The Gains from Takeover Deregulation: Evidence from the End of Interstate Banking Restrictions

This paper uses interstate banking deregulation to explore the benefits of takeover deregulation and how these benefits are distributed across different firms. We find large and significant abnormal returns around the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which imply it created $85 billion of value in the banking industry. Consistent with an active market for corporate control allowing beneficial consolidation and providing needed discipline, there is a strong negative relationship between banks' abnormal returns and their prior performance. Consistent with managerial entrenchment limiting takeover discipline, banks with higher insider ownership, lower outside block ownership, and/or less independent boards have lower abnormal returns.     

Banking deregulation and innovation

We document empirical support for a key micro-level channel—innovation by young, private firms—through which financial sector deregulation affects economic growth. We find that intrastate banking deregulation, which increased the local market power of banks, decreased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. In contrast, interstate banking deregulation, which decreased the local market power of banks, increased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. These contrasting effects on innovation also translated into contrasting effects on economic growth. Our study suggests that the nature of financial sector deregulation crucially affects its potential benefits to the real economy.     

Banking deregulation,consolidation, and corporate cash holdings: U.S. evidence

This paper tests the effects of banking deregulation on the cash policies of nonbanking firms in the United States. We document a significant and negative relation between intrastate banking deregulation and corporate cash holdings. We show that the negative relation is driven by financially constrained firms, especially by constrained firms with low hedging needs. Further, we construct indexes measuring the intensity of bank consolidation in local markets. We find that the intensity of in-market bank mergers is negatively related to corporate cash holdings. However, in-market bank mergers in highly concentrated markets tend to be positively related to corporate cash holdings.     

Banking Market Structure, Financial Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data

This paper explores the empirical relevance of banking market structure on growth. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between the level of development of the banking sector of an economy and its long-run output growth. Little is known, however, about the role played by the market structure of the banking sector on the dynamics of capital accumulation. This paper provides evidence that bank concentration promotes the growth of those industrial sectors that are more in need of external finance by facilitating credit access to younger firms. However, we also find evidence of a general depressing effect on growth associated with a concentrated banking industry, which impacts all sectors and all firms indiscriminately.     

Credit supply and capital structure adjustments

Using the staggered deregulation of the U.S. banking industry as a series of exogenous shocks, I study the effect of the credit supply on the speed of capital structure adjustment. I find robust evidence that interstate and intrastate banking deregulation are positively associated with leverage adjustments. Specifically, the speeds of adjustment to target leverage are faster in the postderegulation periods. I also find that the positive effect is driven by firms that are financially constrained, are financially dependent on banks, and have less access to the public debt market and by deregulated banks’ ability to geographically diversify the credit risk.     

Competition and stability in the credit industry: Banking vs. factoring industries

Over the last decade, most credit-industries registered a decline in lending volumes, while factoring industries instead registered a substantial growth in terms of turnover. Surprisingly, only a handful of papers so far investigate factoring companies. Do factoring firms display the same stability levels of banks? Is the competition similar in factoring and banking industries? Is the relationship between competition and stability the same in these industries? Focusing on Italy (one of the largest factoring and banking markets in Europe) and using a unique dataset, we show three main results: factoring companies are (on average) more stable than banks; 2) the stability of factoring companies increase when competition declines (competition-fragility view); 3) the competition-fragility view is weaker in the factoring industry than in the banking industry. Our findings indicate that competition in the Italian credit industry was greater in factoring than in banking.     

银行保险的制度变迁理论分析以及对我国的启示

20世纪80年代以来，无论是一直实施混业经营的欧洲，还是近几年重新走上混业经营之路的美国，银行保险都成为一种潮流和趋势。银行保险业务的产生及发展，既源于微观领域经营环境和竞争环境的变化，也源于宏观领域制度管制的放松和信息技术的迅猛发展，更源于银行保险经济学机理带来的范围经济和协同效益。银行保险作为一种制度创新的产物，更多地体现为从销售渠道创新到业务产品创新，再到组织模式创新的金融一体化的制度变迁过程。本文从制度变迁理论的角度对银行保险的产生动因以及演变发展进行分析，以期对我国银行保险的走向提供借鉴。     

银行保险的制度变迁理论分析以及对我国的启示

20世纪80年代以来,无论是一直实施混业经营的欧洲,还是近几年重新走上混业经营之路的美国,银行保险都成为一种潮流和趋势。银行保险业务的产生及发展,既源于微观领域经营环境和竞争环境的变化,也源于宏观领域制度管制的放松和信息技术的迅猛发展,更源于银行保险经济学机理带来的范围经济和协同效益。银行保险作为一种制度创新的产物,更多地体现为从销售渠道创新到业务产品创新,再到组织模式创新的金融一体化的制度变迁过程。本文从制度变迁理论的角度对银行保险的产生动因以及演变发展进行分析,以期对我国银行保险的走向提供借鉴。     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

The Wealth and Risk Effects of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act (GLBA) on the US Banking Industry

Abstract:   The Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 marks the end of Depression era regulations like the Glass‐Steagall Act of 1933 and Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These acts have restricted banks from securities and insurance underwriting business. This paper examines the impact of the GLBA on the banking industry. We find that the banking industry has a welfare gain from this law. We investigate two different categorizations of the banking industry. We find that Money Center banks followed by the Super Regional banks benefited most from this deregulation. On the other hand, banks that had Section 20 investment subsidiaries gained more than other banks in the second category. The results also show that the exposure to systematic risk for different categories of banks decreased after the passage of this law, which implies that the GLBA is fairly successful in containing the risk that accompanied the act and also created diversification opportunities. For Money Center banks, Super Regional Banks, banks with a section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial subsidiary, a shift in the exposure to systematic risk can explain the overall cross sectional variation in return from the deregulation. In both categorizations we find that larger banks gained more, while the overall explanatory power of profitability is not conclusive.     

Competition from Large, Multimarket Firms and the Performance of Small, Single-Market Firms: Evidence from the Banking Industry

We offer and test two competing hypotheses for the consolidation trend in banking using U.S. banking industry data over the period 1982–2000. Under the efficiency hypothesis , technological progress improved the performance of large, multimarket firms relative to small, single-market firms, whereas under the hubris hypothesis , consolidation was largely driven by corporate hubris. Our results are consistent with an empirical dominance of the efficiency hypothesis over the hubris hypothesis—on net, technological progress allowed large, multimarket banks to compete more effectively against small, single-market banks in the 1990s than in the 1980s. We also isolate the extent to which technological progress occurred through scale versus geographic effects and how they affected the performance of small, single-market banks through revenues versus costs. The results may shed light as well on some of the research and policy issues related to community banking.     

Consequences of Deregulation for Commercial Banking

In recent years, many of the restrictions on banking activities adopted following the banking collapse of the 1930s have been eroded by improvements in technology and high interest rates, which led to increasing direct competition from unregulated institutions. Beginning in the 1970s, the regulatory agencies, state legislatures, and the Congress have moved to liberalize these restrictions. Based on research on economies of scale and scope, the experience of the conglomerate merger movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the observed effects of changes in state laws governing branches and holding companies, foreign experience, and experience in other industries that underwent deregulation, banking deregulation is likely to lead to reductions in the number of banks and increases in their efficiency, geographic scope, and product diversification. Such an outcome is consistent with the survival of a large number and variety of financial institutions and need not endanger the safety of the banking system.     

赶超战略与大银行垄断——基于新结构经济学的视角

改革开放初期,中国有很多资本高度密集的大型国有企业,需要大量资金维持生产运营,若无法获得足够的银行贷款以致资金链断裂而破产倒闭,极易引发动荡。本文研究发现,在当时中国资本稀缺的要素禀赋结构下,为确保“重要而不能倒”的国有企业获得足够的银行贷款而不破产倒闭,不适合采用放开银行准入以促使银行竞争的方式,反而应限制银行准入,控制银行数量。原因在于,放开银行准入增加的仅是中小银行,其资金动员能力有限,与国有企业的规模特性不相匹配,更重要的是,大量中小银行进入会分流大银行的存款,降低大银行的资金动员及服务国有企业的能力,导致国有企业的贷款成本和破产风险因此而上升。本文指出,一个国家的银行业结构内生于该国的经济发展战略。限制银行准入的政策安排通过在金融方面支持国有企业,在改革初期起到了维护国防安全、保障国计民生和维持社会经济稳定的作用,为平稳推动改革创造了条件。     

Diversification of the Banking Firm

Diversification of banks and bank holding companies into nonbank product lines may reduce the risk to banking returns or cash flows provided appropriate portfolio conditions are satisfied. This study of bank and nonbank financial-service firms and nonfinancial corporations over the 1966–1985 period finds evidence consistent with the proposition that individual banking firm risk may be reduced through selected product-line diversification, particularly in the insurance and data processing fields. Moreover, there is evidence of less cash-flow sensitivity of selected nonbank product lines to exogenous economic and financial-market variables compared to banking firms. While public policy continues to insulate banking firms from most nonbank product and service lines, the potential benefits of risk reduction suggest that a careful review of current policy is needed.     

金融服务、外资政策调整与企业出口——基于中国微观数据的验证

基于金融服务是制造业的重要中间品投入,本文研究我国金融服务业外资政策动态变化对下游企业出口行为的影响。理论上,金融服务业外资准入放松有助于提升金融服务中间品的技术和管理水平,直接效果是有助于提升出口企业使用金融服务的多样化和便捷化,促进企业出口。本文采用国家发改委公布的《外商投资产业指导目录》,首次度量了我国金融服务业外资准入政策的动态变化,并使用投入产出表将其与我国制造业企业数据进行上下游关联,有效检验了金融服务业外资政策调整对下游制造业企业出口的作用。结果表明:金融服务业外资政策调整放开有助于提高下游制造业企业出口倾向和收益,存在出口促进作用;管理效率高、出口非技术密集型及资本密集型产品的企业出口对金融服务业外资政策调整的反应更为灵敏;金融服务业外资政策调整放开通过缓解企业融资约束促进企业出口。本文研究显示我国金融服务业外资政策调整放开是推动我国贸易提升的一个重要支撑点。     

Industrial Loan Companies: Where Banking and Commerce Meet

Should commercial firms be prohibited from owning banking institutions? Should the United States remain the only G20 country opposed to the “mixing of banking and commerce”? These questions have assumed new urgency as the Dodd Frank Act of July 2010 imposed a moratorium on the commercial ownership of industrial loan companies (ILCs), which was the last remaining entry point for commercial firms into banking. This paper specifically examines the role of ILCs in America's financial system from its beginnings in 1910 to the present. Special attention is paid to the performance of commercially owned ILCs prior to, during and after the most recent financial crisis. The examination is based upon both survey data and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data, which represents a database of the ILC industry that is the most comprehensive one available to date. The paper also reviews the laws and regulations regarding the mixing of banking and commerce, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of allowing commercial ownership of banks.     

Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU

This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.     

Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry

Proprietary information generated through the process of lendingcan impact the structure of the banking industry. With morecompeting banks, borrower-specific information becomes moredisperse, as each bank becomes informed about a smaller poolof borrowers. This reduces banks' screening ability, creatingan inefficiency as more low-quality borrowers obtain financing.Incumbent banks' information advantage may also create difficultiesfor potential entrants, so that entry should be easier in marketswith high borrower turnover or where entrants have specificexpertise in evaluating credit risks. We draw implications forwhether financial deregulation is likely to increase borrowers'surplus, and what patterns of entry might be observed.     

Who Benefits from Deregulating the Separation of Banking Activities? Differential Effects on Commercial Bank,Investment Bank,and Thrift Stock Returns

We analyze the deregulation impact on commercial banks, investment banks, and thrifts associated with four major events progressively integrating commercial and investment banking activities in the United States during the 1990s. We find that commercial banks are the only group to react favorably to Federal Reserve announcements relaxing firewalls and easing restrictions on commercial bank revenues from investment banking activities. These regulations primarily benefit large banks. The Bankers Trust acquisition announcement of investment bank Alex Brown is associated with increased wealth for each of the three types of financial service institutions. At the eventual deregulation of the financial services industry, with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999, the values of commercial banks and investment banks increase significantly although thrifts are not affected.     

U.S. financial deregulation : Upheaval and promise

Financial deregulation in the U.S. has ample ramifications for international banking. For U.S. based international banks, the deregulation shifts the emphasis back to the now deregulated U.S. market. For foreign banks in the U.S. deregulation is a mixed blessing. One aspect of the deregulation is interstate banking, another is merger across industry lines. Thus Parker, a pen manufacturer, owns several financial institutions including a bank. All this functional integration may be exaggerated. Banks will continue to operate more or less as they have done in the past. The changes will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary in nature, and they will lead our industry from the production of banking services to the production of financial services.