会计师事务所审计行业专门化对公司代理成本的抑制分析

作为降低公司代理成本的一种制度安排——独立审计,其自身质量的高低会影响这种作用的发挥。公司代理成本可以大致分为公司股东与管理层之间的管理层代理成本、控股股东与中小股东之间的控股股东代理成本以及股东与债权人之间的债务代理成本。通过分析发现,会计师事务所审计行业专门化对这些都有较好的抑制作用。     

会计师事务所审计行业专门化对公司代理成本的抑制分析

作为降低公司代理成本的一种制度安排——独立审计,其自身质量的高低会影响这种作用的发挥。公司代理成本可以大致分为公司股东与管理层之间的管理层代理成本、控股股东与中小股东之间的控股股东代理成本以及股东与债权人之间的债务代理成本。通过分析发现。会计师事务所审计行业专门化对这些都有较好的抑制作用。     

公司治理结构与多元化经营

2003年我国721家A股上市公司的多元化和相关财务数据表明,近一半的企业选择或维持多元化经营.经研究发现:股权结构对公司多元化经营决策和多元化绩效有显著影响:非国有控股公司较多实行多元化经营并且多元化绩效较好;控股股东持股比例越高,越不可能实行多元化经营,多元化绩效也越好.董事会特征、管理层持股对多元化经营决策和多元化绩效基本没有影响.公司负债率越高,实行多元化经营的可能性越大,多元化绩效越好.研究结果支持代理理论,多元化经营是控股股东谋取私利的方式.     

管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验

本文考察了业绩报酬敏感度对企业内部现金流与投资行为之间关系的影响。文章发现投资现金流敏感度不仅受到内外部信息不对称导致的融资约束的影响,而且受到了股东-经理代理问题的影响,但是信息不对称理论的解释力度相对较强。另外,投资现金流敏感度和管理层业绩报酬敏感度之间的关系受到公司控股股东所有权性质的影响。     

终极控股股东特征、多元化经营与融资约束

本文以2008-2012年为研究区间,探讨了多元化经营对缓解融资约束的作用,并研究了表征控股股东代理成本的股权特征对多元化经营缓解融资约束功能的弱化作用。研究表明,多元化经营在一定程度上可以缓解公司的融资约束问题,但在控股股东代理成本的影响下,缓解融资约束的作用被弱化了。     

上市公司财务治理中的代理问题分析

本文认为上市公司财务活动围绕资金供求而建立的代理关系包括:债权人与公司股东之间,公司股东与管理当局之间,控股股东与中小股东之间以及国有股自身的代理问题。本文对以上四种代理关系的表现形式以及代理问题形成的原因作出了理论解释,对研究如何降低代理成本具有积极作用。     

机构投资者独立性对代理成本的影响

本文以2006~2009年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,在根据投资目标对机构投资者进行类型划分的基础上,探讨了机构投资者独立性对代理成本的影响。研究发现,独立机构持股比例越高,公司管理层代理成本和控股股东代理成本越低,而非独立机构持股对两类代理成本影响有限。在进一步考虑了控股股东持股比例的影响后,发现独立机构持股在控股股东偏好控制权私有收益的情况下更能降低管理层代理成本,表明在此情况下,独立机构对管理层自利行为有更大的监督作用。     

资本结构、股权结构与中小企业成长性——基于中小企业板数据的实证分析

本文以中小企业板上市企业2004-2009年数据为基础,以资产市值账面比衡量企业成长性,分析了我国中小上市企业资本结构和股权结构对成长性的影响。实证结果表明,资产负债率和长期负债率均对成长性具有显著正向影响,意味着较高的负债能降低外部权益成本,有利于中小上市企业的成长。成长性与股权集中度显著正相关,表明股权集中有利于股东对管理层进行监督,降低代理成本并能促进中小上市企业成长。管理层持股比重的改变对中小上市企业的成长性无显著影响。     

我国上市公司的股权结构与盈余质量:现实问题与理性思考

一、股权结构、代理冲突与盈余质量:一个分析框架由于契约的不完全性,导致在不同的股权结构下会产生不同的代理冲突,如分散股权结构下的管理层与外部股东的代理冲突,以及股权集中下的大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突.如何缓解代理冲突,使代理成本最小?有效的解决办法是建立一套激励机制和约束机制.激励机制即通过适当的激励制度安排实现管理层与外部股东的利益或者大股东与中小股东的利益一致,也即激励相容,从而使得管理层或大股东从企业价值最大化而不是自身利益最大化出发.约束机制是指通过适当的监督机制来约束管理层或大股东从自身利益出发而与企业价值最大化的目标相悖.     

中小板市场混合所有制上市公司绩效研究

<正>一、引言在公司治理中,制衡股东能够对控股股东和管理层履行监督职能,抑制控股股东的机会主义行为,有利于提高企业绩效(Shleifer and Vishney,1986)。Maury和Pajuste(2005)的研究还发现,利益一致的大股东会通过合谋而非采取监督的方式掠夺中小股东财富。Gomes和Novaes(2005)的研究认为,多个大股东之间的制衡有利于解决企业经营决策中的两类委托代理问题,既能够约束管理层的自利行为,也有助于保护中小股东的利益,是一     

关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究

对股改前后影响现金股利水平的公司治理变量研究表明,虽然股改矫正了现金股利与增长机会之间的关系,使股改后当存在增长机会时,公司会减少现金股利的发放,但是我国上市公司的现金股利尚未呈现出全流通资本市场上作为降低控股股东与中小股东代理成本工具的现金股利政策应有的特征,突出表现在股改前后影响上市公司现金股利支付水平的股权结构变量并未发生变化,股改前后都存在股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例及第二到第十大股东持股比例与每股现金股利呈显著正相关、而流通(非限售)股比例与每股现金股利呈显著负相关的关系。     

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

Abstract:  Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders.     

Entrenched controlling shareholders and the performance consequences of corporate diversification in Taiwan

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the value/performance effects of corporate diversification in an emerging market. Prior evidence on this issue is still mixed. The present study adds the role of entrenched controlling shareholders into this issue. We argue that when controlling shareholders have larger excess board seats control rights, they have higher ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders through corporate diversification. Using a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2003, we find that controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control is negatively associated with the market valuation of corporate diversification. Consistently, we also document that highly diversified firms run by more entrenched controlling shareholders have lower future financial performance than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our findings imply that corporate diversification is not necessarily harmful or beneficial for firms. We conclude that the agency problem arising from the excess board seats control rights owned by controlling shareholders is an influential factor leading to negative performance consequences with regard to firm diversification.     

控制股东的掏空行为与公司的股权结构及公司价值——基于双层委托代理模型的分析

本文构建了一个小股东、控制股东和经理人之间的双层委托代理理论分析框架来分析我国上市公司中同时存在的两类代理问题:股东与经理人的利益冲突以及控制股东与小股东的利益冲突。在此基础上着重研究了控制股东掏空行为与公司股权结构及公司价值之间的关系。通过分析指出:(1)均衡状态下,公司的所有权集中程度由公司股东所受投资者法律保护程度决定。随着投资者法律保护程度的增加,小股东最优的投资数量也会增加,公司的所有权结构趋于更加分散。(2)在公司的现金流所有权结构确定的情况下,由股东和经理人之间的信息非对称性引起的股东和经理人之间的利益冲突会减少公司价值,使得控制股东和小股东的利益均受到损害。控制股东掏空资产收益的比例随着其自身现金流所有权的增加而减少,随着其控制权和所有权之间的分离程度而增加,随着投资者法律保护的增加而减少。(3)相对于公司中仅仅存在股东和经理人之间的利益冲突的情形,控制股东的掏空行为会进一步降低公司的价值,而且降低的程度会随着控制股东的控制权和所有权的分离程度的增加而增加。(4)当控制股东完全不能进行掏空时,即使小股东仍然面临由于公司中的第Ⅰ类代理问题引起的利益损害,但均衡时,由于控制股东和小股东之间不存在利...     

Minority Protection and Dividend Policy in Finland

This paper highlights some theoretical arguments and empirical results on whether legal‐based minority protection affects corporate cash dividends in Finland. The Company Act in Finland states that shareholders having one tenth of all shares can demand a so‐called minority dividend, which is half of the profit of the fiscal year, yet not more than 8% of the equity. Minority dividend, as in Finland, is rarely used in EU countries. I find, that minority protection is a better influence over managerial control than controlling shareholders having absolute voting power. When there is no controlling shareholder and coalition costs are lowest, minority protection in Finland is better than minority protection in mandatory dividend countries. Combining strong shareholder rights (as in the USA) and minority dividend (as in Finland) could decrease agency costs both vertically and horizontally.     

中小股东仅能“搭便车”么?——来自深交所社会公众股东网络投票的经验证据

本文利用深交所的社会公众股东网络投票数据,研究了中小股东参与网络投票与公司决策的影响因素和经济后果。结果表明,大股东代理问题严重、机构投资者持股比例较高的公司,中小股东的网络投票参与率较高;中小股东的网络投票参与率与公司股票异常回报正相关,并且这种关系随着大股东代理问题的严重程度而增强。与小股东利益更为相关的股权分置改革提案中,中小股东投票参与率更高,并且这种更高的投票参与率在股权分置改革提案中能为中小股东增进财富。     

Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada

Abstract:   This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. A large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. This is achieved through the concurrent use of dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. Many suggest that these ownership structures involve larger agency costs than those imposed by dispersed ownership structures and that they distort corporate decisions with respect to investment choices such as acquisitions. We find that average acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns for our sample of 327 Canadian transactions are positive over the 1998–2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets and cross‐border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance mechanisms (outside block‐holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have a positive influence on the acquiring firm performance. Further, the positive abnormal returns are greater for family firms. We do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance. These results suggest that, contrary to other jurisdictions offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, i.e., market participants do not perceive families as using M&A to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. We do find a non‐monotonic relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm abnormal returns. Ownership of a majority of the cash flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders may undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases.     

Retail minority shareholders and corporate reputation as determinant of dividend policy in Australia

This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies. While retail investors are typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived in academic literature to have limited influence on corporate dividend decisions, casual empiricism suggests the contrary. We hypothesise that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers' incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the propensity to manage for corporate reputation is positively related to the degree of retail shareholder base. We find empirical evidence of managers of Australian companies catering to the retail investors' preference for dividends when setting dividend policy, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of these retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and franking credits.     

Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand

This study investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. The empirical results, based on a unique database of Thai firms, do not support the hypothesis that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets. In fact, the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as the ROA and the sales–asset ratio. Since most of the firms do not implement control mechanisms to separate voting and cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders might be self-constrained not to extract private benefits. Otherwise, they would internalize higher costs of expropriation from holding high stakes. The controlling shareholders' involvement in the management, however, has a negative effect on the performance. The negative effect is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder-and-manager's ownership is at the 25–50%. The evidence also reveals that family-controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher ROA, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder.