The impact of forced divestments on parent company stock prices: Buy on the rumor,sell on the news?

We measure how warnings of expropriation and forced divestments of private property affect the stock prices of parent companies. We use a unique database of 116 events in 12 countries from 2005 to 2013. Our results show that different types of warnings have significant negative effects on stock prices, and the largest effect is from a warning that takes the form of a transitory permit revocation. In the case of forced divestments, we find a significant negative impact when a permit is permanently revoked. However, nationalizations are associated with a positive market reaction.     

I Feel Your Pain: The Effect of Regulator as a Minority Shareholder on Merger and Acquisition Performance

We examine the effect of a regulator-led advocate for minority shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance in China. In recent years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission established the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), which began its ownership of 100 shares of public firms in 2016. The CSISC advocates for the interests of minority shareholders proactively. Focusing on abnormal stock returns in M&A announcements, we find that acquirers that have the CSISC as a shareholder (CSISC acquirers) exhibit higher positive abnormal stock returns than non-CSISC acquirers. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that the core results are mainly driven by firms with severe agency problems and weak external/internal monitoring, and those not controlled by the state. In addition, we find that CSISC acquirers have better long-term performance and encounter more M&A failures than non-CSISC acquirers. Our findings indicate that although the CSISC only holds 100 shares of listed companies, it plays an effective role in monitoring and driving firms to make appropriate M&A decisions.     

The ‘credibility thesis’ and its application to property rights: (In)Secure land tenure,conflict and social welfare in China

Debates over tenure insecurity have been divided between those favoring private, marketable, and formalized property rights versus champions of grassroots’ customary and communal arrangements. By positing the “credibility thesis”, this article argues that it might be more insightful to move beyond concepts of formal and informal, private and common, or secure and insecure institutions, to leave the discussion about institutional form for a discussion about function. The notion of credibility does so by drawing attention to institutional function over time and space rather than to a desired form postulated by theory or political conviction. Apart from furthering the theoretical foundations on credibility and institutional functionalism, this article aims to develop its methodology and empirical study by taking China as a case study, with particular reference to its rural land-lease system, which is perceived to be highly insecure due to forced evictions and government intervention. Paradoxically, the study finds significant social support for the rural land-lease system and a low level of conflict. These findings might indicate that the form of the Chinese rural lease system (insecure tenure) is the outcome of its present function (provision of social welfare). Simultaneously, it was also found that when conflict does occur expropriation is a prime cause for it.     

Expropriation risk and technology

This paper develops a unified framework to analyze the dynamics of firm investment in countries with poor legal enforcement. The firm's technology edge over the government generates endogenous property rights. Industry variation in the technology gap predicts a sectoral pecking-order of expropriations. Long-run investment distortions may be Pareto superior relative to persistent investment at the static optimum. The dynamics of investment and transfers depend on whether incentives (backloading) or efficiency (frontloading) concerns dominate at the initial division of surplus. An increase in government efficiency may reduce its welfare. The model provides a technology-driven rationale for the widespread use of conglomerate structures in emerging market countries.     

关联交易与控制性股东的"隧道行为"

在信息不对称情况下,控制性股东能够利用其对上市公司的控制力或影响力进行非公允关联交易,从而以其他投资者的利益为代价从上市公司攫取财富.本文以1998-2005年实施配股的上市公司为样本,分析了配股后上市公司关联交易的分布特征,并研究了关联交易对控制性股东资金占用行为、股票收益和企业价值的影响.研究结果表明:(1)控制性股东通过关联借贷大量侵占了上市公司的资金;(2)投资者在关联交易发生后相应调整了股票价格,导致了上市公司股票收益下降;(3)控制性股东通过隐蔽的关联交易从上市公司输出了财富,造成了以托宾Q衡量的公司价值下降,关联交易与公司价值之间存在负相关关系.非公允关联交易成为控制性股东掠夺中小股东财富的重要方式,导致上市公司的资源被不断输送出去.     

对城郊集体土地征用补偿问题的思考

针对城市化进程中城市扩张对城郊集体土地的大量征用，鉴于城郊土地的区位及权属特殊性，本文侧重讨论了城郊农用地和非农建设用地的征用补偿经济标；隹、法律程序问题并提出了相关建议。     

Diversification to mitigate expropriation in the tobacco industry

While it is well established that diversifying acquisitions by large, cash-rich firms destroy shareholder wealth, we document positive abnormal returns to such acquisitions in the tobacco industry. We show that these abnormal returns are associated with proxies for lower expected expropriation costs. Specifically, we show that wealth creation increases in the degree of domestic geographic expansion afforded by the acquisition (increasing tobacco firms’ influence in more political districts) and in the liquidity of tobacco firms’ assets (converting cash to harder-to-expropriate operating assets). We also show that the threat of expropriation constrains payments to shareholders before expropriation becomes certain in 1998.     

金字塔股权结构、股权制衡与终极股东侵占

上市公司终极股东行为深受金字塔股权结构形态和内部权力配置及结构的影响。我国上市公司的经验数据表明上市公司终极股东侵占行为选择与金字塔股权结构形态特征正相关,与两权分离程度负相关。金字塔股权结构的内部制衡机制不仅直接影响股东侵占行为,并能够强化金字塔基本形态的影响作用。为保护中小股东的权益不受侵占,应完善公司治理结构,规范信息披露制度,并加强对上市公司大股东的监管。     

Why are shareholders not paid to give up their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy

Dual-class share unifications have typically been argued to be beneficial for voting shareholders, who are usually compensated for the loss of their superior voting privileges. However, no covenants exist that make this compensation mandatory for voting shareholders. In this paper, we examine a subset of dual class share unifications from Italy where, in the main, voting shareholders are not offered any compensation in lieu of the loss of their superior voting rights. We present a simple model describing the conditions under which the controlling voting shareholder will choose not to offer compensation to minority voting shareholders as part of a share unification. Our empirical results support the model predictions.     

Zoning plan-based legal confiscation without expropriation in Turkey in light of ECHR decisions

The right to property is a fundamental human right guaranteed by international conventions. In countries like Turkey, where the principles of private ownership apply, this right is guaranteed by laws. The right to property may be restricted by law only in the case of public interest. Nevertheless, the right of ownership of immovable property can be transferred to the public authority only with payment. However, in some cases, a person's immovable property may be de facto converted into a public facility without expropriation. This process is called “confiscation without expropriation”. This concept was introduced into the Turkish Legal System in 1956 by the unauthorized conversion of immovable property for a road. Today, especially in planned areas, a different type of confiscation without expropriation is often seen. Zoning plans are known to be public tools that reorganize properties in public interest. However, the uncertainty in the implementation process of these plans negatively affects the owners of parcels reserved for public use in the zoning plan. This situation is defined in terminology as “legal confiscation without expropriation”. In this study, the subject has been discussed in the light of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decisions and Turkish judicial decisions, and which institutions are responsible for what kind of zoning functions within zoning plans have been investigated. Official (ex officio) applications and voluntary applications have been compared. Conceptual illustrations on the subject have been prepared. According to the results obtained from the study, it has been stated that all public spaces in the zoning plan are not subject to legal confiscation. Due to their location or characteristics, protected areas, unsuitable geological areas and parcels remaining in agricultural areas can be allocated as public spaces in the zoning plan. In such a case, it is not possible to say that there is legal confiscation. In terms of plan classification, there may be legal confiscation in areas if only a 1/1000-scale implementary zoning plan is in practice. As a solution for legal confiscation, land and real estate arrangements should be made ex officio and without delay. In addition to this, alternative models are also needed. Otherwise, public institutions will be subject to severe financial burdens. Some of the proposals include: granting construction right to zone cadastral parcels affecting public facility areas, or granting the right to construct all cadastral parcels in the plan in specified amounts and also developing a zoning right transfer system.