Knowledge of campaign finance regulation reduces perceptions of corruption

We use an experimental survey design to measure how campaign finance regulation influences perceptions of political corruption and trust in politicians when citizens are exposed to information about regulation. Unlike most observational studies, results of this experimental study suggest that knowledge of campaign finance regulation substantially reduces citizens’ perceptions of corruption but has only limited effect on trust in politicians. Findings have crucial implications for public policy. At a time when public cynicism about politics is high, a significant reduction in perceptions of political corruption through successful dissemination of campaign finance regulation would be a boost to the legitimacy of democracies.     

Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments

Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University.     

农户小额信贷信用风险控制研究——基于新疆玛纳斯县、吐鲁番市、托克逊县的农户调查

本文基于对新疆玛纳斯县、吐鲁番市、托克逊县农村农户的实地调查,从社会学制度变迁角度,运用博弈分析的方法,研究了农户小额信贷信用风险控制问题。指出影响农户小额信贷信用风险的三个关键因素:1.在农村初步构建起制度信任安排约束的信用工程。2.农村信用社对信贷员激励相容的内控机制设计。3.小额信贷额度控制和联保贷款风险控制技术。     

Trust, reputation and relationships in grazing rights markets: An experimental economic study

Trust is frequently a requirement for economic exchanges and the management of natural resources. Providing public information on past actions can promote trust through the formation of reputations. We developed an economic experiment to test whether a formal reputation mechanism could facilitate trusting relationships in the tradable grazing rights markets. Providing information to create formal public reputations for market participants did not increase the overall efficiency of the market. However, it did result in greater equality of income between partners, suggesting that participants showed more concern for their partners when they knew they would be rated. Even with public reputation information, bilateral relationships remained central to the market. Market failures in existing grazing rights markets may be better addressed by measures to increase communication between partners rather than simply relying on a formal reputation mechanism.     

When do formal control and trust matter? A context-based analysis of the effects on marketing channel relationships in China

Formal control and trust are two typical governance mechanisms employed to safeguard business transactions. Yet the effectiveness of each mechanism for firm relationship outcomes remains unclear. Some relevant literature suggests that formal control and trust simultaneously can help secure transactions, whereas other research argues the two control mechanisms can substitute for each other. This study applies social embeddedness theory and differentiates strong tie from weak tie relationships. In so doing, it reveals the role of strong versus weak social ties in leading to parallel conclusions about the relationship between formal control and trust and their effects on relationship outcomes. On the basis of empirical tests in a Chinese marketing channels context, this study finds that the joint effects of formal control and trust on governing transactions depends on the relational tie that the focal partners share. Specifically, formal control and trust complement each other only in weak tie relations. On the basis of this new perspective, the authors offer theoretical and managerial implications for managing interfirm governance mechanisms in transitional economies such as China.     

Global marketing of industrial products: Are interpersonal relationships always critical?

The present paper examines the issue of whether interpersonal relationships are critical for global marketing of industrial products. The fields of relationship marketing, IMP group research, sales research, and network theory have stressed the importance of interpersonal relationships in the business-to-business or industrial marketing context. In contrast to this emphasis on interpersonal relationships, we argue that industrial firms can both conceive and enhance marketing strategies based on developing high quality and consistent processes, products, services or outcomes (consistent processes and outcomes). Such strategies are especially important given the fact that developing interpersonal relationships is expensive due to their reliance on frequent and/or face-to-face communications. In this paper, we examine industry and country contexts that lead to the choice of alternative industrial product marketing strategies and highlight some future research directions and managerial implications.     

Collectivist values for learning in organizational relationships in China: the role of trust and vertical coordination

Partners must engage in integrative interaction in order to combine diverse expertise and experiences into effective learning. Results from 103 pairs of customer and supplier organizations in China indicate that trust and vertical coordination are useful ways to characterize this integrative interaction and together they promote learning. Structural equation analysis suggests that collectivist but not individualist values are important foundations for integrative interaction between partners that result in learning. These findings were interpreted as reaffirming the value of effective relationships for coordination between partners and suggesting that collectivist values can be a source of effective organizational relationships.     

A framework to facilitate institutional arrangements for smallholder supply in developing countries: An agribusiness perspective

The industrialization of agriculture and the potential problem of small-scale farmer marginalization calls for a fresh approach to the design of agribusiness supply chain arrangements in developing countries. The objective of the paper is to contribute to a better understanding of institutional arrangements that can promote stable smallholder agribusiness contracting arrangements in a developing country context. A case study approach, incorporating a transaction cost framework, is used to test whether trust can significantly change the contract characteristics of supply. The results suggest that although the presence of trust can influence the contract characteristics of a supply arrangement, it may not be significant because of other factors in a developing country context. Bearing this in mind, a number of institutional arrangements are recommended in order to promote more stable contract conditions.     

国外农村土地信托:研究现状及借鉴

国外关于农村土地信托的研究主要涉及土地信托的产权基础、土地信托的目的和作用、土地信托中的公私关系、组织形式和运作模式几个方面,主要以土地所有权私有化为前提,但已将研究重点从所有权转移到使用权和控制权,且成果主要集中在农村土地改革和土地资源保护方面.因此,通过对国外上述研究成果综述和简要评论,可以为我国在该领域的研究提供借鉴.     

Concerning trust and information

Communication and the associated information exchanges are key drivers of the development of relationships and of the trust embedded within them. This paper considers the development of business relationships in terms of the continuing co-evolution of trust and information exchange and the issues associated with researching these processes. The interconnections of trust and information exchange are examined in a survey of business relationships involving information exchange (n = 355). Analysis of variance shows few, if any, of the aspects of the standard conceptualizations of information exchange are associated with increased levels of trust. It is information exchange norms that have the greatest (positive) association with the level of trust. These norms emerge as part of the long term co-production of the relationship itself. This has important managerial implications. We conclude there are few managerial actions involving managing communication that can “manufacture” trust and improve or develop relationships in the short term. The paper concludes with a discussion of alternative ways of envisaging communication and relationship management and the nature and future of research into the evolution of business relationships.