The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships

To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a “shift parameter”—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism–collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Franchise Fulcrum: The Legal System's Contributions to Research about Power and Control in Business Format Franchising

Franchisors’ need for power over their franchisees and control of their brands underpins their apparent opportunism. Through Australian and United States examples, we identify how the legal system's levers facilitate examination of opportunism within franchising. We suggest that the balance of power and control within franchising is ever changing. We suggest that all legal systems provide rich and often overlooked data for business researchers investigating franchise relationships. They should be accessed to help franchising stakeholders frame research propositions and to understand and meet twenty-first century challenges such as those posed by Gen Y and online retailing.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.     

Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Relations: New Insights from Quantitative Synthesis

After more than two decades of empirical research examining opportunism, a wide divergence of empirical findings regarding opportunism's antecedents remains. The need for more theoretically practicable and managerially actionable insight into the identity, nature, and scope of the antecedents to opportunism is clear. As such, a meta-analysis of the opportunism literature was conducted to (a) investigate the role of six antecedents (dependence, formalization, centralization, control, uncertainty, and relational norms), (b) resolve the disparate relationships' magnitudes and directions, and (c) identify moderators that might explain the disparate effect sizes. Findings suggest extant research findings are affected by socially desirable response bias; the particular operationalization of constructs, for example, whether measured opportunism is actual or perceived or whether the study omitted key antecedents; and whether the sample included firms offering products or services. Theoretical and managerial implications are developed and discussed.     

论混合组织及其治理原则

市场、企业和介于它们之间的混合组织是现代市场经济最基本的三种经济组织形式,混合型组织利用了市场与企业的优势,研究这种混合型组织对于我们更好地理解市场经济的运行有重要意义.文章首先区别三种组织形式,接着分析混合组织的特点,最后提出了混合组织的治理原则.     

Technological opportunism and firm performance: Moderating contexts

Technological opportunism is a sense-and-respond capability of firms with respect to new technologies. This research examines the effect of technological opportunism on firm performance from the dynamic capabilities' perspective, and how such an effect depends on relevant firm and/or market contingencies. Analyzing data from a variety of Taiwanese manufacturing industries, the authors find that technological opportunism has a positive effect on firm performance. The technological opportunism–firm performance link is negatively moderated by market orientation and network externality, and positively moderated by technological turbulence. These results confirm the underlying theme of the dynamic capabilities approach to technological changes and contextual (environmental and organizational) relevance. The finding that technological opportunism and market orientation fail to produce any synergistic impact implies that technological opportunism is a more influential source of a firm's competitive advantage.     

Examining the Nomological Network of Opportunism: A Meta-Analysis

Opportunism has prompted several orientations to the study of inter-firm interaction. Some research maintains that opportunism is an exogenous construct, whereas other research implicates opportunism as a mediator of the relationships between organizational properties and organizational effectiveness. Yet another stream of research argues that the assumption of opportunism precludes researchers from investigating collaborative governance. To examine the merits of each perspective, this study employs meta-analytic techniques and structural equation modeling to assess the nomological network of opportunism research. The analysis of 684 effect sizes extracted from 262 publications supports two of the three orientations. Implications of the findings and future research directions are discussed.     

组织间关系中机会主义治理机制的博弈分析——以ASP外包关系为例

有效机会主义治理机制是维持组织间诚信合作的基础，这些机制主要包括：选择伙伴与改变伙伴偏好、设计惩罚与奖酬的激励机制、依靠隐性的社会关系合同、完善信息获取与共享机制等。首先应着力选择诚信的伙伴或增强伙伴的诚信偏好，但仅此而已是不够的，有必要借助激励相容的显性合同与隐性关系合同的共同治理。同时，有效的治理需要有用的信息，因此信息获取与共享机制是关键，这种机制还通过影响参与方获得重复交易机会的方式来抑制机会主义行为。     

Investors Facing Opportunistic Governments: Is it Really Good to “Know the Market” before Investing?

When a government cannot commit to future policies, investors face the risk of opportunistic behavior in addition to uncertain market conditions. We show that although reducing market uncertainty is sometimes essential for investment, it may aggravate problems of opportunism. The better informed the investor is before investing, the more information the government can infer from observing that investment takes place, in turn enabling more efficient rent extraction. This signaling effect can dominate; if the investor receives "too accurate" information before investing, the only equilibrium is the one in which no investment occurs.
JEL classification : D 82; L 51     

政府或有负债的多维度理论解析

现阶段我国政府或有负债的产生有多方面原因:既有客观原因如公共风险的存在,也有主观原因如财政调整过程中的政府机会主义行为。不仅如此,政府或有负债的产生还受制于政府的内部财政能力约束和外部财政压力约束,而预算编制中的收付实现制为政府或有负债的产生大开制度之门,使得政府能够以政府担保为主要载体来进行间接融资,导致政府或有负债的过度积累。只有在对政府或有负债产生原因进行全面、客观的理论解析后,我们才能有针对性地给出控制政府或有负债积累的相关措施。