机会主义、价格诚信与制度安排

价格失信行为的根本原因在于人性中的机会主义倾向,而机会主义行为得以实施必需两个条件:第一,机会主义行为产生的前提是信息不对称.现实社会中,信息是不对称的,一般说,卖方比买方具有更多关于商品价格方面的信息,卖方就可能利用自己的信息优势欺骗买方;第二,机会主义行为产生的动机在失信收益大于失信成本.所以,通过相应的制度安排,消解机会主义产生的前提--信息不对称、抑制机会主义产生的动机--较高的收益预期,是减少和杜绝价格失信的关键.     

“经济人”的行为困境

"经济人"的自利心是人类社会发展的内在动力,个人理性的追求其利益最大化的自由行为往往会无意识地、客观地增进公共利益。但是,由于"经济人"的自利心和有限理性,其行为往往会产生诸如机会主义、群体的无理性、X无效率、经济市场失灵和政治市场失灵等困境。要克服"经济人"的行为困境,必须发挥"看的见的手"的作用。     

知识与跨国公司进入模式选择——一个不同于交易成本的框架

交易成本理论在分析企业进入模式的选择时,将机会主义作为关键的假设,但这种分析忽略了知识是以各种方式结合在一起的,这种结合减弱了机会主义的威胁,因此一种不同于交易成本的框架——知识为基础的框架建立起来了。这个框架将知识为基础的能力区分为建构能力和组合能力,它们影响着进入模式的选择。企业的知识战略对进入模式的选择也有直接或间接的影响。     

会计政策选择行为特征研究

由于市场上存在着机会主义，导致以节约交易费用的企业出现；企业的出现又把机会主义从市场带到企业内部。为减少企业内的机会主义，必须让人力资本分享剩余索取权。由于人力资本特殊的产权特征，导致企业出现产权的公共领域，剩余分享没有客观的标准，只能对人力资本采取各种激励措施。而奖金和期权收益与盈余大小以及股价高低直接相关，从而激发管理者操纵盈余的动机。这样为减少企业内部的机会主义，又把机会主义从生产领域带到计量领域。     

政府机会主义与民营企业成长——中国转型期民营企业成长的政治经济学分析

政府的机会主义行为不仅使大量的投资机会难以实现,而且内生企业的腐败行为。只有建立有效的法治,才能从根本上改善民营企业的生存和发展环境;有效的法治不仅能维护社会公正,而且还能实现经济活动的效率。此外,有效的法治对经济活动和政府行为的规范所起到的长期激励效应,使法治在一定程度上只是起一种威慑作用。但法治作为市场经济体制的制度基础,它的建立是一个长期的过程,因此政府机会主义以及腐败等还将在我国转轨时期长期存在,从而民营企业成长环境的根本改善也将是一个长期的过程。     

企业风险承担与内部控制:从“灵丹妙药”到“机会主义”

企业风险承担水平受到多种因素影响,但从内部控制角度进行研究的文献尚不多见。本文运用迪博内控质量指数,研究了风险承担与上市公司内部控制质量之间的关系。研究结果显示,上市公司存在着仅满足内部控制监管需求而虚化内部控制效用的“机会主义”倾向,且这种倾向在国有企业和股权集中度高的企业中表现得更为显著。本文的结论为进一步加强内部控制建设、促进企业良好发展提供了政策启示。     

Environmental Antecedents of Channel Opportunism

While the notion of opportunism has intrigued marketing channel researchers for almost two and a half decades, our understanding of the antecedents of opportunism is still unclear. Specifically, while literature has suggested several antecedents to opportunism, including environmental uncertainty, none of the extant studies have gone deeper than the broader construct of environmental uncertainty. This study examines the relationship between the feeling of uncertainty attributed to competitive environment and opportunism in marketing channels. Using the data collected from managers responsible for distribution channel management, this study finds that while unfairness in competitive environment results in opportunism, severity of competitive environment does not. In fact, competitive severity results in a stronger sense of trust in channel members. The implications of these findings for channel managers are also discussed in this study.     

Determinants of the acquisition of listed versus unlisted firms in different legal and institutional environments

The aim of this article is to analyse the determinants of the decision to acquire unlisted rather than listed firms in different legal and institutional environments. We estimate a probit model considering the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) announced by European listed firms (19 countries) that acquires worldwide listed or unlisted firms (36 countries) in the period 2002–2007. Our results show that managerial opportunism is a determinant in the acquisition of listed firms, occurring with greater probability in acquiring countries with low shareholder and minority shareholder protection. Information asymmetry is another relevant determinant that promotes the acquisitions of unlisted firms. Furthermore, the less developed the capital market in the country of the acquired firm, the greater the probability of acquisitions of unlisted firms. This article contributes to the M&A literature by showing that in addition to managerial opportunism and information asymmetry, the legal and institutional environments in both the acquiring and the target countries are also relevant aspects explaining the decision of whether to acquire listed or unlisted firms.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.     

The Franchise Fulcrum: The Legal System's Contributions to Research about Power and Control in Business Format Franchising

Franchisors’ need for power over their franchisees and control of their brands underpins their apparent opportunism. Through Australian and United States examples, we identify how the legal system's levers facilitate examination of opportunism within franchising. We suggest that the balance of power and control within franchising is ever changing. We suggest that all legal systems provide rich and often overlooked data for business researchers investigating franchise relationships. They should be accessed to help franchising stakeholders frame research propositions and to understand and meet twenty-first century challenges such as those posed by Gen Y and online retailing.