shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the game played by regional and central governments is socially optimal. The anticipation of equalization of marginal utilities of public consumption and equalization of marginal utilities of private consumption provides regional governments with correct incentives in the setting of capital taxes, preventing the phenomenon known as “race to the bottom.”     

税费替代:增值税减税、非税收入征管与企业投资

通过减税促进企业投资和提振宏观经济是近年来中国税收制度改革的重要目标,但减税政策的实际效果却存在争议。本文利用2009年增值税转型改革,研究了减税对地方政府税费收入和企业非税负担的影响,从税费替代的角度揭示非税负担变动如何影响企业固定资产投资。研究发现:(1)增值税转型在减税的同时提高了地方政府非税收入并加重了企业非税负担,地方财政收入受增值税转型冲击越大,企业非税负担上升越明显。(2)上述应主要体现在小型、微型和民营企业上,大中型、非民营企业的非税负担未发生明显变化。(3)非税负担上升会显著抑制小型、微型和民营企业的固定资产投资,促使小型微型和民营企业通过持有更多现金和减少流动性负债来应对税费负担不确定性。本文有助于理解减税政策对小型微型和民营企业非税负担的溢出效应及其影响,为通过减税降费促进投资和提振经济提供经验支撑。     

转移支付与地方政府支出规模膨胀——基于中国预算制度的一个实证解释

自2000年以来,为了缩小地区间差距和促进基本公共服务均等化,我国的财政转移支付规模迅速扩大。本文利用1994-2015年省级年度数据发现,地方政府获得的一般性转移支付和专项转移支付每增加1元,年度一般预算财政支出将分别增加1.61元和2.12元,远远超过本地财政收入增加所产生的影响。这也意味着财政转移支付在我国产生了较大的“粘蝇纸效应”。在2010年提前下达固定数额转移支付指标改革后,一般性转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”有所下降。使用分月数据的回归结果显示,“年底突击花钱”对专项转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”的贡献最大。本文的研究表明,转移支付引发的地方财政收入的不确定性、转移支付下拨时滞以及刚性的年度预算平衡制度是导致我国地方政府支出规模膨胀的重要原因。本文的研究结论意味着,中央应进一步规范转移支付制度、扩大提前下达转移支付指标的范围、加快转移支付的拨付进度、建立和完善跨年度预算平衡机制、积极防范转移支付的道德风险问题。地方各级政府应该加强预算执行管理,强化预算约束力。