论表决权排除制度对规范关联交易的作用

目前在我国，法人成为上市公司控股股东的现象日益普遍，产生了大量的关联企业，关联方之间的关联交易电越来越多，关联企业、关联交易属于中性范畴，有其存在的必然性和一定程度的合理性，然而，南于现阶段对关联交易的监管还不完善，上市公司的大量关联交易中隐藏着许多问题，许多关联交易都属于不公平关联交易，侵害中小股东、债权人及上市公司利益。表决权排除制度利用其对公司利害关系人表决权的限制可以抵制大股东与公司的不公平关联交易行为，     

上市公司非公允关联交易及其审计对策

我们国家上市公司与其控股股东或受控股股东控制的其他子公司之间的关系密切复杂。关联交易普遍存在于我国上市公司的日常经营业务中,而关联交易往往建立在非公允的基础之上,控股股东为了谋取控制权私利,通过不公平的关联交易转移上市公司利润,占用上市公司资金等,使得上市公司的持续经营能力受到严重威胁,损害了中小股东的利益,还将导致较高的审计风险。同时,这类不公允的关联交易事项具有较强的隐蔽性。文章将揭示非公允关联交易产生的原因,并在此基础上提出注册会计师审计的应对策略。     

关联交易与控制性股东的"隧道行为"

在信息不对称情况下,控制性股东能够利用其对上市公司的控制力或影响力进行非公允关联交易,从而以其他投资者的利益为代价从上市公司攫取财富.本文以1998-2005年实施配股的上市公司为样本,分析了配股后上市公司关联交易的分布特征,并研究了关联交易对控制性股东资金占用行为、股票收益和企业价值的影响.研究结果表明:(1)控制性股东通过关联借贷大量侵占了上市公司的资金;(2)投资者在关联交易发生后相应调整了股票价格,导致了上市公司股票收益下降;(3)控制性股东通过隐蔽的关联交易从上市公司输出了财富,造成了以托宾Q衡量的公司价值下降,关联交易与公司价值之间存在负相关关系.非公允关联交易成为控制性股东掠夺中小股东财富的重要方式,导致上市公司的资源被不断输送出去.     

上市公司关联交易若干问题的思考

由于我国目前资本市场尚且不够完善,关联交易制度缺乏规范程度,许多上市公司采用非公允的关联交易谋取不合法的利益,严重损害中小股东的利益。关联交易具有独特的两面性,一方面,上市公司可以通过与关联方进行关联交易以节约交易成本,能起到提升上市公司竞争力的作用;但由于关联交易缺乏公平的市场竞争环境,且具有隐蔽性,这成为了上市公司的控股股东进行利润操纵的常用手段,掏空上市公司,以实现实际控制人利益最大化为目标。文章通过对关联交易的动机、危害及形成原因进行分析,并就存在问题提出规范关联交易的政策建议。     

国企改组中关联交易的解决途径

关联交易是指上市公司或其附属公司与在本公司直接或间接占有权益、存在利害关系的关联人士间所进行的交易。对上市公司的关联交易,许多国家都通过立法加以一定的限制,目的是为了防止公司的关联人士,如公司董事、行政总裁或主要股东等利用其在公司的权力或影响,在与公司进行的交易中牟取不正当的利益,损害公司及全体股东的利益。如     

转型环境中大股东代理行为的表现及制度成因

股权集中背景下,上市公司的代理问题主要表现为大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突。中国在向市场经济逐步转型的过程中,大股东侵占小股东利益的手段多样,包括关联交易、公司间贷款、盈余管理、现金分红、控制权转移、股票回购,以及定向增发和配股等。大股东侵占上市公司利益的现象普遍且屡禁不止,与我国转型过程中的国企改制背景、股东间持股成本及利益实现方式的不同及弱法律制度环境等制度背景有关。     

控股股东“掏空”行为影响因素的实证研究

以我国发生关联方并购重组交易的上市公司为样本,实证分析了控股股东"掏空"行为的影响因素。研究发现,公司第一大股东较高的持股比例和负债均与控股股东的"掏空"行为负相关,二者可在一定程度上减少控股股东的"掏空"行为;公司的盈利能力、发展能力和自由现金流量均与控股股东的"掏空"行为正相关,说明了控股股东"掏空"行为存在的普遍性。研究还表明,上市公司的上市年限越长,发生控股股东"掏空"行为的可能性越小;资产规模大的公司和ST/PT公司更容易遭到其控股股东的"掏空"。     

上市公司关联交易解析

我国上市公司中普遍存在的不当关联交易情况，近年来有不断翻新并发展的趋势。上市公司利用关联交易来粉饰或输出利润，严重危害了中小股东的利益。笔者拟对上市公司关联交易的新趋势加以解析，并提出治理思路。     

专家解析整体上市“路线图”之一：分拆引退整体上市布局2008

2008年，整体上市注定成为国企改革的重中之重。整体上市与分拆上市相比，整体上市可从根本上解决上市公司与存续公司的矛盾，使控股股东与中小股东的利益趋于一致，发展上市公司成为所有投资者的共同目标。[编者按]     

上市公司关联交易及其规制

一、上市公司关联交易的种类我国上市公司的关联交易具有形式繁多、关系错综复杂、市场透明度较低等特点,归纳起来主要有如下几种:1.产品购销中的关联交易。一般是指上市公司与控股或非控股股东之间的原料采购、产品销售,以及委托加工、提供后勤服务等。很多上市公司的关联方是上市公司的主要客户,有的上市公司甚至所有的购销业务都发生在关联企业之间。这类关联交易的交易量在各类关联交易中占首位。2.费用负担中的关联交易。有些集团公司部分资产改制上市后,虽然形成了两个独立的法人实体,而实际上是“两个牌子,一套班子”。当股份公司需…     

隧道行为与盈余管理——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究

本文利用"隧道行为"理论解释我国家族上市公司的盈余管理活动。通过对2002-2004年间我国家族上市公司样本的实证检验,结果发现,控制性家族控制权偏离现金流量权的程度越大,公司盈余管理幅度越高。这说明控制性家族有动机操纵盈余以隐藏其掏空公司资源的"隧道行为",从而补充了现有对公司盈余管理动机的研究。     

Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in China*

Under the 1996‐98 security regulations in China, the accounting rate of return on equity (ROE) has to be greater than 10 percent for three "consecutive" years for a firm to qualify for stock rights offers. Despite declining economic conditions during this period, the percentage of firms reporting ROE between 10 and 11 percent is about "three" times that for 1994‐95. This unique regulatory environment provides a natural experimental setting for the empirical assessment of earnings‐management behavior and its consequences. This study examines whether listed Chinese firms manage earnings to meet regulatory benchmarks and whether regulators and investors consider the quality of earnings in their respective regulatory and investment decisions. On the basis of a sample of listed Chinese firms from 1996 to 1998, we observe that managers execute transactions involving below‐the‐line items and use income‐increasing accounting accruals to meet regulatory ROE targets for stock rights offerings. The firms that apply for, but fail to receive, regulatory approval manage earnings more significantly than do firms that receive approval and pair‐matched control firms. Our market study also suggests that investors differentiate the quality of earnings and put less value on earnings suspected of a greater degree of management. Overall, our results imply that the regulatory bodies and investors to some extent make rational adjustments for the quality of earnings.     

Auditor Choice and Its Implications for Group‐Affiliated Firms

We examine which of two opposing financial reporting incentives that group‐affiliated firms experience shapes their accounting transparency evident in auditor choice. In one direction, complex group structure and intragroup transactions enable controlling shareholders to pursue diversionary activities that they later hide by distorting reported earnings. In the other direction, as outside investors price‐protect against potential expropriation, controlling shareholders may be eager to improve financial reporting quality in order to alleviate agency costs. To empirically clarify whether group affiliation affects company insiders' incentives to address minority shareholders' concerns over agency costs, we examine auditor selection of group firms relative to stand‐alone firms. In comparison to nongroup firms, our evidence implies that group firms are more likely to appoint Top 10 audit firms in China, especially when their controlling shareholders have stronger incentives to improve external monitoring of the financial reporting process. After isolating group firms, we find that the presence of a Top 10 auditor translates into higher earnings and disclosure quality, higher valuation implications for related‐party transactions, and cheaper equity financing, implying that these firms benefit from engaging a high‐quality auditor. In additional analysis consistent with our predictions, we find that group firms that are Top 10 clients pay higher audit fees and their controlling shareholders are more constrained against meeting earnings benchmarks through intragroup transactions and siphoning corporate resources at the expense of minority investors. Collectively, our evidence supports the narrative that insiders in firms belonging to business groups weigh the costs and benefits stemming from auditor choice.     

公司治理、转让价格与盈余管理

上市公司在公平原则下进行关联交易可以减少企业之间的交易成本,但上市公司往往会利用关联交易对公开报表中的盈余信息进行调整,从而侵害了利益相关者的合法权益.从上海证券交易所获取上市公司披露的关联方销售总利润这一独特数据,对良好的公司治理结构是否有助于限制管理层通过转让价格操纵盈余进行了实证检验.结果表明,在董事会中有高比例的独立董事或低比例的代表母公司的董事、董事会主席与CEO的职位不相容以及在审计委员会中有财务金融专家的上市公司,不太可能进行转让价格操纵.     

Are Related Party Transactions Red Flags?

This study investigates whether or not related party transactions serve as “red flags” that warn of potential financial misstatement. We hand‐collect related party transactions for S&P 1500 firms in 2001, 2004, and 2007 and find a positive correlation between these transactions and future restatements, suggesting restatements are more likely when a firm engages in related party transactions. The association is concentrated among transactions that appear to reflect “tone at the top” rather than arguably more necessary business transactions. We also find RPT firms pay lower audit fees. However, “tone RPT” firms that subsequently restate pay higher audit fees, providing evidence that auditors recognize the individual restatement risks of these firms. Our results suggest that tone‐based RPTs serve as signals of higher risk of material misstatement.     

Parents’ Use of Subsidiaries to “Push Down” Earnings Management: Evidence from Italy

We find evidence consistent with Italian nonlisted subsidiaries engaging in accrual and real earnings management, so that their listed parents can meet or beat benchmarks. Thus, the parent firm drives the earnings management of the subsidiaries. We identify parents that are more likely to have managed earnings as the ones that avoid a small loss or meet or beat analyst forecast by a few cents. Cross‐sectional analysis reveals that Big 4 auditors mitigate accrual earnings management at the subsidiary level and that family‐owned firms use earnings management through nonlisted subsidiaries mainly to avoid reporting losses. Finally, we find that parent firms communicate earnings management strategies to their subsidiaries using board proximity. Our evidence shows that business groups manage earnings differently from single firms, pushing earnings management down to subsidiaries. It also supports the monitoring role of Big 4 auditors in a business group setting and contributes to understanding financial reporting decisions in family‐owned firms.     

JIT Adoption: The Effects of LIFO Reserves and Financial Reporting and Tax Incentives*

Using matched samples of JIT adopters and nonadopters, we examine the association of JIT adoption with firms' financial reporting and tax incentives, earnings‐management histories, and LIFO reserve levels. We find evidence that adoption decisions are influenced by the interaction of firms' LIFO reserves with their income smoothing, debt covenant, and tax incentives. We also find that adoption is less likely for firms historically engaging in high degrees of earnings management, particularly when such firms have no substantial LIFO reserves. Our study extends earlier research demonstrating a relation between inventory valuation method and year‐end inventory transactions, and documents a relation between earnings‐management incentives and a fundamental supply‐chain design choice.     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

Ill-intentioned or well-intentioned: earnings management and trade credit

The use of trade credit as important short-term financing for firms is increasing. This study explores the differential impact of firm earnings management on trade credit financing under different motives, using A-share listed firms in China from 2009 to 2020. The results show that accrued and real earnings management reduce a firm's trade credit. On the other hand, the classification shifting earnings management increases a firm's trade credit. Accrued and real earnings management are opportunistically motivated, while classification shifting earnings management is non-opportunistically motivated. Moreover, external audits weaken the negative effect of accrued and real earnings management on trade credit and enhance the positive effect of classification shifting earnings management on trade credit, indicating the ‘bilateral matching effect’ between external audits and firms. Finally, financing constraints weaken the impact of earnings management on trade credit.