Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator's competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behavior can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators' ability to stem panics ex post.     

透明度、信息披露与银行危机

加大银行业的透明度和对银行行为的信息披露有助于防范和化解银行危机,但并不像有些人说的那样万能,因为,银行危机往往反映了严重的宏观经济问题,此外,加大银行体系的透明度和信息披露的力度确实能减少由银行危机带来的损失,并促进银行业迅速复苏。     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.     

Do Financial Markets Care about Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? Further Evidence from China

Corporations increasingly define their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as a part of their business. However, is this trend beneficial to investors? Based on an event study methodology and a sample of Chinese listed companies, we extend the literature on voluntary disclosure by exploring the role of CSR disclosure in reducing stock market information asymmetry, as proxied by share price volatility and liquidity. Our results show that the share price volatility after CSR disclosure is lower than before CSR disclosure; however, the trend is that it decreases first and then increases for three months following disclosure. Stock liquidity also significantly improves after CSR disclosure; however, it increases first and then decreases. Additionally, by dividing CSR disclosure into economic (hard) disclosure and generic (soft) disclosure, we find that the reduction in information asymmetry is higher for hard disclosure than soft disclosure, suggesting that although CSR disclosure does indeed have an impact on investors’ behaviour in China, an economic‐based disclosure contributes more substantially. Finally, to better understand the characteristics of the Chinese financial market, we also explore the role of marketisation with results that show that the effect in reducing information asymmetry is greater for companies located in a region with a higher degree of marketisation.     

Transparency,Value Creation,and Financial Crises

This article reports the findings of the authors' recent study of the impact of the level of corporate transparency on shareholder value creation during periods of financial crisis. Their sample consists of the companies comprising Spain's IBEX 35 stock index during the ten‐year period 2000–2010. The study uses three different measures of earnings management (EM) as inverse indicators of the quality of disclosure and carries out fixed effects regressions that adjust for firm and industry characteristics, two periods of financial crises, and the passage of time. The main findings of the study are that (1) companies with lower disclosure quality have generated less value for their shareholders over long time periods and that (2) the shareholders of companies that were more aggressive in managing their earnings experienced greater wealth destruction during the two financial crises of the last decade. Given the still unfolding impact of the recent global financial crisis, as reflected in the current debt crisis in Western European countries, the authors' study reinforces the importance of the current debate over the benefits and costs of increasing the regulation of financial markets, especially in the areas of transparency and disclosure requirements.     

我国货币政策透明度的实践及问题研究

提高货币政策透明度有利于加强货币政策的可信性和有效传递,因而受到了各国的重视。我国货币政策透明度的实践及实证分析结果表明,提高货币政策透明度具有积极的效用。然而,当前总体上我国货币政策透明度还不高,还存在着目标不透明、信息披露不完全、决策不公开等一系列问题。因此,如何提高货币政策透明度成为当前央行亟待解决的问题。     

Does Voluntary Disclosure Improve Stock Price Informativeness?

According to theory, comovement in stock prices reflects comovement in the fundamental factors underlying the values of stocks. Recent theory contends that stock price comovement can be driven by information markets or the informational opacity of the firm. To the extent that voluntary disclosure reduces information acquisition cost and enhances firm transparency, we predict that enhanced voluntary disclosure reduces stock price comovement. We provide evidence in support of this prediction using analyst evaluation of firm disclosure policy. Overall, our evidence supports the effectiveness of firm disclosure policy in increasing the amount of firm‐specific information contained in stock returns.     

货币政策透明度与通货膨胀的关系研究——基于PVAR模型的实证检验

通过使用PVAR模型对11个发达国家1999～2009年的中央银行货币政策透明度与通货膨胀的动态关系进行的实证分析表明:11国中央银行货币政策透明度的提高显著地降低了通货膨胀水平,但这种效应存在滞后;反之,通货膨胀对于货币政策透明度没有显著影响。因此,提高货币政策透明度、加强中央银行的信息披露从长期看对治理通货膨胀具有积极的作用。     

Corporate disclosure quality and institutional investors' holdings during market downturns1

We examine institutional investors' responses to corporate disclosure quality conditional on market states. Transient institutions react more positively to corporate disclosure quality during market downturns than during normal market periods, as better disclosure practices lower information asymmetry and are thus associated with reduced uncertainty, enhanced liquidity, and weakened impacts of crises, which are the most desirable features of assets during market downturns. Dedicated institutions are insensitive to corporate disclosure quality in both normal and market downturn periods, as they have access to inside information and rely less on public disclosures. Their reliance on corporate disclosures in market downturns, however, increases sharply after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which removes their inside information advantage. We further show that corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetry to a greater extent in market downturns than in normal market periods and that transient ownership in market downturns provides strong price support and stabilizes return volatility, whereas dedicated ownership does not possess such functions. Finally, we show that the results are not simply driven by endogeneity and are robust to alternative corporate disclosure quality measure and to the control of other determinants of institutional holdings.     

交易透明度与信息揭示制度：国际趋势与启示

由于经济文化环境、交易制度、市场结构，技术模式和投资者分布等方面的差异，不同交易所在交易信息揭示的种类，数量和程度方面有所区别。本文首先总结了采取指令驱动的主要交易所的交易信息揭示制度和市场透明度，在比基础上分析了交易所交易信息揭示制度变革与市场透明度的发展趋势．希望能对我国证券市场交易信息揭示制度的发展提供一点有益的借鉴和启示。     

政策连续性与商业银行系统性风险

本文基于2007年第一季度至2019年第四季度中国A股32家上市银行非平衡面板数据,从“冲击”和“传染”两个维度考察了政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响。实证结果表明,政策连续性程度的提高通过降低银行个体风险和减弱银行个体与系统的关联性进而显著降低了银行系统性风险。进一步分析发现,政策连续性降低了银行被动风险承担水平而非主动风险承担意愿,减弱了银行间接关联程度而非直接关联程度。异质性分析表明,经济下行和货币宽松时期,政策连续性对系统性风险的降低效应更大,并且本身破产风险越高、信息透明度越低的银行,其系统性风险受政策连续性的影响越大。区分不同类型的政策发现,货币政策、财政政策、汇率与资本项目政策的连续性上升均能显著降低银行系统性风险,其中货币政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响力度最大。     

货币政策、信息披露质量与公司债务融资

信息透明度是影响企业债务融资成本的重要因素。本文以2002-2010年深圳A股公司为样本,研究发现:信息披露质量较好的公司在货币政策趋紧时获得了更多的银行借款,且随着融资需求的增大,获得的银行借款更多,银行借款的利率也更低。结果表明,较高的信息披露质量有助于降低银企间的信息不对称程度,增强企业获得银行贷款的资信度,降低企业的债务融资成本,从而减轻货币政策变动对企业债务融资带来的不利影响。     

年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率

既有文献较少从银行视角关注年报风险信息披露的经济后果。银行更有能力解读年度风险信息,银行利益也更直接受到年报风险信息的影响,银行贷款利率更能体现年报风险信息披露的经济后果。本文基于2008-2017年单笔银行贷款利率数据的研究发现:总体上我国年报风险信息披露降低了银行贷款利率,说明我国年报风险信息披露更符合趋同观假说。中介效应检验发现:我国年报风险信息披露通过提高信息透明度,降低银行风险感知水平进而降低了银行贷款利率,即信息质量和风险是我国年报风险信息披露影响银行贷款利率的不完全中介。进一步分析发现:我国年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率的负相关关系主要体现在货币政策紧缩组、非国有企业组以及公司治理水平较高组。本文首次研究银行贷款利率与年报风险信息披露的关系,有助于丰富风险信息披露文献和银行贷款文献。     

Bank stability and transparency

A number of recent policy initiatives have called for enhanced transparency of banking firms. While the hope is that enhanced transparency may improve incentives ex ante, it is less clear whether transparency is necessarily a good thing ex post, when a bank might have hit hard times and provision of information could have a destabilising effect. This paper provides a synopsis of these different effects and provides some new, bank-level evidence in an attempt to clarify empirically whether, taking ex ante and ex post effects together, transparency is likely to reduce or increase bank stability. The analysis suggests that, on balance, transparency reduces the chance of severe banking problems and thus enhances overall financial stability.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Optimal Release of Information By Firms

This paper provides a positive theory of voluntary disclosure by firms. Previous theoretical work on disclosure of new information by firms has demonstrated that releasing public information will often make all shareholders worse off, due to an adverse risk-sharing effect. This paper uses a general equilibrium model with endogenous information collection to demonstrate that there exists a policy of disclosure of information which makes all shareholders better off than a policy of no disclosure. The welfare improvement occurs because of explicit information cost savings and improved risk sharing. This provides a positive theory of precommitment to disclosure, because it will be unanimously voted for by stockholders and will also represent the policy that will maximize value ex ante. In addition, it provides a “missing link” in financial signalling models. Apart from the effects on information production analyzed in this paper, most existing financial signalling models are inconsistent with a firm taking actions which facilitate future signalling because release of the signal makes all investors worse off.     

The economic rationale for the nature and extent of corporate financial disclosure regulation: A critical assessment

The regulatory framework for corporate financial disclosure has been the subject of a large literature, most of which has focused on the economic rationale for disclosure requirements. This extant economic analysis has not led to any definitive conclusions regarding the necessity for disclosure regulation nor has it provided public policy guidance as to the nature and extent of required corporate financial disclosure. It is evident that broader-based analysis and research incorporating relevant social and political (as well as economic) factors is necessary to gauge appropriate public policy for financial information disclosure.     

Sovereign liquidity crises: Analytics and implications for public policy

This paper offers an analytical framework with which to assess some recent proposals for strengthening the international financial architecture. We develop a model of sovereign liquidity crises that reflects two sources of financial stress – weak fundamentals and self-fulfilling expectations. We examine the nature of the underlying co-ordination game and investigate the properties of the unique equilibrium. In so doing, we are able to characterise the welfare costs of belief-driven crises, which we find to be potentially significant. We also evaluate some recent policy proposals including prudent debt and liquidity management, capital controls, greater information disclosure, and the efficacy of monetary policy tightening in the midst of crisis.     

Strategic Complementarity,Stabilization Policy,and the Optimal Degree of Publicity

This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study's key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications; specifically, in the presence of optimally designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare.