公司为股东担保的法律效力及商业银行的对策建议

现行银行贷款担保中相当比例是公司为股东担保，其法律效力如何直接关系到银行贷款的安全。我国现行的法律规定并未绝对禁止公司为股东的债务提供担保。允许公司为其股东的债务提供担保既是现实经济生活之需要，亦有利于公司自身的发展，对促进债权实现和维护交易安全均具有积极作用，符合现代立法趋势。商业银行有条件地接受公司为股东提供的融资担保，有利于在防范风险的前提下拓展自己的业务领域。本文提出应修改《公司法》第60条第3款和相关法律法规，建立和完善股东表决权排除制度、董事回避制度、股东诉讼制度和担保信息披露制度，以构建和完善我国公司为股东担保制度。     

论一人公司为其股东提供担保的有效性

现行《公司法》有关一人公司为其股东提供担保的规定并不明确。2005年《公司法》允许公司提供担保,但对于一人公司为其股东提供担保的规定并不明确,能否适用、如何适用等问题不断出现,理论与实践均对一人公司担保能力及程序提出了质疑。要实现一人公司为其股东提供担保,即需要厘清一人公司相比于普通公司存在的特殊之处,在理论上对其提供担保的正当性进行强化,同时对可能产生的风险进行防范,在程序方面对担保予以完善。     

控股股东担保、债务融资与资金侵占

以控股股东担保为切入点,在考虑担保的连带责任风险的基础上,构建控股股东通过担保进行资金侵占的理论模型,并以2010-2014年上证A股上市公司为样本进行实证研究.研究显示:控股股东对上市公司担保显著提高了上市公司债务规模,并通过债务融资加大了资金侵占程度;现金流权在担保对债务规模和资金侵占程度影响中具有正向的调节作用,表现为控股股东向较高现金流权公司提供了更多的担保债务从而进行资金侵占.     

全资子公司为母公司担保的思考

目前，银行贷款担保方式中，母子公司之间担保较为普遍。2005年10月27日修订的《公司法》虽然对公司为股东担保作出了规定，但对于公司为股东担保的形式之一——“全资子公司为母公司担保”并不能完全适用。那么，全资子公司是否可以为母公司提供担保呢？     

银行贷款担保制度中存在的问题及建议

银行贷款担保制度在现代经济生活中所起的作用是举足轻重的,但由于我国现行贷款担保制度本身的缺陷和立法不足,大部分中小企业的贷款需求未得到满足,使得贷款担保制度的作用没有得到良好发挥。本文从县域金融机构贷款担保制度的问题入手,分析其存在原因,提出解决银行贷款担保制度的政策建议。     

A公司控股股东资金占用原因及对策研究

近年来,上市公司控股股东资金占用事件频发,损害了公司及中小股东的利益.本文以A公司为例,首先,对该公司控股股东资金占用进行了案例回顾,主要方式是利用违规担保占用资金.其次,进行原因分析,主要包括公司内部治理存在缺陷、外部监管力度不足且违规成本低、担保内部控制执行存在缺陷.本文针对上述问题提出了三点对策:第一,完善公司治理结构;第二,加强外部监管及处罚力度;第三,加强印章管理,落实授权审批制度.     

从担保问题谈上市公司公司治理

作为理性的"经济人",控股股东会通过种种手段在担保事项中获益,而中小股东和债权人才是真正的受害者.本文就目前上市公司对外担保存在的问题进行了分析,并从公司治理的角度入手,提出优化股权结构和完善独立董事制度来维护全体利益相关者利益的建议.     

完善动产担保物权制度 优化金融生态

当前，我国正在制定《物权法》。《物权法》中担保物权制度与金融发展关系最为密切，担保法律环境直接影响金融生态。银行和工商企业普遍反映我国现行担保物权制度偏重于不动产担保，动产担保物权制度薄弱，动产担保物范围太窄，多种动产的担保价值无法发挥，不利于企业融资尤其是中小企业融资，不利于金融产品创新，不利于信贷人权利保护和银行贷款风险防范。因此，在制定《物权法》时，应充分考虑完善动产担保物权制度，促进金融发展和经济长期稳定增长。     

加强信用担保立法 促进信用担保业健康发展

信用担保是指由专门的信用担保机构为中小企业向银行贷款提供保证服务．接受担保服务的中小企心向信用担保机构交付一定担保费用的担保方式；当被担保的企业不履行或不能履行债务时．由信用担保机构对贷款银行代为履行债务。信用担保是保证担保的一种特定形式，但它又与自然人保证和一般法人组织的保证不同。信用担保产生于20世纪二三十年代的工业化国家。     

我国商业银行小企业的融资担保研究——关于第二顺位担保物权在反担保中的具体运用

在小企业信贷业务中，当借款人提供的自有抵押物价值不足以为借款提供全额担保时，银行通常会要求增加融资担保机构作为保证人，同时要求融资担保机构承诺在借款人违约时，放弃法律赋予的物保优先抗辨权，先行履行保证责任，再处分抵押物。在我国现行法律框架下，融资担保机构在向借款人行使追偿权欲处分抵押物时困难重重，不利于保障其追偿权的实现。本文从发展的观点出发，建议在借款人已抵押给银行的财产上设定第二顺位担保物权，对融资担保机构提供反担保，从而解决融资担保机构在履行银行债务之后向借款人追偿难的问题，有利于促进我国小企业贷款市场的发展。     

Does Board Independence Matter in Companies with a Controlling Shareholder?

A number of studies have reported value discounts for listed companies in countries that provide weak legal protection to minority shareholders. Such studies typically attribute these discounts to the ability, and the well‐documented tendency, of controlling shareholders to extract a disproportionate share of corporate resources for “private benefits.” This tendency and the resulting discounts create a dilemma for those controlling shareholders intent on maximizing value for not just themselves, but all shareholders: How can such controlling shareholders assure their minority shareholders that they will not exploit their power to expropriate resources and so eliminate the discount from their companies' shares? This article investigates the possibility that such discounts can be reduced by appointing boards of directors made up of individuals who are independent of the controlling shareholders. Based on the systematic analysis of some 800 companies representing 22 countries, the authors' recent study reports that corporate values are consistently higher when boards are more independent of controlling shareholders—and that this relationship is especially strong in those countries that afford fewer rights to minority shareholders. What is likely to cause controlling shareholders to appoint more independent directors—a change that, after all, effectively limits the controlling shareholders' power and “degrees of freedom”? The answer provided by the authors is that board independence is most likely to be pursued by companies with controlling shareholders that also have major growth opportunities that must be funded mainly with outside equity.     

我国商业银行小企业的融资担保研究--关于第二顺位担保物权在反担保中的具体运用

在小企业信贷业务中,当借款人提供的自有抵押物价值不足以为借款提供全额担保时,银行通常会要求增加融资担保机构作为保证人,同时要求融资担保机构承诺在借款人违约时,放弃法律赋予的物保优先抗辩权,先行履行保证责任,再处分抵押物。在我国现行法律框架下,融资担保机构在向借款人行使追偿权欲处分抵押物时困难重重,不利于保障其追偿权的实现。本文从发展的观点出发,建议在借款人已抵押给银行的财产上设定第二顺位担保物权,对融资担保机构提供反担保,从而解决融资担保机构在履行银行债务之后向借款人追偿难的问题,有利于促进我国小企业贷款市场的发展。     

THE LEGALITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BY-LAW IN DELAWARE: PRESERVING THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Just as some lawyers almost killed the takeover market with the invention of the poison pill in the 1980s, others are now about to reinvigorate it with another legal invention. The “shareholder rights bylaw,” which promises to be the next major legal battleground in the market for corporate control, aims to eliminate the current ability of target company boards of directors to block changes of control by keeping their poison pill defenses in place. The new bylaws require the poison pill (and other defensive measures) to expire automatically whenever the firm receives an allcash offer for 100% of the firm's stock at a price at least 25% above the prebid market price. The firm can keep its poison pill, but only if shareholders vote to keep it after receiving the offer. Although the legality of the share-holder rights bylaw has been challenged as an undue infringement on boards of directors' power to run companies, this article argues that their legality will be upheld for three reasons:

• ? First, shareholder rights bylaws merely reinforce the corporate manager's responsibility to manage the firm to maximize shareholder value.
• ? Second, Delaware and most other jurisdictions give shareholders the specific right to amend the bylaws of a corporation; and the shareholder rights by-law is a straightforward exercise of this explicit right granted to shareholders.
• ? Third, the adoption of shareholders rights by-law does not prevent the board of directors from advising share-holders to vote to reject a takeover bid, nor does it prevent shareholders from giving management the authority to use defensive mechanisms such as the poison pill.

As the article concludes, upholding this right of shareholders to choose whether a poison pill is used to block a takeover is critical to the vitality of the takeover market and, hence, to the preservation of the agency relationship between directors and shareholders. Upholding this right may also prove critical to Delaware's ability to maintain its predominance in the market for corporate chartering.     

《公司法》修订与商业银行信贷债权的维护

新修订的《公司法》放宽了对公司设立与出资的管制，规范了公司的关联交易与对外担保行为，引入了法人人格否认制度，强化了对公司中小股东与债权人利益的保护。本文认为，在新《公司法》框架下，公司信用的基调已从静态的资本信用转向动态的资产信用。对此，作为公司债权人的商业银行，应当确立事前、事中和事后的不同措施，认真做好贷款管理和评价工作。商业银行必须关注客户公司内部治理和对外经营的动态变化，并分析这些变化对公司偿债资产的法律影响。在此基础上，商业银行应充分利用新《公司法》及其他相关法律赋予的权利，有效维护信贷债权。     

《公司法》修订与商业银行信贷债权的维护

新修订的《公司法》放宽了对公司设立与出资的管制,规范了公司的关联交易与对外担保行为,引入了法人人格否认制度,强化了对公司中小股东与债权人利益的保护。本文认为,在新《公司法》框架下,公司信用的基调已从静态的资本信用转向动态的资产信用。对此,作为公司债权人的商业银行,应当确立事前、事中和事后的不同措施,认真做好贷款管理和评价工作。商业银行必须关注客户公司内部治理和对外经营的动态变化,并分析这些变化对公司偿债资产的法律影响。在此基础上,商业银行应充分利用新《公司法》及其他相关法律赋予的权利,有效维护信贷债权。     

上市公司非正常担保问题的实证研究

本文研究了上市公司的非正常担保行为的动机和效果。非正常担保是指上市公司超过自身能力范围之外的担保,包括过度担保、违规担保和连续担保。结果表明,资产负债率更高的公司更有可能参与非正常担保。非正常担保带来了显著的负面效果,它导致公司绩效下降、代理成本上升以及公司投资水平降低。本文对上市公司担保行为的监管具有一定的启示。     

Law and Executive Compensation: A Cross‐Country Study

Companies outside the U.S. use substantially less equity in their compensation mix than U.S. firms. But despite this consistent “cross‐sectional” difference, the pattern of changes in equity‐based pay of non‐U.S. companies over time appears to mirror changes in the pay of U.S. companies. The authors provide persuasive evidence that features of a nation's legal environment help explain major differences in compensation structure across countries. As a general rule, companies in countries that provide greater protection of shareholder rights use larger amounts of equity‐based compensation. And the equity mix also tends to be higher when a country's legal system ensures strict enforcement of the laws that are on the books. At the same time, since the equity mix varies considerably over time within the same legal environment, it is clear that factors other than the legal environment affect compensation structure. The authors report that, after controlling for legal factors, company‐specific variables that proxy for “agency” conflicts—not only between managers and shareholders, but between controlling and minority shareholders as well—also affect the compensation mix in fairly predictable ways. The bottom line of this study is that, although we may have a global market for talent, compensation structures across countries are not likely to converge unless and until the underlying legal protections afforded shareholders converge. At the same time, the effect of agency costs in compensation design for non‐U.S. firms appears to be partly conditioned by the nation's legal system and the entire set of regulatory and other institutions that are affected by it.     

基于法律视角下商业银行贷款核准制的风险分析与控制

贷款担保核准制要求借款人先落实合法有效的担保并经银行核准之后,再对其发放贷款。这一制度存在许多不足之处,如贷款担保核准制容易引发担保合同法律效力的争议与纠纷,容易造成部分抵押、质押担保丧失法律效力,容易产生民事争议与纠纷,可能导致权力寻租和孳生腐败,已办理抵(质)押担保登记却未能核准放款而引起的违约纠纷等问题。鉴于此,作者提出如下风险防范建议:(1)修改现行的贷款核准制,改贷前担保核准为提款之前核准;(2)完善信贷台账管理系统;(3)允许一份合同使用两种编号;(4)尽量签订最高额担保合同;(5)修改《借款合同》附条件生效约定。     

中小企业信贷融资信用担保缺失研究

文章深入分析了国内中小企业信贷融资信用担保缺失现状,指出我国中小企业信贷融资信用担保缺失的深层次原因在于担保体系机制设计不合理,导致担保资源未能充分发挥效用。文章创新地提出应重整体系结构,完全取消政府直接担保机构,并对担保体系发展提出了有益的建议。