股票期权激励计划的披露与经理的机会主义行为

《上市公司股权激励管理办法》（试行）和《国有控股上市公司（境内）实施股权激励试行办法》出台后,经理股票期权作为一种激励机制有了法规的指导,但这种理论上激励相容的机制设计现实中可能由于经理人的机会主义行为而无效。文章以我国上市公司2006—2007年的经理股票期权激励计划首次披露事件为样本,分析了经理利用信息优势选择信息披露内容和时间影响股价,进而影响股票期权行权价格确定的机会主义行为,实证研究的结果验证了研究假设,借此提出对我国经理股票期权实施的借鉴意义。     

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Friendship,not altruism: an economic theory with cross-cultural applications

Friendship is both ubiquitous and economically important, but neglected in the economic literature. We provide a definition of friendship supported by anthropology research that we believe is plausible, widely accepted, and distinct from altruism. This motivates a game-theoretic model of friendship that provides a characterization of how friendship in a bilateral relationship can explain cooperation in a finite-horizon setting without the aid of altruism or pro-social preferences. We highlight the difference between two key equilibria of our model: opportunistic friendship that is short-lived and driven by material support, and sustained friendship that is long-lived and is distinguished from opportunistic friendship by the provision of support without the expectation of return. Opportunistic friendship seems more likely in environments characterized by economic uncertainty such as in developing countries or immigrant communities. We provide cross-cultural examples of friendship that are consistent with the conditions underpinning opportunistic versus sustained friendship equilibria.     

董事高管责任保险与审计费用增加:监督、激励还是纵容?——基于中国A股经验数据的实证研究

董事高管责任保险的引入引起审计费用显著增加,既可能是监督、激励效应所致,也可能是机会主义行为所致,研究清楚到底是哪一种原因导致审计费用增加,对认识董事高管责任保险的治理职能、加强公司治理机制建设等均具有重要意义。基于沪深交易所上市公司2003—2017年的数据,实证检验了董事高管责任保险对审计费用的影响。研究发现,董事高管责任保险的引入将显著增加上市公司的审计费用支出,且审计费用支出的增加是因为保险人积极履行监督行为、追求更高的审计质量所引起的,而非是其引致的机会主义行为所导致的。进一步研究发现,董事高管责任保险与审计费用之间存在显著的正向交互效应,即在较差的外部治理环境中董事高管责任保险的监督激励效应更为显著。这一研究对董事高管责任保险与审计费用的关系有了全新的认识,也为董事高管责任保险的推广提供了经验支持。     

政府竞争:行政区经济运行中的地方政府行为分析

从政府竞争的角度,为行政区经济形成构建了一个政府行为分析框架.通过对政府竞争和博弈三个层面的考察,揭示区域经济发展中的各层级政府间互动关系,对行政区经济形成的深层次原因提供较为系统的解释.     

Transaction Costs of Entrepreneurs as a Deterrent of Housing Construction Development in Russia

Nowadays realization process of investment and construction projects is not always effective because of imperfection of institutions regulating construction, high investment risks and, as a consequence, increase transaction costs. The facts of the objective existence of transaction costs in the economy, including housing construction, are researched in the article. We have determined that the transaction costs significantly affect the cost of construction, reduce profit entrepreneurs, and indirectly increase the shortage of housing in Russia. Such parts of modern economics as neoclassical economics and institutional economics are methodological basis of the paper. Logical, economic and legal （institutional）, socio-economic approaches were used during the research of transaction costs function. The authors used the complex of ideas and different methods of sociological and economic analysis that allowed deepening the importance of institutional state regulation of business activity in housing construction area. The classification of transaction costs creation was worked out; this model unlike well-known models considers the most important parts of transaction costs which really exist in business activity of construction companies nowadays; implementation of the model allows calculating and predicting this kind of costs in business. Recently Russian government returns to the questions about efficiency of production （increase of labor productivity, efficiency and profitability of production）, therefore attention to the reduction of transaction costs is going to increase profits and efficiency.     

“机会主义”还是“道德行为”?——履行社会责任公司的盈余管理行为研究

企业社会责任履行及信息披露,既可能是一种负责任的道德行为,也可能是一种掩饰包装的机会主义行为。一方面从企业履行社会责任的动机出发,考察履行社会责任公司的盈余管理程度;另一方面以企业社会责任为调节变量,考察企业履行社会责任在盈余管理对企业价值影响中的作用。实证研究发现,企业履行社会责任程度与盈余管理程度负相关,且企业履行社会责任能够正向调节真实盈余管理对企业价值的负面影响,说明我国企业履行社会责任是一种获得投资者认可的道德行为。     

Governing local supplier opportunism in China: Moderating role of institutional forces

China provides a vast and prominent manufacturing base, so curtailing its local supplier opportunism represents a primary concern for local and foreign buyers. Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines how regulatory uncertainty and relationship structure moderate the role of contracts and trust in restricting local supplier opportunism in China. An analysis of 293 buyer–supplier dyads in China reveals that contracts are more effective in deterring supplier opportunism when regulatory uncertainty is high. In addition, contracts help curtail opportunism more in domestic, compared with international, buyer–supplier relationships, whereas trust is more effective in restricting supplier opportunism in international relationships than in domestic ones.     

Drivers of importer trust and commitment: Evidence from a developing country

This study investigates the interrelationships between antecedents of importers' trust and commitment to their foreign suppliers in an Asian country. This area has been under-researched in comparison to exporters' behavioral perspectives as well as in comparison to developed countries. A theoretical model is developed based on theories of transaction cost (TC) and the internationalization process (IP), and studies examined regarding the context of relationship trust and commitment. The model is tested using SEM on a sample of 238 importers in Bangladesh. The findings suggest that importer trust leads to commitment but that foreign supplier's opportunistic inclination affects both their trust and commitment. Overall, the findings indicate that cultural similarity, effective communication, knowledge and experience, opportunism and environmental uncertainty are vital antecedents of trust and commitment. The findings have important implications for academics and practitioners.     

Managing Opportunism in Value-Added Supply Chains: Lessons From Organics

In recent years there has been an increasing demand for specific characteristics in food products pertaining to origin, quality, health, and environmental factors. Due to the credence nature of many products, it is difficult to determine if products reflect the traits under which they are marketed. Cheating through misrepresentation and unauthorized practices presents a threat to the development of identity-preserved production and marketing (IPPM). In Canada, value-added IPPM systems have not been highly formalized except for the organics sector, but new traits from biotechnology may lead to greater market segmentation. Through interviews with organic supply chain stakeholders, we can achieve a better understanding of the efficacy of formalized quality-control regulation by examining characteristics of these supply chains that are susceptible to opportunism.