论我国地方财政运行中的道德风险问题

在我国财政分权改革中,地方政府逐渐成为相对独立的公共实体。由于我国现行体制下,上级政府对下级政府、中央政府对地方政府的隐性财政担保关系缺乏有效的风险约束机制,引致了地方财政运行中道德风险蔓延,提高了我国的财政风险。防范地方政府道德风险需构建风险约束机制,并在改革进程中进一步完善财政管理体制。     

Business-to-Business Negotiations: The Role of Relativism,Deceit, and Opportunism

Purpose: Studies examining the impact of relativism and deceitful tendencies on unethical negotiation tactics have yielded inconsistent results; some studies report a positive relationship, some negative, while some others report a nonexistent relationship between these constructs. These inconsistencies suggest that there may be intervening variables mediating the effects of these factors on unethical negotiation tactics. We propose that opportunism plays an important role in determining the effects of these two antecedents on business managers' perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics.

Method: An Internet-based survey was administered to a sample of managers at U.S. firms engaged in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modeling techniques were used to evaluate the mediating role of opportunism between deceitful tendencies and relativism on questionable negotiation tactics.

Findings: The analysis supports the hypothesized role of opportunism as a mediating variable. Opportunism was found to play a significant role in mediating the relationships of both relativism and deceitful tendencies on attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics.

Contribution: In addition to the theoretical contributions suggested here, this article includes suggestions for minimizing the likelihood that a negotiation partner's relativism and deceitful tendencies will negatively impact business negotiation.     

Concurrent sourcing,governance mechanisms,and performance outcomes in industrial value chains

We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in‐house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis‐à‐vis an external supplier and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

新制度经济学视角下保险理赔难的原因与对策研究

保险理赔难近年已经成为消费者投诉的一个重点,制约中国保险业健康发展。通过使用制度经济学的方法,分析其原因主要就是理赔制度的不完善和监督制度的低效率。通过完善保险理赔和保险公估制度,建立全国信用征信体系等措施,有助于解决理赔难的问题,促进保险业的健康发展。     

预算机会主义、预算治理构造和预算审计——国家审计嵌入公共预算的理论架构

各国的国家审计在公共预算中的作用呈现不同特色.沿着预算机会主义、预算治理构造到预算审计这个逻辑路径,建立一个关于国家审计在公共预算中作用的理论架构,并以美国和中国作为案例来验证这个理论构架,具有重要意义.各个国家针对预算机会主义会有一个由预算文化、预算制衡和预算问责组成的预算治理构造,预算审计属于预算问责,预算审计如何嵌入预算治理构造的决定因素是剩余预算机会主义,剩余机会主义决定预算审计体制、预算审计重点和预算审计模式.     

转型时期中国品牌崛起的制约因素研究

改革开放30多年来,中国实现了经济大国的崛起,但是,崛起过程中"中国品牌"成了短板。通过企业价值导向、政经环境、文化传承以及管理人才等角度分析后发现,机会主义的企业价值导向从目标设定上背离了品牌发展的方向,不成熟的政治经济环境是约束品牌成长的背景变量,实用主义的传统文化让中国品牌迷失了方向。此外,中国缺乏商界领袖等管理人才也是制约中国品牌崛起的重要因素。     

Promotion and Prevention Contracts in Distributor–Supplier Relationship Using Matched Dyadic Data

ABSTRACT

Purpose: This article aims to introduce and distinguish two features of contract design – prevention and promotion contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism within the distributor–supplier relationship. It also examines the moderating role of ex post contract enforcement strategies.

Methodology/approach: The authors test the proposed theoretical model by collecting matched data from distributors and suppliers in China. Moreover, partial least squares regression is used to analyze the data and test the hypothesis model.

Findings: The results show that a prevention contract leads the distributor to vigilantly avoid mistakes and punishments, thereby deterring him from behaving opportunistically. Alternatively, a promotion contract motivates the distributor to make an effort to attain potential long-run payoffs instead of short-term profits, subsequently restraining his opportunism. Overall, the promotion contract is more effective in curbing distributor opportunism than the prevention contract. In addition, the inhibitory effect of a prevention contract on opportunism is reinforced along with a severe contract enforcement strategy. By contrast, a promotion contract effectively mitigates opportunism with a swift contract enforcement strategy.

Originality/value/contribution: This study untangles two distinctive features of contract design – prevention-framed and promotion-framed contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism management. This study also provides a profound understanding of contract effectiveness by revealing the interaction effect between ex ante contract design and ex post contract enforcement.

Research implications: Researchers are encouraged to explore contract effectiveness from a framing perspective. In particular, ex post contract enforcement strategies should be included in research frameworks related to contract governance. Suggestions for further research on the effects of prevention and promotion contracts on different forms of opportunism are also proposed.

Practical implications: This article provides several insightful implications for managers in designing and enforcing contract in business-to-business marketing. Managers can strategically achieve control and motivation effects by consciously making framing decisions in the contract design, further curbing opportunistic behaviors. Moreover, managers can select a contract enforcement strategy in accordance with the contract type to maximize the effects of the specific contract.     

Institutional investors’ information seeking and stock price crash risk: nonlinear relationship based on management’s opportunistic behaviour

This paper examines the influence of management’s opportunistic behaviour on the relationship between institutional investors’ visits and stock price crash risk. We find that the relationship between visit frequency and stock price crash risk is inverted U-shaped because of management’s opportunistic behaviour aiming at avoiding the negative impacts of visit. Institutional investors’ visits raise stock price crash risk when visit frequency is low and it can reduce crash risk just when visit frequency is high enough. This nonlinear relationship is more significant when management’s opportunistic behaviour is highly motivated and the implementation space is larger.     

Rogues and Deviants: a game-theoretic perspective on opportunism in strategic alliances

ABSTRACT

This research examines how relational factors, such as monitoring, relative alliance identity (RAI), and trust, influence opportunism and, consequently, alliance performance. The authors suggest that the strategic alliances literature would benefit from recognising that opportunism does not always originate from the firm (rogue opportunism), but can also originate from individual employees (deviant opportunism). Hypotheses are tested in a multi-method approach within a business simulation and a cross-sectional sample of alliance executives. The results demonstrate a U-shaped relationship between trust and opportunism; however, monitoring moderates the relationship such that at high levels of trust, opportunism is practically non-existent. Further, results indicate that employees’ identification with the alliance impedes opportunism. Additionally, both types of opportunistic behaviours negatively impact the performance of partner firms and alliances.     

政府审计对预算违规的作用：抑制还是诱导？——基于中央部门预算执行审计数据的实证研究

预算执行审计本来是抑制预算机会主义行为的一种制度安排,如果制度安排不当,则可能诱导预算机会主义行为。理论分析表明,政府审计对于公共部门预算违规究竟发挥抑制作用还是诱导,是由预算违规的审计发现率、审计处理率和审计处罚率共同决定的,审计处罚率是关键变量,预算单位是否违规是根据政府审计机关的审计发现率、审计处理率和审计处罚率来做出策略性选择。根据中央部门预算执行审计的数据分析表明,预算执行审计不是抑制了预算违规,而是诱导了预算违规,产生这个结果的主要原因是审计处罚没有力度。