Diversity, persistence and chaos in consumption patterns

In this paper we present a model from which discretionary consumption dynamics can be analyzed as global properties emerging from the endogenous transformation of a society inhabited by boundedly rational interactive consumers. By considering local and global interactions among consumers, we show that behavioral diversity plays a central role in the evolution of consumption patterns. The analysis of the model reveals the existence of a regime characterized by the persistence of different social standards, and a time evolution of the social distribution of behavioral patterns towards a heteroclinic cycle. In some cases the evolution seems to be chaotic, generating unpredictable, erratic dynamics of the aggregate social indices (average or social propensity for discretionary consumption).      

地方财政支出的空间外部效应研究

财政行为的空间外部性是应用公共经济学的重要研究课题。目前，国内既有文献多是集中于对税收竞争的考察。对于地方财政支出空间外部效应的研究还非常缺乏。依据Case和Rosen（1993）的思路，本文采用空间计量方法对我国地方财政支出的空间外部性进行了经验研究。结果表明，总体上看，地方财政支出具有显著的正外部效应。但进一步对建设支出和教育科技支出这两个细分项目的分析则显示，后者并未表现出显著的空间外部效应。上述结论的得出为最优分权规模的确定提供了一个新的观察视角。     

Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division.     

Existence of equilibria in economies with externalities and non-convexities in an infinite-dimensional commodity space

We prove an equilibrium existence theorem for economies with externalities, general types of non-convexities in the production sector, and infinitely many commodities. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers, and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account the external effects. The firms set their prices according to general pricing rules which are supposed to have bounded losses and may depend upon the actions of the other economic agents. The commodity space is L_∞(M,M,μ), the space of all μ-essentially bounded M-measurable functions on M.As for our existence result, we consider the framework of Bewley (1972). However, there are four major problems in using this technique. To overcome two of these difficulties, we impose strong lower hemi-continuity assumptions upon the economies. The remaining problems are removed when the finite economies are large enough.Our model encompasses previous works on the existence of general equilibria when there are externalities and non-convexities but the commodity space is finite dimensional and those on general equilibria in non-convex economies with infinitely many commodities when no external effect is taken into account.     

Externalities of R&D Expenditures

Innovation is generally recognized as a major source of economic growth. R&D investments explicitly aim at generating innovations and creating knowledge. Since knowledge has certain public good properties, positive externalities are likely to exist. In this paper, we extend well-known concepts from the input-output literature (backward multipliers) to indicate at which commodities stimuli should be targeted to enhance R&D and its positive externalities in the economy as a whole. Next, we argue that there may also be negative externalities of R&D, due to increased prices. This issue can be studied by means of forward multipliers. Both concepts are applied to the United States, 1977-90.     

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.     

Impatience and equilibrium indeterminacy

This paper extends the neoclassical one-sector optimal growth model by postulating that individual agents’ time preference (impatience) depends on the economy-wide average consumption and average income, which are social factors taken as external by individual agents. The paper shows that with the socially determined individual time preference local equilibrium indeterminacy can arise. Moreover, local indeterminacy can also be associated with global indeterminacy in many cases. The results hold in models with bounded and unbounded growth.     

Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

We study Bayesian mechanism design in the context of the siting of noxious facilities. Under incomplete information, we characterize optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and cost sharing of the facility. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian–Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomenon disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.      

城市环境外部性的经济分析与对策研究

本文将就环境外部性的特点进行经济分析,提出运用经济学、伦理学及政治学综合性知识,在追求高效率、确立道德约束、建立政治规则和明确衡量标准的基础上,制定治理环境外部性的积极对策。