The global financial crisis and the evolution of markets, institutions and regulation

This paper analyses the recent global financial crisis in the context of the dual processes of market development and regulation. It discusses how, in the absence of a globally integrated financial framework, past and present regulations and interventions in reaction to national and global financial crises did not resolve the cross border regulatory arbitrage. The paper discusses how crises often lead to the emergence of new national and international institutions. It also analyses the proposed “new global framework” that needs to be in place if the policy recommendations contained in the G20 communiqué are going to be effectively implemented. The paper argues that unless international agreements are ratified by all nations and become part of national rules and laws, the presence of regulatory arbitrage and the lack of adequate cross border information and data may prevent the global economy from addressing the underlying causes of the recent global financial crisis. The paper also discusses the evolution of central banks and their new role in contributing to global financial stability. The paper argues that the recent global financial crisis has provided a unique opportunity to go beyond economic data and attempt to capture cross border financial data and other information that could assist international and national institutions to measure and manage financial risk more effectively. Finally, the paper discusses “too big to fail” and argues that only an internationally integrated financial system will make large banks global, both when operational and in the event of insolvency.     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

系统重要性银行监管改革进展及对我国的启示

近年来,随着我国银行市场的逐步开放,大型商业银行持续开展综合经营业务,银行在金融体系中的系统重要性不断增强.银行集团的快速发展推动了银行机构与其他类型金融机构、金融市场间的组织融合和业务交叉,同时也对集团风险管理和银行监管制度带来较大冲击.金融稳定理事会、巴塞尔银行监管委员会提出的系统重要性银行评估方法和额外资本要求,以及美国、英国、欧盟对系统重要性银行的监管改革经验做法,对完善我国银行监管制度具有重要的启示意义.     

Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the US and EU before and during the great recession

This paper investigates the links between regulatory arbitrage, financial instability, and taxpayer loss exposures. We model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits from increased leverage and asset volatility at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003–2008. Hypothesis tests indicate that, in both crisis and precrisis years, difficult-to-fail-and-unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Compared to the US sample, safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions are less driven by asset size. Introducing a proxy for differences in government susceptibility to regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. Our findings suggest that authorities in both venues could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on monitoring volatility as well as capital.     

贷款证券化、监管资本套利与资本监管改进

巴塞尔协议的资本充足率指标可以反映银行部门吸收风险损失的能力,但是无法监测和控制银行体系外的贷款总额和累积的信用风险。20世纪70年代的贷款证券化创新导致银行进行监管资本套利,并使得资本充足率监管趋于失效。本文基于贷款证券化下银行贷款余额与社会贷款余额的差异,分析银行监管资本套利的微观机制并提出改进资本监管的建议。     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.     

Bank-specific shocks and the real economy

Governments often justify interventions into the financial system in the form of bail outs or liquidity assistance with the systemic importance of large banks for the real economy. In this paper, we analyze whether idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have effects on real GDP growth. We employ a measure of idiosyncratic shocks which follows Gabaix (forthcoming). He shows that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on US GDP growth. In an application to the banking sector, we find evidence that changes in lending by large banks have a significant short-run impact on GDP growth. Episodes of negative loan growth rates and the Eastern European countries in our sample drive these results.     

影子银行体系监管改革的国际经验及其对中国的启示

全球金融危机过后,影子银行体系的监管改革问题前所未有地成为各国金融当局普遍关注的热点,以美国为代表的发达经济体掀起了一场旨在规范影子银行体系发展的金融监管体制改革。本文的研究表明,过度金融创新以及金融监管的缺失是刺激美国影子银行体系迅速发展的直接原因。然而,危机过后,美国并未简单地采取抑制金融创新的办法加强对影子银行体系的监管,而是通过金融监管机构改革以及提高微观金融数据的采集与分析的办法,规范和引导影子银行体系的健康发展。这种市场化的监管改革思路值得我们借鉴。从影子银行体系的运行机制以及发展来看,中国的影子银行体系与美国存在较大差异,但全面强化宏观审慎金融监管是我国金融监管体制改革的大势所趋。在此情况下,美国金融监管改革的经验值得我们认真总结和研究。最后,本文认为,中国应当继续深化金融体制改革;积极探索现行金融监管框架的改革;加强微观金融数据的收集与整合,完善宏观金融风险预警机制。     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

巴塞尔协议Ⅲ下我国商业银行流动性风险监管研究

近年来,遵照巴塞尔协议Ⅲ,我国的流动性风险监管新规促使我国商业银行优化了优质流动性资产的配置,提高了商业银行抵御金融风险的能力。但是目前我国商业银行的流动性风险监管仍然存在着流动性监管指标因存款增长不足而导致的优化困难、中小型银行流动性风险监管压力持续增加、监管难度因商业银行同方向调整资产负债结构而增加、金融市场存在一定程度的扭曲、流动性监管指标监管效果尚需评估等诸多问题。为进一步完善商业银行流动性风险的监管体系,我国亟需有效引导商业银行完善资产负债配置、引导中小型商业银行实施差异化发展策略、建立差异化的流动性监管指标、建立业务数据动态报备制度、及时更新与修正流动性风险的监管政策等。     

Inflation targeting: Is IT to blame for banking system instability?

In light of the financial crisis, the practice of inflation targeting (IT) has been blamed for authorities’ failure to respond to the increase in financial systemic risk and to the development of asset bubbles. However, utilizing a rich database containing nearly 5500 commercial banks from 70 countries (among which, 22 are IT) for the period 1998–2012, this paper argues that on average, inflation targeting national banking systems (i) are more stable; (ii) possess sounder systemically important banks; and (iii) are less distressed than (or at least as distressed as) other banks during periods of global liquidity shortages. Our results are robust to a series of tests, such as when we compare countries with the same legal origins or control for the delegation of bank supervision responsibility to bodies other than the central bank. Overall, we conclude that IT cannot be blamed for contributing to financial fragility.     

美国金融监管改革法案与其现实的借鉴意义

2010年7月21日,美国总统奥巴马签署了《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》,该法案正式生效。文章对该法案的内容进行了解析,详细介绍了该法案在促进金融稳定、重塑银行业监管格局、加强对大型银行的监管、强化金融消费者权益保护、完善银行业及金融市场基础设施监管等核心内容方面的立法宗旨和具体措施,并进一步阐述了该法案对完善我国金融监管的重要借鉴意义。     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

电子支付与存款准备金调控关系研究

近年来,随着计算机与网路技术的发展,电子支付系统得到普及推广,银行业金融机构之间的关联性不断加强,金融市场流动性风险的控制与管理受到普遍关注。存款准备金率作为金融宏观调控的重要工具之一,不仅要发挥金融市场流动性管理作用,而且要满足银行间资金清算的需要。那么,电子支付信息与存款准备金之间的具体关系如何,是否能够反映金融市场对准备金头寸需求的变化,对存款准备金率宏观调控的实施效果又有何影响,对此进行了研究。     

中国银行业竞争与非金融企业影子银行化

本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。     

Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.