Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage,liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms

This essay examines how the Banking Acts of the 1933 and 1935 and related New Deal legislation influenced risk taking in the financial sector of the U.S. economy. The analysis focuses on contingent liability of bank owners for losses incurred by their firms and how the elimination of this liability influenced leverage and lending by commercial banks. Using a new panel data set, we find contingent liability reduced risk taking. In states with contingent liability, banks used less leverage and converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could survive larger loan losses (as a fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. In states with limited liability, banks took on more leverage and risk, particularly in states that required banks with limited liability to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In the long run, the New Deal replaced a regime of contingent liability with deposit insurance, stricter balance sheet regulation, and increased capital requirements, shifting the onus of risk management from bankers to state and federal regulators.     

The Effect of Business Risk on Capital Structure of Indian Corporate Firms: Business Groups vs. Stand-alone Firms

Abstract

This study estimates the relationship between leverage and business risk for Indian corporate firms by applying semi-parametric regression method for three time points, namely 2001, 2007 and 2012. We observe that the relationship is non-linear for all the three measures of RISK in 2001 and 2012. Since we get different results for different measures of risk, we lay more emphasis on RISK2 as the better measure of risk here. From the graphical plots, we find that the relationship between leverage and RISK2 appears to be a polynomial of degree 5 or more. Thus, it invalidates the previous argument of a quadratic relationship between leverage and risk. We then check if the quadratic specification between leverage and risk, as proposed in the existing studies, is appropriate by applying Hardle and Mammen's test. We observe that the relationship varies over the measures of risks and it differs between group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms. Moreover, the relationship changes over time. Thus, our findings raise questions about the predictions of Castanias, Kale et al. and others on the relationship between capital structure and business risk as a U-shaped one. We conclude that the generalization of a U-shaped relationship between capital structure and business risk is not true.     

杠杆演进以及初始杠杆对资本结构的影响分析

本文对公司财务杠杆的演进趋势以及初始杠杆对资本结构的影响进行了实证检验。结果表明,在初始时较高(或较低)杠杆公司在10年后仍维持较高(或较低)杠杆,并保持明显的差异性。随着时间的推移,较高(或较低)杠杆公司呈现出显著的杠杆收敛性。初始杠杆对10年以后公司当前杠杆的决定存在着显著且稳定的影响,即初始杠杆不随时间而改变且反映公司初始企业特征的因素是当前杠杆的重要决定因素。     

The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right: Reply to M. Pierru

In this journal [Miller, R. A. (2009). The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 128–138], I argued that the standard WACC formula is inadequate in most circumstances to reward stockholders and bondholders where the necessary cash flows are calculated separately to exactly cover the respective costs of capital. Axel Pierru [2009. ‘The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right’: A comment. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 1219–1223] observes correctly that my assumed repayment schedules (equal periodic payments to bondholders; similarly for stockholders) imply a temporal drift in the debt (or leverage) ratio; he would recalculate the WACC annually. He proposes an alternative calculation of the repayment schedules under the constraint of a constant debt ratio. Here I suggest three additional possible repayment schedules; in general repayment schedules determine the drift in the debt ratio. However, the expected repayment schedules are established at the time the project is accepted and financed, hence the relevant debt ratio is that which exists at that time. The WACC for a specific project need not (and should not) be recalculated for that project throughout its financial life when that project has already been accepted and financed.     

过度投资、公司业绩与债务融资——基于信息对称视角下的持续时间模型研究

基于信息对称的视角,通过建立持续时间模型,并用杠杆比率表示为投资项目进行融资的总成本中债务融资所占的比重来研究债务融资对过度投资和公司业绩的影响.结果发现:当信息是对称的情况下,公司如果发生过度投资便不会出现投资不足,并且债务融资占投资项目总成本的比重越高公司过度投资程度越大.     

The effect of management incentives and cross-listing status on the accounting treatment of R&D spending

This paper investigates the effect of management incentives and cross-listing status on the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) spending for a sample of Canadian hi-tech and biopharmaceutical firms. U.S. GAAP adopts an immediate expensing rule for all R&D spending except for software development costs for which technological feasibility has been established. Contrary to the U.S., Canadian and international standard setters recommend capitalization if development costs meet certain criteria. Because those criteria are largely based on management judgment, capitalization of R&D spending is an accounting choice that can be used for income manipulation or signaling.Using a logit model, we examine how the decision to capitalize R&D spending is influenced by the cross-listing status and several other key firm characteristics that are well documented in the accounting literature. We find that the probability of capitalizing R&D spending increases for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in the software industry. The probability of capitalizing R&D spending also increases for firms that are more leveraged, more mature, and have higher level of cash flows from operations. However, the probability of capitalizing R&D spending decreases for larger corporations, firms with more concentrated ownership and highly profitable firms. Overall our results indicate a preference for Canadian firms in the software industry to emulate U.S. accounting practices for R&D spending. They also suggest that firms use the decision to capitalize or expense R&D spending as an earning management tool to either meet debt covenants or to smooth income.     

房产税对宏观经济的影响效应研究

本文扩展Dong et al.(2019)通过企业家对住房地产和实体经济投资进行资产组合决策,把房价、投资、消费和产出等重要经济指标纳入主流新凯恩斯框架,考虑银行能否区分贷款是投入实体经济还是房地产业两种情形,分析了房产税引入住房市场前后对宏观经济的影响效应。研究结果表明:开征房产税对房地产开发投资、房价和新住房生产具有明显的抑制作用,对实体经济投资则具有正挤入效应增加和负抵押效应减少的双重效应。从短期看,当银行无法区分企业贷款是投入实体经济还是房地产业时,因前期的负抵押效应大于正挤入效应,总实物资本减少,产出下降;当可清晰区分二者时,负抵押效应变为小于正挤入效应,总实物资本增加,产出上升。鉴于推出房产税对宏观经济影响较为复杂,应充分权衡利弊,采取必要辅助措施趋利避害。     

房产税对宏观经济的影响效应研究

本文扩展Dong et al.(2019)通过企业家对住房地产和实体经济投资进行资产组合决策,把房价、投资、消费和产出等重要经济指标纳入主流新凯恩斯框架,考虑银行能否区分贷款是投入实体经济还是房地产业两种情形,分析了房产税引入住房市场前后对宏观经济的影响效应。研究结果表明:开征房产税对房地产开发投资、房价和新住房生产具有明显的抑制作用,对实体经济投资则具有正挤入效应增加和负抵押效应减少的双重效应。从短期看,当银行无法区分企业贷款是投入实体经济还是房地产业时,因前期的负抵押效应大于正挤入效应,总实物资本减少,产出下降;当可清晰区分二者时,负抵押效应变为小于正挤入效应,总实物资本增加,产出上升。鉴于推出房产税对宏观经济影响较为复杂,应充分权衡利弊,采取必要辅助措施趋利避害。     

制造业企业房地产投资与企业杠杆率

摘 要：21世纪以来,中国制造业企业进行房地产投资是其“多元化”投资战略的主 要形式之一。本文利用2010-2020年中国 A 股上市制造业企业数据,研究了制造业企业 房地产投资对企业杠杆率的影响,发现制造业企业房地产投资能够提升企业杠杆率。机 制分析表明,制造业企业房地产投资通过发挥挤压效应和抵押效应进而提高企业杠杆率。 制造业企业房地产投资对企业杠杆率的提升作用在非国有企业和小企业中更显著。在区 分长期杠杆率和短期杠杆率后,制造业企业房地产投资对企业杠杆率的提升作用表现在 长期杠杆率方面,同时该提升作用显著提高了企业的财务风险。本文提出企业应当加大 研发创新,促进自身高质量发展;政府监管部门完善系列政策避免制造业企业盲目进行房地产投资而导致“企业空心化”。     

不一样的杠杆——从国际比较看杠杆上升的现象、原因与影响

本文以次贷危机前美欧国家的杠杆率上升为参照,比较了中国2009-2016年期间中国杠杆率上升的现象、构成、原因及其对实体经济的影响。较高的货币增速、地方政府和国有企业预算软约束、高储蓄率等旧原因难以解释中国近年来杠杆率的快速上升。从制造到服务的经济结构转型特定背景下,债务扩张带来的真实GDP增速和通胀增速边际效力下降,带来杠杆率上升。应对中国式高杠杆,宏观层面重点是避免通缩,结构层面重点是放松服务业管制、平衡中央和地方关系并推动相关投融资机制改革、以及其他释放经济增长活力的改革措施避免政府被动加杠杆。